The administration will probably make some overtures to Africa; as it did in the first term. It will probably keep the Presidential Council on Doing Business in Africa largely as a gesture to the American business community. But most of the administration’s overtures are likely to be largely performative or transactional – like Trump’s unfocused August White House meeting with the leaders of four small West African states or his efforts to pressure African governments to take some of America’s immigrant deportees.
Donald Trump is bad news for Africa. He was tough on Africa in his first term, and after nine months, his second term is shaping up to be much worse.
Trump’s “America First” policies of high tariffs and economic protectionism, restrictive immigration procedures, open hostility to international organisations and assault on development assistance agencies, are at variance with African views and interest.
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Trump’s policies are undermining relations with Africa, especially with important states like Nigeria and South Africa. His negative attitude toward Africa will have a long-term impact on Washington’s future engagement with the continent, and his regressive policies will expand opportunities for China and Russia to make greater economic and political inroads with African leaders.
As Washington pulls back, Turkey, India and the oil rich Gulf Arab states are also expanding their economic and political reach and influence.
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The administration’s disinterest in the promotion of democracy, human rights and fair elections abroad will also embolden Africa’s authoritarian leaders and military rulers, accelerating democratic backsliding and weakening the continent’s fragile democratic institutions.
As the United States turns its back on Africa, the continent’s leaders are stepping up pan-African economic and political cooperation and building stronger ties with other transregional organisations like the BRICS, the G77 and the Organisation of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS). African leaders are also exerting greater pressure on global institutions to reform and include more African leadership and policy recommendations.
Trump’s First Term Damage
Trump has never taken Africa seriously. He didn’t travel to Africa during his first term, and he notoriously disparaged African countries, criticising them in crude and vulgar language. He met in the White House with only two African presidents, and over four years he implemented a series of policies that had a profoundly negative impact on Africans.
Travel Restrictions
During his first week in office in 2017, President Trump signed the infamous Muslim Travel Ban, an Executive Order prohibiting citizens of seven predominantly Muslim states from coming into the United States. Three of those states were in Africa: Libya, Sudan, and Somalia. The order was an early indication of the administration’s disdain towards Africa, where Islam is the fastest growing religion and over half of the continent’s population is Muslim. Although US courts forced the administration to restructure its travel ban, the revised travel restrictions were extended to thirteen countries, with Nigeria among those added to the list. The restrictions on Africa’s most populous country were especially punitive – cutting off the issuance of immigrant visas and prohibiting Nigerians from participating in the popular global immigrant visa lottery programme.
Attack on Key UN Organisations
Trump’s visa ban was followed by an assault on several United Nations organisations with significant Africa programmes. The administration pulled out of the Paris Climate Change Agreement in 2020, reversing a US pledge of $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund, a third of which would have gone to Africa. According to the UN, Africa is impacted by climate change more than any other region of the world. The Climate Fund would have provided much needed financial assistance to help Africa address climate shocks and to transition from fossil fuels to renewables.
The first Trump administration also took aim at the World Health Organisation (WHO), the largest international provider of health care services to Africa and a key partner in addressing the continent’s health challenges. Angered by the WHO’s position on the origins of the COVID virus, the administration pulled back its support for the WHO and set in motion the process to formally withdraw from the organisation. In addition, the Trump administration pulled out of UNESCO and the UN Human Rights Council, criticising both organisations for supporting programmes and countries inimical to American interests. He also sought, with mixed results, to reduce the US’ contributions to the UN’s operating budget and to cut one billion dollars from the UN peacekeeping account. Although the animosity towards the UN had global implications, his policies probably hurt Africa more than any other region, given the continent’s dependence on the organisation’s programmes in health care, development, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.
Key Programmes that Remained Under Trump One Are Now Under Threat
Many of the most important bilateral and multilateral US programmes with Africa survived during Trump’s first term, and some of his egregious policies were reversed by the Biden administration. But in the first nine months of his second term, the administration has taken a sledgehammer to virtually every major programme directed toward Africa. And more are probably under threat.
Although backed in many cases by strong bipartisan Congressional support, the administration has eliminated:
- PEPFAR, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, an extraordinary initiative launched by President Bush that has saved twenty-six million lives, most of them in Africa;
- Power Africa which has connected over 74 million Africans to electricity on the world’s most power challenged continent;
- Feed the Future, which was designed to help create a green agricultural revolution in Africa;
- Prosper Africa, a major trade and investment initiative designed to promote two-way trade between the US and Africa and to counter China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”;
- African Development Foundation (ADF), which provides development assistance to Africa’s most marginalised communities; and
- Young Africa Leaders Initiative (YALI), an Obama era initiative to connect with Africa’s youthful population, the fastest growing in the world.
In addition, a wide range of Africa-focused development programmes administered and funded by USAID were eliminated with the administration’s shuttering of that organisation in early February. And half of the grant programmes run by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), both established under Republican administrations, have been hobbled by staff reductions and programme closures.
MCC infrastructure projects in several African countries, including Senegal, Kenya, Zambia and Tanzania, have been cancelled. MCC and IFC were two of the most effective programmes in countering China’s Belt and Road initiative in Africa.
The Next Four Years
In the weeks and months ahead, the administration will probably eliminate many of the remaining government programmes that have generated goodwill and fostered positive relations with African nations.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the centrepiece of US-Africa trade relations for over two decades, is in serious jeopardy. The legislation, which allowed duty free access for most African products, expired on 30 September, but AGOA supporters hope it will be renewed for one year, and possibly updated and extended for much longer.
Unfortunately, however, the prospects for AGOA’s long term renewal and reform are not encouraging. AGOA is inconsistent with Trump’s views on tariffs and trade, and the administration has already slapped duties of ten per cent or more on products coming in from Africa. The loss of AGOA will have a crippling impact on imports from several African countries, including South Africa, Kenya, Lesotho and Mauritius.
South Africa, which is Africa’s largest recipient of AGOA benefits, has already come under heavy political criticism from the White House, and the administration has shown little interest in cooperating with South Africa on G20 transition issues.
The administration may well [will probably] reduce America’s diplomatic, consular and commercial services across the continent, closing several consulates and smaller embassies and consolidating visa issuances, requiring more African citizens to travel to neighbouring countries for visa and consular services.
The State Department has already terminated all visa services in nine of Africa’s fifty-four countries, including Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Niger, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. US embassies in Africa are understaffed and the loss of positions at the State Department and administration budget cuts may well lead to the closure of some embassies in smaller countries.
In Washington, the survival of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs as an independent division, is under threat. The Bureau has been without an Assistant Secretary since the beginning of the administration, and there has been reporting that the Bureau may be downsized or integrated into the Department’s Middle East Bureau. Downgrading has already taken place at the White House, where the Africa Desk at the National Security Council has been reduced in staff and merged into the Middle East and North Africa office.
On the economic side, as the administration continues to cut domestic budgets and foreign assistance, it could cut funding for the African Development Bank; stop further support and lending to the African Finance Corporation; and redirect some of the support to the World Bank and the IMF away from African projects and loans – in the same manner as it has withdrawn support from United Nations programmes and activities.
In the military and political sphere, the administration is likely to recognise the Somaliland Republic and set up a small diplomatic mission in Hargeisa, a position long advocated by some individuals close to the administration. Such an action would run counter to the views of many in the African Union.
The administration may also downsize the Africa Command and re-integrate it into the European Command, where it was formerly lodged. At the United Nations, the administration will step away from Biden era efforts at UN Security Council reform, which advocated for two permanent African seats on the Council.
The administration has already moved towards ending support for the promotion of democracy, human rights and women’s empowerment issues across the continent, cutting support for civil society and democracy groups and opening the door for more autocrats. The administration has also drawn back from criticising questionable and abusive electoral practices in several African nations. In furtherance of its transactional diplomacy, the administration may turn a blind eye to illegal or questionable actions of authoritarian leaders in exchange for supporting American initiatives in the UN, the Middle East and Asia.
Dim Outlook for the Future
The administration will probably make some overtures to Africa; as it did in the first term. It will probably keep the Presidential Council on Doing Business in Africa largely as a gesture to the American business community. But most of the administration’s overtures are likely to be largely performative or transactional – like Trump’s unfocused August White House meeting with the leaders of four small West African states or his efforts to pressure African governments to take some of America’s immigrant deportees.
He may also engage in some diplomatic initiatives like the work of his Special Envoy to end the long-running conflict in the Great Lakes region – pursuing what will prove to be a short sighted and flawed White House strategy to secure access to critical minerals in one of Africa’s most unstable and war-torn areas.
Sadly, however, none of these efforts will alter the downward spiral and negative trajectory of Trump’s Africa policies. Over the next three-and-a-half years, Africa will not get much love or attention in Trump’s Washington.
Johnnie Carson, who served most recently as Special Presidential Representative for Implementation of the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit, had 37-year career in the Foreign Service dedicated to African diplomacy.
This reflection was originally published on AllAfrica.com.
