ANALYSIS: Trump’s Africa Policy: Strategy or shakedown?

Amid a turbulent start to the year and the emergence of the ‘Donroe Doctrine’, global policymakers are adjusting to an increasingly muscular, interventionist United States (US) intent on setting the rules.

The doctrine is highlighted in the 2025 US National Security Strategy as a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine that aimed to assert US geopolitical dominance across the Western Hemisphere. The implications will undoubtedly reverberate globally. Africa is no exception, even though it receives just three paragraphs in the strategy.

As Niall Ferguson recently observed, this moment represents a ‘back to the future’ return to great-power competition, with Washington and Beijing as the primary poles. Africa is no stranger to such rivalries. The continent bears the scars of Cold War proxy conflicts and colonial competition, and again risks becoming an arena for competition over its resources, markets and geostrategic locations.

Compounding this is Washington’s increasingly à la carte approach to multilateralism. By selectively engaging with, or bypassing, international institutions, the US is eroding the credibility of the global governance architecture. The underlying message is clear: might is right, and institutions that constrain US state action are expendable.

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In this emerging order, the strong set the rules and the weak absorb the consequences. For African states, with limited (albeit varying degrees of) power and leverage, there is cause for concern. Strategic agility, diplomatic dexterity and a clear-eyed assessment of national interests are needed.

Most African states simply cannot play the game of the great powers of old, and the one currently being championed by Washington. Accordingly, many will remain rule takers (not makers) as US foreign policy abandons all pretences. Even for the few African countries that can individually leverage their power on the world stage, their room for manoeuvre will likely narrow.

The more pernicious implications may be counteracted if African states band together to take advantage of their collective weight. However, greater fragmentation is just as likely an outcome, as countries may prioritise tit-for-tat trade and security deals with external actors.

African leaders’ main conundrum will be how to avoid abandoning the continent’s collective long-term peace and development agenda in favour of unsustainable short-term material gains. Identifying the macro-level drivers of US interest in Africa will be vital in talks.

In an era of declining trust in the global political and financial system, economic policy has increasingly been framed through a national security lens. This shift began during President Donald Trump’s first term, accelerated through the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, and continued under former President Joe Biden.

Now, under Trump 2.0, the deglobalisation and derisking agenda is turbocharged in what the Financial Times describes as a return of ‘resource imperialism.’

Inevitably, Africa emerges as a strategic theatre because of what it can supply. The US’s main economic interest will be securing critical mineral value chains – cobalt, lithium, copper, rare earths and graphite – in the race against China to dominate future industries including semiconductors, electric vehicles and batteries.

Although Mr Trump’s rhetorical emphasis remains on reviving 19th-century fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) for US energy dominance, the underlying industrial rivalry with China is forward-looking. Beijing already leads in clean energy technologies and mineral processing, forcing Washington to focus less on climate leadership and more on controlling inputs.

This logic will shape where Washington intervenes economically. It will likely concentrate on resource-rich mineral belts – from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia to Namibia, Mozambique and Guinea – rather than broader trade integration or governance and institutional reform.

Crucially, the mode of US engagement will also change. Rather than moral positioning or institution building, economic intervention will likely take the form of short-term, bilateral and transactional dealmaking.

Access, offtake agreements and security guarantees will be prioritised over development finance, regional value chains or long-term industrial policy. As US-China rivalry deepens, Africa’s role in the global economy will be determined by how it positions itself in increasingly securitised and contested supply chains.

On the security front, Mr Trump’s self-styled identity as a dealmaker and peacemaker will shape intervention choices, particularly when quick, low-cost and low-commitment, visible ‘wins’ are possible. Africa offers several such opportunities.

Peace processes may increasingly reflect bilateral quid pro quo arrangements in which peace is bartered for political access or resources – rather than institutionally anchored settlements. The DRC-Rwanda accords reveal the playbook that will likely be used in other conflict flashpoints. US intervention may also target states needed to safeguard critical mineral value chains and maritime trade routes, particularly focused on the transatlantic.

Finally, the resurgence of Islamist militant activity in parts of Africa provides a third entry point for US security interventions. Although the National Security Strategy cautions against long-term commitments, Islamist threats allow for quick, affordable engagements that could evolve into deeper geopolitical and economic influence.

Recent US airstrikes coordinated with Nigeria against militants in the country’s northwest illustrate the approach Washington may use: bilateral, targeted, short-term – and outside the scope of regional, continental and international peace and security frameworks.

There may be some upside for certain African states, as the rules of the game are much simpler if countries are willing to accept Mr Trump’s worldview. Governments prepared to bend the knee are likely to be rewarded with economic deals that can facilitate immediate material gains for political elites.

The downside is that in doing so, countries cede their sovereignty and national priorities. They may lose domestic political support, alienate other longstanding partners, and further weaken the international rules-based order.

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For African states especially, this means jeopardising the continent’s collective peace, security and development agenda, which can only be achieved through deeper regional integration.

To advance Africa’s integration in the face of geopolitical headwinds blowing in from Washington, its leaders must band together in pursuit of a common vision. Otherwise, history may repeat itself.

Priyal Singh, Senior Researcher, Africa in the World, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Pretoria and Ronak Gopaldas, Director, Signal Risk and ISS Consultant

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).