Since the beginning of 2026, Algeria has stepped up its diplomatic outreach to Niger and Burkina Faso in an attempt to reassert its role in the Sahel. Relations with the three Alliance of Sahel States (AES) members – Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali – had deteriorated after Algerian forces shot down a Malian drone near their shared border in April 2025.
All three AES confederation countries condemned the incident as a hostile act and withdrew their ambassadors after Algeria recalled its envoys from Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou for consultations. Tensions subsequently escalated between Bamako and Algiers, with both countries closing their airspace and trading sharp exchanges during the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025.
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To rebuild its foothold in the Sahel – which it views as both a natural extension of its sphere of influence and geopolitical strategy – Algeria is leading with economic engagement. The process began with back-to-back visits by the country’s Energy and Mines Minister, Mohamed Arkab, to Niger in January and Burkina Faso in February.
Beyond sectoral agreements, Algiers backed its outreach with tangible commitments, announcing a CFA50 billion ($88 million) programme to modernise Burkina Faso’s mining and energy infrastructure, and the donation of a 40-megawatt power plant to Niger. The latter is a significant gesture towards a country that relies on Nigeria for more than 70 per cent of its electricity supply.
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In Niger, discussions also covered the development of the Kafra oil block in the country’s northeast, which is strategically important to both countries. The Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, whose construction was recently announced as imminent, stands at the centre of this energy diplomacy.
Algiers’ outreach also aims to preserve its regional influence amid growing Moroccan initiatives. Rabat is promoting King Mohammed VI’s Atlantic Initiative, designed to provide landlocked Sahelian countries with access to the ocean, as well as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline, presented as an alternative to the Trans-Saharan project backed by Algeria.
These efforts by Algeria have paved the way for the restoration of formal diplomatic relations. On 12 February, Niger’s ambassador returned to his post in Algiers, while his Algerian counterpart was instructed to resume duties in Niamey. Nigerien President Abdourahmane Tchiani’s state visit to Algiers on 15-16 February, leading a large ministerial delegation, expanded cooperation to infrastructure, health and training.
Amid the rapprochement with Niger and Burkina Faso, Algeria’s diplomatic impasse with Bamako persists, with Malian authorities denying reports of an imminent return of their ambassador to Algiers. The growing ties between Algeria, Niger and Burkina Faso highlight the delicate balance within the AES between alliance solidarity and national interests.
The alliance took shape under external pressure, as the three countries drew closer in response to the threat of a military intervention in Niger by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following the July 2023 coup. The three then aligned their foreign policies around a sovereignist posture, marked by a break with Western partners and a closer relationship with Russia. Mali played a leading role in driving this shift.
The geopolitical environment has also become less constraining for the AES’s military governments. The break with ECOWAS is now complete, five-year transition timelines to 2030 are in place, the European Union is recalibrating its approach, and the United States is engaging through a more transactional diplomacy. In this context, AES states may feel less compelled to maintain tightly aligned diplomatic positions.
Although the confederal treaty allows member states to conclude agreements with third countries, heads of state adopted an additional protocol on diplomatic coordination at the second AES summit in December 2025. The protocol, however, is not public.
It appears unlikely that Niamey and Ouagadougou would have re-engaged Algiers without prior consultation with Bamako. Such a step would risk weakening the confederation’s cohesion and exposing divisions over sensitive issues, particularly security and energy.
Mali’s deep mistrust of Algeria is closely tied to national security concerns. For Bamako, the dispute goes beyond the drone incident. Malian authorities accuse Algeria of meddling in the country’s north, including through contacts with armed groups. Against this backdrop, many Malians would be suspicious of their allies maintaining close relations with Algiers, which some also accuse of supporting terrorist groups active in the border region.
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The normalisation process underway with Niger and Burkina Faso could eventually create the conditions for a thaw between Algiers and Bamako. A broader rapprochement between Algeria and the three AES capitals would reflect clear strategic realities.
Algeria is a pivotal actor in the Sahel. It shares more than 2,280 km of porous borders with Mali and Niger, and faces many of the same challenges, including terrorism, cross-border crime and irregular migration. Reopening channels of dialogue would serve pressing security, economic and political interests for all.
Framing engagements with Algeria as an AES initiative could offer Mali a politically acceptable pathway. Presented as a collective decision among allies, it would be consistent with the sovereignist posture that underpins the AES project. If formally spearheaded by one of its members, such as Niger, the move would show that AES solidarity can translate into tangible diplomatic action.
Such an initiative would also strengthen the confederation’s institutional standing at a time when its ability to coordinate member states is under scrutiny. It would give the AES an opportunity to show that it can bring its members into alignment and act as a collective diplomatic actor on regional issues.
Hassane Koné, Djiby Sow and Rahinatou Leïla Salia, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa, and the Sahel
This article is published with the support of the Danish and Dutch governments and the Bosch Foundation.
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
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