Tanzania is approaching its October 2025 general elections with uncertainty. The main opposition party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), has been disqualified from running, and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is manoeuvring to claim its seventh consecutive term.
CHADEMA chairperson Tundu Lissu is in custody on treason charges due to his party’s demands for electoral reforms. The ‘no reforms, no elections’ campaign has been interpreted by the courts as an attempt to disrupt the polls. Mr Lissu is also charged with incitement and publishing false information. The treason charges are non-bailable and carry the death penalty.
|
|
Tanzania has had six elections since multiparty democracy was introduced in 1995. The CCM has won them all, making it one of Africa’s longest-ruling independent parties. Much of this electoral dominance has resulted from exclusion, censorship, electoral fraud and violence against the opposition.
Tanzania is sliding into electoral authoritarianism – a system where polls are held, but within a manipulated process where the ruling party retains power through state control, patronage, violence, intimidation and manipulation of electoral systems.
|
|
|
|---|
Since 2016, Freedom House has categorised Tanzania as ‘Partly Free’, because its defective or flawed electoral democracy lacked robust civil liberties and political rights. In 2025, the country moved to the ‘Not Free’ category, signalling an authoritarian turn as political freedoms and rights decline.
The ruling party’s vote share shrank to its lowest point ever in 2015 when John Magufuli was elected (see table), with the opposition gaining in both the presidential and parliamentary polls. When dominant political parties are threatened, they often resort to suppression and control to remain in power.
Under Mr Magufuli, crackdowns on civil society and independent media increased, and laws were weaponised to silence dissent, such as the passing of the Cybercrimes Act and the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations. Other authoritarian tactics included the co-option of prominent opposition figures and the fusion of state and party, blurring the divide between public service and party loyalty.
In the 2020 general elections, Mr Magufuli won the presidency by 84.4 per cent, with CCM clinching 261 of the 264 parliamentary seats (98.7 per cent of the vote). In Zanzibar, Tanzania’s semi-autonomous state, CCM won 76.6 per cent of the presidential ballots. That was followed by a landslide 99.3 per cent victory in the November 2024 local government elections.
Like other liberation and independence parties in Southern Africa, such as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia and Angola, CCM has benefited from the legacy of state-building. Institutional structures established by these long-serving ruling parties have supported patronage and clientelist networks, entrenching one-party dominance. Although their trajectories are changing, the prospects for fair and credible elections in Tanzania, as in Mozambique and Zimbabwe’s last polls, remain bleak.
Tanzania’s President Samia Hassan, who succeeded Mr Magufuli in 2021, reversed many retrograde policies to try to bring about reforms. Through her reconciliation, resilience, reforms, and rebuilding (4R) philosophy, she initiated dialogues with the opposition and other stakeholders to reform the electoral architecture.
Three bills governing the electoral process were subsequently enacted in 2024, but they failed to reflect the desired electoral reforms. Although the Independent National Electoral Commission Act (2024) established a new commission, it retained the president’s power to appoint commission members. This became the basis for the opposition’s ‘no reforms, no election’ agenda.
Mr Magufuli’s legacy lingers in the CCM, exposing factions and divided loyalties. Ms Hassan initially tried to tame party hardliners but has gradually brought them back. As elections approach, internal rifts continue to simmer.
One emerging faction contends that Ms Hassan bypassed the party’s nomination procedures, calling into question her candidature for the October polls. Another has criticised alleged state involvement in abductions of government critics and state repression. Also, the nomination process for parliamentarians and ward councillors was momentarily suspended because of perceived bias and favouritism.
CHADEMA’s push for electoral reforms has been undermined by other opposition parties’ apparent alignment with CCM’s approach, making them seem like ruling party puppets.
Increased repression has moved public discussions about the elections to digital spaces like X Spaces, Clubhouse and WhatsApp groups. When the state responded with restrictions on social media, citizens turned to virtual private networks to continue their social media engagement. Youth-led protests in neighbouring Kenya were mobilised using social media. To avoid this, Tanzania has pursued continued state censorship.
Official election observer missions from regional bodies such as the East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) could expose Tanzania’s democratic decline. But although they regularly observe elections, these bodies often take non-confrontational and diplomatic approaches, rubberstamping polls that are not ‘free and fair’.
The AU Commission deployed a pre‑election assessment mission to Tanzania in June to assess election preparations, especially the electoral commission, but hasn’t yet publicised its report. In May, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning Mr Lissu’s arrest and treason charges to try to pressure Tanzania to ensure fair elections. The government accused it of interfering in the country’s internal affairs.
The European Union and the United States could use aid and diplomacy to apply pressure, but economic and strategic interests limit their actions. Regional bodies like the EAC and SADC must call for free and fair elections in Tanzania, and accreditation for their election observers who have been excluded from the upcoming polls.
In Tanzania’s last general elections, major international observers were barred from monitoring proceedings. Domestic observers – and others who may get accreditation – should document election-related irregularities as was done in Mozambique in 2024.
READ ALSO: Nigeria Correctional Service confirms dismissing whistleblower gives reasons
As Institute for Security Studies Researcher Borges Nhamirre notes, the observers were crucial in monitoring and documenting flaws in Mozambique. Although this did not make the election free or fair, it increased transparency and raised public awareness.
The current electoral situation shows that Tanzania is sliding further into a de facto authoritarian system where voting is reduced to a procedural coronation ritual for the ruling party. Electoral reforms are urgently needed.
Nicodemus Minde, Researcher, East Africa Peace and Security Governance, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Nairobi
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
