When participants first encountered the preaching, it sounded like the truth. But reality soon diverged sharply from the promises the leaders of the terror groups made to them.
Their expectations before they joined the terror groups significantly differed from what they experienced after joining.
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Their experiences were not obtained through a direct interview with former insurgents. They were recounted by the Radicalisation and Rehabilitation Coordinator of Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), Usen Archibong, during a phone interview with this reporter.
According to Mr Archibong, many participants described how religious messaging and visions of a better life initially drew them in. “The things they told us were not what we saw,” he quoted some of them as saying. “The same leaders preaching against wrongdoing were the ones taking drugs and other people’s wives.”
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Mr Archibong said the illusion collapsed for many of the former terrorists, who have now abandoned such beliefs.
“If you misbehave even a little, they will just shoot you,” he quoted one of them as saying.
He explained that this stage is often when disillusionment sets in and plans to escape begin.
These indirect insights illuminate the experiences of individuals processed through Nigeria’s flagship deradicalisation initiative.
Public claims and official responses
Across Nigeria, Operation Safe Corridor remains the subject of widespread public debate.
A recurring claim frequently shared on social media, in radio discussions, and in public conversations, alleges that “repentant” Boko Haram members are recruited into the Nigerian military and rewarded by the state.
The narrative resonates deeply, tapping into widespread anxieties over justice, accountability and national security. For many citizens, the notion of former insurgents receiving reintegration support without visible punishment raises profound questions about fairness.
At a media engagement organised by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Abuja, OPSC Coordinator Yusuf Ali dismissed the claim as false and misleading. Recruitment into the armed forces, he explained, adheres to rigorous procedures that bar individuals with criminal records. Former Chief of Defence Staff Lucky Irabor has also stated publicly that no such recruitment takes place.
Understanding the gap between perception and reality is central to assessing one of Nigeria’s most contested security initiatives. The question, however, is not only whether the programme works, but whether it is trusted by the public.
Why the programme exists
Operation Safe Corridor was launched in 2016 as a non-kinetic pillar of Nigeria’s counter-insurgency strategy in the North-East.
Speaking at the CDD event, Mr Ali, a brigadier general, noted that the programme emerged amid intensified military operations, when security forces encountered a heterogeneous mix within insurgent ranks. Not everyone captured or found in camps was a committed fighter; many had been abducted or forcibly conscripted, including farmers, traders and travellers around the Lake Chad Basin.
A purely kinetic approach, Mr Ali said, could degrade insurgent capacity but would not stop recruitment or provide an exit pathway for individuals seeking to disengage. Operation Safe Corridor, he explained, was therefore designed to separate individuals considered low-risk from hardened combatants and to provide a structured process for rehabilitation and reintegration.
He described the programme as a complement to ongoing military operations, aimed at reducing the pool of individuals available to insurgent groups.
Within Nigeria’s broader counterinsurgency framework, Operation Safe Corridor functions as a non-kinetic component intended to support long-term stabilisation efforts.
How Operation Safe Corridor works
Entry into the programme begins with a rigorous screening process. Speaking at the CDD media engagement in Abuja, OPSC Coordinator Mr Ali explained that individuals who surrender or are captured undergo profiling by security and intelligence agencies. This includes biometric data collection and background checks to assess each person’s level of involvement in insurgent activities.
He added that only those classified as low risk are admitted to the programme, while individuals linked to serious crimes are referred for prosecution. Even among those accepted, initial trust is often absent.
During a phone interview with this reporter, Mr Archibong said some participants initially believed the deradicalisation process is a trap.
“One of them thought it was a trap,” Mr Archibong said. “He believed the government would kill them. Even when they were flown in, he thought they would be thrown into the sea.”
Mr Archibong said such fears typically ease once participants reach the rehabilitation facility in Gombe State and begin structured counselling. He said participants undergo several months of rehabilitation, including psychosocial support, religious reorientation led by clerics, and vocational training in skills such as farming, tailoring, and shoemaking.
He explained that the aim is not only to disengage individuals from violence, but to address the conditions that made their involvement possible.
Inside the experience
For many participants, entering the programme does not immediately erase fear. Mr Archibong said years of exposure to violence shape how participants interpret the rehabilitation process.
He recalled the case of one participant who remained deeply sceptical.
“He did not believe it was real,” he said. “He kept thinking, how can a government take care of people like us?”
Mr Archibong explained that change, when it occurs, is often gradual.
Through repeated counselling sessions and structured engagement, he said, participants are exposed to alternative perspectives on religion, authority, and social life.
He added that responses vary.
“For some, it takes time. For others, the change comes earlier,” he said.
He emphasised that the programme is not designed to produce immediate transformation, but to create conditions that support behavioural change over time.
Reintegration and resistance
Exiting insurgent camps marks only the first transition. Returning to civilian communities presents another steeper challenge.
Mr Archibong identified reintegration as the most difficult phase. “The community does not really believe them at first,” he said. Returnees often face suspicion, social avoidance, exclusion from gatherings or close monitoring by residents.
He explained that this wariness stems partly from perceptions that the government prioritises former insurgents over conflict victims.
Over time, he said, some returnees work to rebuild trust by demonstrating changed behaviour, offering vocational skills to others or contributing to community projects.
He added that acceptance, where it occurs, remains gradual and far from guaranteed.
Viral claims versus institutional reality
Misinformation thrives amid these fragile dynamics. The most enduring allegation that OPSC graduates are absorbed into Nigeria’s security forces was firmly rejected by Mr Ali at the CDD event.
“There is no such integration,” he stated. “The processes are completely different.” Military recruitment involves multiple independent screening layers that OPSC participants do not have access to.
Mr Ali also addressed claims of automatic financial rewards or housing. The programme, he clarified, emphasises rehabilitation, skills acquisition and community reintegration rather than material incentives. By offering a credible exit for low-risk individuals, it aims to weaken insurgent recruitment pipelines.
He explained that providing a pathway for low-risk individuals to disengage weakens insurgent recruitment pipelines, reducing the likelihood of individuals’ continued involvement in insurgent activities.
Misinformation, justice and unresolved tensions
Despite official explanations, scepticism about Operation Safe Corridor persists. At the CDD engagement, the CDD Director, Dauda Garuba, attributed the confusion to overlaps between federal initiatives like OPSC and various state-level reintegration efforts, which are frequently conflated in public discourse.
Beyond administrative overlaps lies a deeper erosion of trust. Civil society voices highlight limited public visibility into the programme and the relatively slow pace of support for victims in affected communities.
Mr Archibong acknowledged the sentiment: “People feel the government is taking care of those who caused harm more than the victims.” Participants receive pre-reintegration counselling on managing stigma. Access to facilities remains restricted for security reasons.
Mr Garuba advocated for greater transparency, arguing it could counter misinformation and bolster confidence. In its absence, public narratives often fill the vacuum left by independently verifiable data.
What the evidence shows
Programme officials report low recidivism rates based on internal assessments. Mr Ali has stated publicly that only a small fraction of participants return to insurgent activity, with no verified cases in recent briefings. The initiative has also encouraged defections and helped constrain recruitment.
Independent verification of long-term outcomes remains limited, as most available information derives from official sources. Participants at the event emphasise that deradicalisation efforts cannot, by themselves, resolve broader conflict drivers such as poverty, displacement, and governance deficits.
In that context, Operation Safe Corridor represents one component of a wider counterinsurgency strategy rather than a standalone solution.
The bigger picture
Discussions at the CDD event revealed an evolving understanding of Nigeria’s counter-insurgency approach: military operations alone cannot eradicate the conditions that sustain recruitment into terrorist organisations. While kinetic actions reclaim territory, non-kinetic measures, such as OPSC, address the human dimension by reducing the pool of potential fighters.
However, participants at the event emphasised that its success hinges on parallel advances in governance, economic opportunities and public trust. Without these, the underlying drivers of insurgency are likely to persist. Operation Safe Corridor thus sits within a broader peacebuilding framework that balances immediate security needs with long-term stabilisation.
Conclusion
For many participants, disengaging from insurgency does not end uncertainty. They move from an environment they no longer trust, through a rehabilitation system initially viewed with suspicion, and into communities that may withhold immediate acceptance.
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“We normally educate them that they are going to face this kind of stigmatisation,” Mr Archibong said. “But with time, and with the good character they’ve developed, things begin to change.” Some returnees actively reassure communities through positive contributions.
As described by officials and reviewed at the recent CDD policy engagement, Operation Safe Corridor offers a structured framework for managing disengagement from insurgency. Yet it also serves as a litmus test for public trust in Nigeria’s broader counter-insurgency and peacebuilding efforts.
Public perception continues to be shaped by persistent misinformation, calls for greater transparency, and legitimate concerns about justice for victims. Addressing these tensions will determine whether the programme strengthens national security or deepens societal divides.
