Nineteen-year-old Bá Gado still remembers the chaotic night of 30 October 2022.
Motivated by the successful Kuje prison break led by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a joint team of jihadists (from Nigeria and the Sahel) stormed the Wawa military detention facility in a bid to free their captured comrades. Soldiers repelled the attack, but for Mr Gado and his community, that night marked the beginning of a nightmare that would engulf the hundreds of communities surrounding the Kainji National Park.
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A year earlier, the warning signs had already appeared. Rangers working with the park stumbled into a group of bandits during a routine patrol. One of them, Tanko, was killed, while several others were wounded, and their patrol vehicle was set ablaze, according to multiple sources in Wawa.
Gripped by fear, the park management suspended operations, leaving vast stretches of protected forestland exposed to armed groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates—Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi-Biladis Sudan, commonly known as Ansaru.
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Since then, Kainji, Nigeria’s first national park, which once served as a sanctuary of biodiversity, has steadily transformed into a conflict zone. While bandit kingpins like the late Ali Kawaje and the venomous Dogo Gide entrenched themselves in the Zugurma sector, a jihadist cell led by Mallam Mamuda took control of the Borgo sector, exploiting locals and targeting security forces.
What was once a conservation haven has become what locals, including park rangers, described as a “battlefield.”
Before and after 2012 Boko Haram schism
Al-Qaeda’s footprint in Nigeria could be traced back to mid-2009 when the late Abubakar Shekau, the successor of Boko Haram founder Muhammed Yusuf, sought its monetary and weaponry support through Abou Zeid, a commander of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) who was later killed in Mali in 2013.
Experts said that Boko Haram under Mr Shekau received support, funds, training and weapons from AQIM. However, Mr Shekau’s increasing brutality, particularly his indiscriminate targeting of Muslims, strained relations with al-Qaeda. By 2012, AQIM severed ties with Mr Shekau, paving the way for its rival faction, Ansaru, which broke away [from Boko Haram] a year before under the leadership of Khalid Al-Barnawi.
Ansaru, at the time, was operating from Birnin Gwari and other areas surrounding the Kamuku National Park in Kaduna, north-western Nigeria. But it went under the radar in 2016 following the arrest of its leader. It resurfaced in January 2020 after killing at least six soldiers in the convoy of a traditional ruler. But before its violent resurgence, two jihadi experts, Jacob Zenn and Caleb Weiss, found that Ansaru had embedded itself in criminal activities, blurring the lines between jihadism and banditry.
Adopting the playbook of its networks in the Sahel, the group exploited the herders’ grievances to its advantage, recruiting the aggrieved herders and forming alliances with bandit kingpins like Messers Gide and Kawaje.
Ansaru was involved in high-profile attacks and kidnappings, such as the Abuja-Kaduna train attack and Kuje prison break. The attack was in collaboration with the Sadiku-led Boko Haram faction and some bandits.
From Benin to Nigeria: The Infiltration of al-Qaeda into Kainji forest
When park patrols were suspended in 2021, the vacuum created gave room for armed groups to spread unchecked across Kainji’s vast landscape.
In their study, James Barnett & Ahmed Rufa’i referenced an internal memo by African Parks Network, recounting how some groups of turbaned Sahelian jihadists approached a park ranger and a staff member of W National Park in northern Benin.
The experts said the men suspected to be members of JNIM from Burkina Faso “were not looking for a fight with the park ranger that day…” Their aim was “reaching northwestern Nigeria.”
Given the timing and direction of their travel, the experts said the JNIM fighters were “likely” passing through Benin in order to reach Nigeria and link up with Ansaru, with the aim of pledging “bay’ah (an Islamic oath of loyalty)” to al-Qaeda.
Subsequently, locals observed cross-border movement of more armed people with the demeanour of the Sahelian terrorists.
“Our people close to the border with Benin Republic observed that more terrorists, including their wives and children, came in and out of the park area,” a resident of Kemanji, one of the terrorised Kwara State villages around the park, told PREMIUM TIMES.
A similar pattern of border movement was noticed around Luma and Babana, near Wawa in Niger State.
Soon, the terror group led by Mr Mamuda started infiltrating villages from its hideout in the Kainji park.
“They promised to fight kidnappers terrorising our people and even gave unhindered access to farmlands and fish ponds in the reserved forest,” Yunusa Idris, a resident of Kaima local government in Kwara State, said. “They also gave access to illegal loggers.”
But the mutual benefits did not last long. The group turned on its host after security operatives invaded its enclave and arrested its members in urban cities. It subsequently accused farmers, loggers and fishermen of spying for the military.
That marked the genesis of its violent campaign.
In several audio messages obtained by this reporter, the group promised to launch a war against the community, labelling them as enemies. Following the audio messages that went viral in communities around Kwara and Niger states, the group attacked Kemanji and Duruma villages (in Kwara) and Luma in Niger State.
Mamuda or Ansaru?
Before the recent covert operation that led to the arrest of its leaders—Abu Bara’a and Mahmud al-Nigeri— locals knew the group as “Mamuda.”
However, there are diverse opinions about the group’s affiliation. Some experts linked it to Darul Salam, an isolated group evicted from Niger State in 2009. However, the recent covert operation revealed that the group is identified as Ansaru.
Before this operation, many jihadi researchers with whom our reporter has been finding an answer to the question of the group’s affiliation believed that it was linked to JNIM. Although there was no evidence that JNIM operates in Nigeria, the Sahelian group has claimed attacks near Nigeria’s border with Benin.
An independent jihadi researcher, Brant Philip, told PREMIUM TIMES that the Mr Mamuda-led group could have a “peaceful relationship with JNIM as their territorial bases occupy the same area around Kainji reserve and lake.”
Mr Philip said cross-border activities like transporting and trafficking of weapons and fuel around the border area could be taking place between the groups.
Taiwo Adebayo, a Lake Chad Basin researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), shared a similar view, disputing claims that the Mamuda-led group is linked to Darul Salam.
“The group is largely Ansaru,” Mr Adebayo said. “There are possibilities that some remnant of the Darul Salam joined forces with Boko Haram’s Sadiku in Shiroro, Niger State, after they were dispersed in Niger.”
Mr Adebayo said the leader of Darul Salam was made to sign an undertaking that his group would not take part in any violence after his arrest in 2009.
“When [another] Darul Salam resurfaced in Nasarawa and was dislodged, the leader came out publicly to deny his involvement,” Mr Adebayo continued. “So there is no clarity of what Darul Salam is, and there is also not enough evidence to link the [Mamuda-led] group to them.”
Ribadu’s crackdown and Ansaru’s leadership arrests
The recent covert operation that led to the arrest of Abu Bara’a and Mahmud al-Nigeri, the leaders of the Ansaru, was officially confirmed by National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu on 16 August.
Mr Ribadu, whose office has recorded tremendous counterterrorism successes since his appointment by President Tinubu, described the arrests as part of a broader counterterrorism strategy aimed at dismantling jihadist networks operating in Nigeria’s forest reserves.
Security experts believe the capture of these commanders marks one of the most significant blows to Ansaru. However, concerns remain that their dispersed foot soldiers, if not curtailed, could regroup or return to banditry, further deteriorating the security situation in the area.
From Wawa to Kamuku, the story of Nigeria’s forests is no longer about biodiversity but survival. Unless local grievances are addressed and cross-border security strengthened, the once-safe parks like the Kainji and Kamuku risk becoming the next Sahelian stronghold of al-Qaeda and Islamic State, including their affiliate—ISWAP and Lakurawa.
