A review of the 4D framework should thus, first, be moderated in scope; secondly, take cognisance of the country’s limited power capability, and shrinking space in the comity of nations; and thirdly, focus pointedly on the most critical issues to Nigeria’s overall wellbeing. The first is the expansion of infrastructure, attraction of foreign investment, and promotion of external trade in all its dimensions, including in the creative space where Nigerians are doing extremely well globally, yet the State remains tentative in harnessing the attendant soft power potentials.
Conceptual Characterisation
Foreign policy is a complex pot pouri of ideas, impulses, perspectives, and objectives, which every country is compelled to engage. It is not just that no country exists as an island on its own, but none has the leeway to choose its neighbours. The situation is made particularly challenging because, while at best a country may help in shaping the nature of its external environment, no nation, no matter how powerful, is in full control of the dynamics therein. It is in order for nations, and political regimes, to make sense of the maze of data waiting to be dealt with, and issues of interests to be handled in the external domain, that foreign policy thrusts are established. Such seek to prioritise foreign policy currents, placing them in some form of hierarchical order, vis-a-vis the allocation of resources, in its multiple dimensions.
To make the best of these challenging circumstances and realities, every state tends to concentrate resources mostly on subjects and issue-areas with ramifying effects across the entire spectrum of its foreign policy. Invariably, such thrusts also reflect the preferences and orientation of the state authority that has constitutional responsibility over foreign policy. It is so because the foreign policy of a nation – when the façade is off – is owned by such authorities of state constitutionally empowered to superintend it. In the Nigerian case and, indeed, in virtually all presidential systems, it is the president of the country – personifying the executive branch – who occupies this very pivotal position. This is why, foreign policy, in general, and the choice of priorities, in particular, often reflect the idiosyncrasies and inclinations of the particular individual who occupies the presidential office at specific times. It is for this reason that such enunciated thrusts are often referenced as the doctrines of incumbent presidents in a presidential system. Examples are the Monroe Doctrine (1823), Truman Doctrine (1947), Khrushchev Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence (1956), Brezhnev Doctrine of Righteous Intervention (1968), etc.
Significantly, in the same manner that the enunciation of foreign policy thrusts serves as guide to elite preferences, and foreign policy action, so also could it be the harbinger of what effectively amounts to a policy conundrum for a country. Akin to what Burin (1963) characterises as doctrinal liability, such policy conundrum reflects a situation in which a country, regime, or leader finds itself in a policy cul-de-sac, as it were, by reasons of a policy framework it had enunciated, which, for some reasons, turned into a liability for the policy process. When such is presented in the language of ultimatums, it tends to make the country enunciating such lose respect in the international community, if it fails to follow through on the ultimatums issued. Nigeria’s President Shehu Shagari’s inability to follow through on his threat to deploy Nigeria’s oil power to force the decolonisation of Namibia by 1980, and US President Barack Obama’s decision to back down on his ‘red line’ commitment, vis-a-vis the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian war, belong in this category. For others, the pressure to follow through on commitments made, threats issued, and ultimatums given, make countries to falter in the conduct of their foreign policies. Such a rash commitment made by the Kaiser regime in Prussia, to Austro-Hungary in the early part of the last century, invariably propelled the first World War. This is the sense in the thesis of John Stoessinger that all wars are consequent upon miscalculation on the part of leaders of country.
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The 4-D Foreign Policy Thrust
Nigeria’s foreign policy, over the years, has more often than not been crafted in thrusts; broad frameworks defining the direction in which Nigeria desires to engage with other actors in the global system. This started from the government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa, which laid the broad principles upon which the country’s foreign policy has been predicated since 1960. In consonance with this tradition, and in his appreciation of the need to put some order into Nigerian’s foreign policy, Foreign Affairs Minister, Yusuf Tuggar, enunciated what he described as “the Tinubu 4D doctrine,” which is “anchored on democracy, developments, demography and diaspora” in August 2023; implying that the focus of President Tinubu’s foreign policy would be on these four elements.
In relation to democracy, Nigeria’s new foreign policy, according to the Minister, would seek to “consolidate democratic gains made since the return to civil rule in 1999”; and “continue to encourage this, both in Africa and the world.” On development, it is planned that foreign policy would, first, be directed at “working to enhance Nigerian and African development in order to halt the circle of dependency which is against the interest of Africa … (and) exploit the opportunities presented by the Africa Continental Free Trade Area to facilitate the exchange of goods and services and boost trade and investment through economic cooperation.” Referencing the “vibrant … talent and skills that (Nigeria’s) young population possesses,’” the Minister indicated under the third D, that the country’s foreign policy would be directed at using this “demographic advantage to harness its human capital resources for development.” The fourth D, i.e., diaspora, is predicated upon the assertion that the “Nigerian Diaspora community plays a major role in the development of the country,” especially in relation to their remittances, which “had become a significant contributor to Nigeria’s economic growth and development.” The Diaspora community is thus, expected to “continue to be a catalyst for Nigeria’s imaging and a veritable source of direct investment.”
An interrogation of the value of the 4D foreign policy thrust would require working around three basic questions, which a viable foreign policy framework must address. First, is such a framework capable of harmonising the country’s foreign policy aspirations with its realistic domestic power capability? Secondly, does it provide any guide in putting the country’s foreign policy on a transactional keel, a quid pro quo scenario, of sort? Thirdly, does it provide an adequate guide in prioritisation, i.e., is the framework addressed to the most critical issues of importance to the country? To answer these critical questions would require unpacking the nature and orientation of each of the elements in the 4D framework, as a window to what Nigeria would be capable of achieving from them; or better still, the extent to which they can give focus and direction to the country’s foreign policy objective.
In relation to the desire to use foreign policy to advance democracy, at least four questions, relating to conception and conceptualisation, credibility, capability, and objective, must be answered. Taking off from the pedestal that approximates mainstream thought is the assumption that democracy is wholly desirable as a pathway to good governance, stability, and development on the African continent. This is the assumption that drives the commitment of countries on the continent to the democratic system, encapsulated in the averment of President Tinubu in Guinea Bissau, on 9 July, 2023, that while democracy may be ‘very tough to manage,’ it nevertheless constitutes ‘the best form of government.’
Even so, some critical questions arise as to the validity of these assumptions. First, it is doubtful if democracy on the continent has delivered on the promise of inclusivity, stability and development. Available evidence does not suggest that social development has been broadly consequent upon democratic governance on the continent. Instead, what Africa has come to parade is some form of electoralism – a system defined by regular elections that are hardly consequential, either in terms of prospects of changing ruling parties, or the direction of government’s acts and public policies. What is more, the electoral system is itself often convoluted, with very minimal integrity, and thus hardly able to engender the level of legitimacy requisite for stability. The question that arises here, therefore, is that of nuance, to wit, what is the exact configuration of the democracy that Nigeria’s foreign policy seeks to prioritise and advance? Is the country’s interest in sustaining extant limited democracy, with its little impact in terms of securing stability and welfare on the African continent? Or does the country have in focus a more robust form of democracy, with demonstrable evidence of relevance to the mass of the people of Africa?
The question that arises, therefore, is, what exactly is Nigeria’s objective – the end-state – in relation to democracy, and what is its modality for exacting same on the continent of Africa? The implications of the foregoing are, first, that there is the need for greater clarity in relation to what exactly Nigeria seeks vis-a-vis the democratic agenda, within and outside its shores. Secondly, there is the need for Nigeria to set realistic goals in this regard…
Whichever form of democracy Nigeria is committed to using its foreign policy to advance, the question that arises revolves around the moral platform upon which such a commitment is to be predicated. Is Nigeria itself in conformity with the minimum standard in democratic practice, especially in relation to elections as basis for constituting governance? Can a country, which itself reels in deep electoral conflicts be a credible advocate of electoral integrity requisite for running a legitimate government?
What options do Nigeria really have, when other African countries come under the rulership of military juntas, or some more benign forms of the reversal of democracy, like constitutional coups, or the progressive conscription of the democratic space? As the Niger Republic situation has demonstrated, Nigeria in such circumstances, due to doubtful power capability, as well as profound diplomatic constraints, has little or no choice, other than to play along, hoping that the ruling junta would be agreeable to rapid re-democratisation (the transition back to civil rule).
The question that arises, therefore, is, what exactly is Nigeria’s objective – the end-state – in relation to democracy, and what is its modality for exacting same on the continent of Africa? The implications of the foregoing are, first, that there is the need for greater clarity in relation to what exactly Nigeria seeks vis-a-vis the democratic agenda, within and outside its shores. Secondly, there is the need for Nigeria to set realistic goals in this regard, the parameters of which should be substantially defined by the nation’s overall power capability.
The desire to enhance Nigeria’s and Africa’s development, and by so doing “halt the cycle of dependency which is against the interest of Africa” is the essence of the country’s second D, according to Minister Tuggar. Appropriately highlighted by government here is the AfCFTA, with its profound potentials for boosting intra-African trade. It should, therefore, be assumed that Nigeria’s foreign policy, going forward, would seek the advancement of the AfCFTA regime; deliberately push back on trends that may seek to deepen, rather than attenuate, Africa’s external dependence, including the tendency at kowtowing to the aid agencies; and seek not just Nigeria’s development, but that of the whole of Africa.
The most pressing question that arises here is whether it is appropriate, feasible and desirable for Nigeria to drive Africa’s, rather than its own narrow development agenda; and whether Nigeria has any influence on this process beyond extending diplomatic support – usually of limited consequence – to propositions within and outside the continent that portend positive outcomes for the economies. Yet, another question relates to how dependency is conceived by the Nigerian government, in the context of the incipient close affinity between the Tinubu government and the broad outlines of the neoliberal economic framework propagated by IMF and the World Bank, on the one hand; and the scramble across the continent for foreign direct investment, on the other.
Nigeria is a country of 220 million people, and parades a very young demographic. While it is trite that a huge population, when appropriately mobilised, may suggest some potentials for development, this is neither a sufficient condition for, nor guarantee of development. Indeed, an inappropriately mobilised (education, skill set, etc.) population could be the very recipe for sundry social crises. At any event, to the extent that what Nigeria seeks to leverage upon here is the “talent and skills that our young population possesses,” and not necessarily their youthfulness, methinks what should be in focus here is not age (i.e. demographic), but creativity, which is not (youth) demographic-specific.
As well, Nigeria has a large and widespread Diaspora community, not just in the West, but also across Africa and the Middle East. Annual remittances are in the range of $22 billion. It is, therefore, apposite that the country’s foreign policy should, among others, be seeking to reach as many members of this Diaspora as possible, to organise them, and sensitise them to the pathways of supporting Nigeria’s overall development agenda. A condition precedent to all of these, however, which the foreign policy establishment also has to mainstream is, enhancement of the country’s foreign missions to offer effective consular services to Nigerians overseas. This is one veritable route to implanting Nigeria on the minds of the affected communities in the manner which the 4D framework orientation requires to function.
On doctrine, an overarching theme can be gleaned from President Tinubu’s Renewed Hope Agenda – on Foreign Policy, to wit, to “promote the best possible outcomes for Nigeria in all engagements with other nations.” This is a most suitable line for crafting a proper Tinubu Doctrine, or the nucleus of one, i.e., that Nigeria on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s watch commits to promoting the best possible outcomes for itself in all its engagements with other actors in the global system.
The Three Working Questions
It is apposite to surmise, in the light of the foregoing, that defining the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy soon after the new Tinubu government came into office was appropriate. This conforms to conventional practice all across the world. The action also aligns with a basic element in statecraft, i.e., policy prioritisation for effective resource utilisation. Yet, as they currently stand, the four elements of democracy, development, demography and Diaspora are rather too fluid in conception, too broad in scope, and too woolly in objective, thus making the entire 4D framework of little use in fathoming the exact direction of Nigeria’s foreign policy.
In addition, the first two elements in the framework – democracy and development – are both anchored on Africa, i.e., as far as these foreign policy directions are concerned, Nigeria is still going to continue to be largely Africa focused. This much President Tinubu stated in his first official trip outside the country, in Paris, in June 2023, that Africa remained the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The two, therefore, do not still seem to address a lingering concern that Nigeria’s foreign policy has never been imbued with the transactional orientation, a commitment to reciprocity, which it needs. As a guide to resource prioritisation, the 4D schema is also too broad to be useful, as it covers virtually everything Nigeria’s foreign policy had always focused on. Its attention to realism is also rather weak, as it does little in harmonising the country’s foreign policy aspirations with its domestic power capability, and with no clear, measurable goals for evaluation purposes.
In relation to the characterisation of this framework as a doctrine by the Foreign Affairs Minister, it is apposite to note that ordinarily, foreign policy doctrines are made of clearly enunciated objectives, all related to the overarching issues of importance to a country vis-a-vis the external environment. They are also invariably imbued with clear pathways to accomplishing same. A good example in this regard is the Carter Doctrine, issued sometime in the late 1970s, thus, “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including force.” It is also the sense in which the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 expressed the self-imposed duty of the former Soviet Union to intervene in defence of socialism anywhere in the Soviet bloc. The Akinyemi Doctrine, in the mid-1980s, made it clear that whichever country desired to have Nigeria’s diplomatic support on any issue, must first consult with the latter; suggesting that no one was allowed to take Nigeria’s support for granted. General Ibrahim Babangida’s Economic Diplomacy, with its clear objective of deploying the country’s foreign policy in the promotion of its economic and trade objectives, was also in line with this general orientation. In contradistinction to all of these, however, the 4D framework comes across as too much of a pot pouri of ideas to advise strict governmental focus, prioritisation, and resource maximisation. It is at best what Akinterinwa (2023) refers to as a set of means and tools for delivering foreign policy, but certainly not strategic objectives. The Premium Times would rather refer to it as the Tuggar Principle, after the Foreign Affairs Minister (Premium Times, Editorial, 16 October, 2023).
Finetuning the 4D Policy Thrusts
It is evident from the foregoing that a review of the content of the 4D framework is imperative. Recall that Foreign Minister Tuggar actually enunciated it on the very day he resumed for work in August 2023, indicating that it probably had not been well thought through. It certainly did not receive much input from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Nigeria’s broader foreign policy establishment. Thus, while the 4D framework could be retained, it is imperative that greater articulation is brought to bear on this all-important concept, going forward.
Nigeria, like any other country, exists in a foreign policy milieu that is of two dimensions: a domestic environment, which it creates by the string of choices made by the leadership, and as responded to by civil society; and an international community, over which it has at best a tenuous control. Both realities must be factored into a workable foreign policy delivery framework. The most critical challenges the country faces at home today relate to economic development, insecurity, and the broadening scope of questioning of the spatial integrity of the country. In addition to all its constitutive features, especially its inherent dynamism, the world in which Nigeria must exist now is one in which, according to UN Economic Commission for Africa’s (2023) Economic Report on Africa, “global crises have become a new normal.” I venture to add that it is also an African regional system in which all of the 55 countries seek virtually the same bouquet of objectives; and a West African sub-region in which democratic backsliding is taking the status of a domino effect.
A review of the 4D framework should thus, first, be moderated in scope; secondly, take cognisance of the country’s limited power capability, and shrinking space in the comity of nations; and thirdly, focus pointedly on the most critical issues to Nigeria’s overall wellbeing. The first is the expansion of infrastructure, attraction of foreign investment, and promotion of external trade in all its dimensions, including in the creative space where Nigerians are doing extremely well globally, yet the State remains tentative in harnessing the attendant soft power potentials. Others are, defeat of violent extremism; deepening of internal cohesion to stave off threatening centrifugal forces; acknowledgement that Nigeria is in competition with other African countries for virtually the same values; and stanching the domino effect that coups d’état are fast engendering in West Africa. These are issues around which performance indicators in the foreign policy domain could be developed; and where achievements are measurable.
On doctrine, an overarching theme can be gleaned from President Tinubu’s Renewed Hope Agenda – on Foreign Policy, to wit, to “promote the best possible outcomes for Nigeria in all engagements with other nations.” This is a most suitable line for crafting a proper Tinubu Doctrine, or the nucleus of one, i.e., that Nigeria on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s watch commits to promoting the best possible outcomes for itself in all its engagements with other actors in the global system.
Femi Mimiko, mni, is a professor of Political Science at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, and member, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru. E-mail: femi.mimiko@gmail.com; nomimiko@oauife.edu.ng @FemiMimiko
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