ANALYSIS: Why jihadist takeover of a Sahelian capital is unlikely

Insecurity has risen sharply in the Sahel in recent months. Between late May and early June, major attacks claimed by Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeted various locations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

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This resurgence underscores the two groups’ adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counter-terrorism strategies implemented by the Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) military-led governments. Consequently, some analysts are concerned about the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall under jihadist control – drawing parallels to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by the terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

However, there are critical contextual distinctions between the two scenarios. Unlike HTS, which has consistently pursued regime change to position itself as a political-religious alternative, JNIM and ISGS show no intent to seize power in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou.

Rather, their strategies emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries where they mediate local conflicts, enforce norms and collect taxes. This underscores their comparatively limited operational capacity. JNIM and ISGS primarily operate in remote rural areas, using light weapons such as rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars. They also utilise motorcycles, improvised explosive devices and weaponised civilian drones.

Although they have taken and temporarily controlled towns in the interior, such as Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to sustain a prolonged siege and occupation of a major city. Their strength lies in mobility and local knowledge rather than the capacity to occupy and govern territory for long periods.

HTS, by contrast, developed a structured military force with centralised command and tactical units capable of coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The group had sustained access to sophisticated weaponry through well-organised transnational supply lines.

The fall of Damascus represented the culmination of a broader regime-change dynamic set in motion by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to varying degrees, by some Western and Gulf countries. For a while, HTS capitalised on key cross-border corridors – particularly with Turkey – that enabled the steady influx of foreign fighters, medical aid, munitions and advanced weapons systems.

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No comparable geopolitical architecture exists in the Sahel. While weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed groups, there is no declared international effort aimed at toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Although AES leaders frequently accuse foreign actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the region, open-source data offers little evidence of this. Even Algeria, whose role in northern Mali has occasionally been ambivalent, has never sought to overthrow the government in Bamako.

Another point of distinction is the internal dynamics of state militaries. The fall of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and ultimately Damascus occurred within just two weeks. This was primarily due to the limited resistance by the Syrian Army, weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating living standards.

In contrast, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian countries are increasing. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally resistant to jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Furthermore, having assumed political power, AES military leaders have entrenched their authority within the state apparatus, bolstering their responsibility and accountability.

Also, the rise of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian population and economic collapse, further aggravated by international sanctions. Disillusioned by Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime, many Syrians viewed HTS as either a lesser evil or, in some cases, a more favourable alternative.

The Sahel situation is starkly different. Although hardline Islamist ideologies have found some traction in urban centres, public sentiment in the capital cities remains hostile towards jihadists who are perceived as instigators of violence, instability and national suffering.

For now, these factors together render the capture and sustained control of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces improbable. JNIM and ISGS will likely restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation tactics.

As history shows, however, this does not make these cities immune to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was triggered by military setbacks in the north. Similarly, Burkina Faso’s January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny prompted by escalating casualties among security forces.

Considering the AES countries’ protracted military transitions and constrained political environments, further upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of security forces cannot be ruled out. This could have unpredictable consequences for the Sahel and West Africa at large.

To avoid this, AES governments must acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised approach to terrorism. While increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures haven’t incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world’s epicentre for terrorism for the second consecutive year, accounting for half of all global casualties.

The youthful appearance of the assailants in the foiled 2 June Timbuktu attack should be a wake-up call to AES strategists. It reflects a generation of children deprived of schooling due to chronic insecurity, and whose families lack access to income, justice and essential social services. These factors are potent drivers of recruitment into armed groups, and cannot be solved through military means alone.

AES governments need a coherent, region-wide counter-terrorism strategy that goes beyond military interventions. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin’s disengagement and reintegration programmes, Mauritania’s religious dialogue initiatives, and Algeria’s non-kinetic approach. Equally important is the need to engage with communities stigmatised by counter-terrorism operations, fostering trust and reducing the risk of recruitment.

Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Economic Community of West African States could bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capacity to reduce the threat posed by armed groups.

Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel could descend into prolonged fragmentation, with profound consequences for West Africa’s stability.

Djiby Sow, Senior Researcher and Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).