What, then, is the way out of this “Russian roulette”? A sustainable solution requires a “whole-of-government” approach that moves beyond the barrel of a gun. While Western interventions have historically struggled with paternalism, they remain fundamentally more aligned with the long-term goals of development than the current Russian alternative. A successful counter-terrorism strategy must be a sophisticated blend of kinetic force and non-kinetic engagement.
The Sahel, a vast and semi-arid belt spanning the breadth of the African continent, has long served as an indispensable bridge connecting Sub-Saharan Africa to its northern neighbours. Beyond its geography, the region, and West Africa at large, is a treasure trove of strategic resources. From the gold veins of Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso to the crude oil of Nigeria and Guinea, the uranium of Niger and Nigeria, and the lithium deposits in Nigeria and Mali, the region is a magnet for global powers.
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This wealth, however, is a double-edged sword. While it attracts the interest of the United States, China, and Russia, it also draws the gaze of malign non-state actors. Groups such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have turned this resource-rich corridor into a theatre of persistent conflict. For countries like Niger, Mali, Chad, and Burkina Faso, the struggle against these jihadi insurgents and bandits has pushed national security and political survival to the absolute breaking point.
The Pivot to Moscow
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The region’s descent into instability accelerated in the early 2020s. A rapid succession of coups d’état in Mali (2020/2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) sent shockwaves through the continent. By 2025, these new military juntas made the radical decision to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to form the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES). Almost immediately, they severed long-standing military ties with Western partners, ordering the expulsion of French and American troops. The putschists argued that Western allies, France in particular, were “forever war” protagonists more interested in prolonging counter-terrorism operations to maintain unfettered access to strategic minerals. Simultaneously, the stringent human rights conditions attached to American military aid frustrated the juntas. These frictions provided the perfect opening for a pivot towards Moscow.
Has the Africa Corps succeeded where the West allegedly failed? The data suggests a resounding “no.” Since the arrival of Russian paramilitaries, the security situation in the Sahel, rather than stabilising, has only metastasised. Russia has failed to stop the advance of malign non-state actors; in many cases, its heavy-handed kinetic tactics have served as a recruitment tool for extremists.
Moscow’s Playbook: Security for Sovereignty
When the AES expelled its Western technical partners, Russia moved swiftly to fill the power vacuum. This was not Moscow’s first foray into African “regime security.” As early as 2017, the Kremlin deployed the Wagner Group, its state-backed, quasi-military expeditionary force, into the Central African Republic (CAR). The deal was simple: Russia would provide an ironclad security detail for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s administration in exchange for exclusive mining rights to gold and diamonds. Russia has since used these revenues from African minerals to insulate its economy against Western sanctions and fund its invasion of Ukraine.
From CAR, Russia extended its footprint into Libya and Sudan using the same “security-for-resources” blueprint. Following the death of Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023, the Kremlin rebranded the group as the Africa Corps and brought it under its direct military control. This new entity is now the primary military partner for the AES, operating not as a traditional ally, but as a mercenary-for-hire that prioritises the survival of the ruling elite over the safety of ordinary citizens.
A Failed Shield: The Reality of the Russian Promise
Has the Africa Corps succeeded where the West allegedly failed? The data suggests a resounding “no.” Since the arrival of Russian paramilitaries, the security situation in the Sahel, rather than stabilising, has only metastasised. Russia has failed to stop the advance of malign non-state actors; in many cases, its heavy-handed kinetic tactics have served as a recruitment tool for extremists. In Mali, JNIM has effectively placed Bamako under a state of psychological and economic siege, using a strategy of attrition to strangle the capital. In Niger, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) continues to operate with near impunity in the Tillabéri region. Burkina Faso, perhaps the hardest hit, has seen the state lose control over nearly 40 per cent of its territory.
If the Sahelian states continue to trade their sovereignty for the shadow of Russian protection, they may find they have not invited a saviour, but a landlord who has no intention of leaving and no interest in the welfare of the tenants. The region must return to a multilateral framework that prioritises the African people over the survival of military regimes and political elites.
Russia is not interested in laying a solid economic foundation or building institutional resilience. Unlike Western partnerships, which, despite their flaws, invested in governance, economic development, and civil society, the Russian model is purely extractive. The patterns observed in Sudan, Libya, and Syria suggest that Russian intervention leaves behind a trail of hollowed-out institutions and escalated violence. The “protection” Russia offers is a shield for dictators at the expense of the economic and physical security of ordinary citizens.
Beyond the Horizon: Reclaiming Stability
What, then, is the way out of this “Russian roulette”? A sustainable solution requires a “whole-of-government” approach that moves beyond the barrel of a gun. While Western interventions have historically struggled with paternalism, they remain fundamentally more aligned with the long-term goals of development than the current Russian alternative. A successful counter-terrorism strategy must be a sophisticated blend of kinetic force and non-kinetic engagement. This means addressing the root causes of violence: lack of access to quality education, basic health facilities, fair judicial systems, and the crushing poverty that makes a jihadi paycheck attractive to jobless youth. It further requires democratic consolidation and a commitment to human rights. These political virtues are entirely absent from the Russian playbook. If the Sahelian states continue to trade their sovereignty for the shadow of Russian protection, they may find they have not invited a saviour, but a landlord who has no intention of leaving and no interest in the welfare of the tenants. The region must return to a multilateral framework that prioritises the African people over the survival of military regimes and political elites.
J Adewunmi Falode is a professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies and director of Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Lagos State University, Ojo.
