Creating a one-party state: Lessons from the Second Republic, By Jibrin Ibrahim

Our learning from the politics of the Second Republic is that the NPN got many to decamp but the decampees lost the support of their constituents and could not deliver. Ondo State went up in flames over the imposition of Omoboriowo as governor and the election became the definition of election without credibility or legitimacy. It was a pyrrhic victory for NPN, as three-months later, Major General Muhammadu Buhari announced his coup because the election was not free, fair and credible.

During the years preceding the establishment of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in 1978, a coalition of politicians from most of the parties of the First Republic worked together in an organisation called the National Movement, to set up ONE DOMINANT party that would be used to share power and its fruits. In a sense, the idea was to create national unity by ending the two divides in Nigerian politics – the ideological and the ethno-religious. Candido, the famous and perceptive man behind the mask in New Nigerian newspapers captured the spirit well on his editorial page in 1978. He was referring to the NPN in the following:

“It is led by Comrade, Chief, (Dr), Alhaji Candido on a platform dedicated to democratic dictatorship and capitalist socialism and inspired by the philosophy of CHOP AND LET CHOP.” 

In actual fact, one of the parties that applied for registration and failed to get it in 1978 was the “You Chop I Chop party.” Maybe the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) thought they were too blunt about their objective. The politicians were turning their backs to the politics of the First Republic and were then ready to focus on pillaging the national treasury. Scholars and politicians concerned today about the risk of the current attempt by the APC to forge a one-party state should start from the dynamics of 1978. They should start by reading The Barons, written by late statesman, Ahmadu Kurfi, who gives a detailed overview of how the Northern political class worked very hard to ensure that all the political actors in the country were in ONE political party together. Then they should read the account of the formation of the NPN by its first secretary, Uba Ahmed; Ahmed IU (1986), The National Party of Nigeria, From Origins to Electoral Success (Master’s Thesis), University of Birmingham.

The political project of the NPN was the development of a national system for the distribution of the ‘national cake’, a spoils system, as it were. That cake refers to federally generated resources made available for political appropriation by the Nigerian State. This Nigerian concept was therefore developed and popularised in response to the vastly expanded scope for primitive accumulation that was created by the petroleum boom.  The NPN was formed as a coalition of various fractions, which had roots in the regional process of accumulation that characterised the First Republic, but had since significantly moved to Lagos, the new distribution centre of the “national cake.”

The point being made was not so much that regionalism had disappeared from the political landscape, but that it had been superseded by national exigencies. The legal and constitutional provisions for “federal character” that governed the political process of the Second Republic were a simple formal institutionalisation of shifts in the political economy and, consequently, in the structure of political power. It was the clarion call for all to come together in order that ALL in this class might partake of the “national cake.

There was, however, an unsurmountable problem: the key leaders that joined the national movement – Awolowo, Azikiwe, Aminu Kano, Tarka, etc., all had expectations that they would emerge as the presidential candidate. They believed the NPC group had already had its turn in power and the time for rotation had come. However, when they read the tea leaves, they realised that the party was firmly in the hands of its creators from the NPC cabal, and all, except Tarka, left to set up their own parties.

The founding fathers of the NPN systematically waxed a coalition form the segmented and disparate fractions that constituted the Nigerian political class. In the North, they were able to form what former party secretary, Uba Ahmed, described as a “victorious troika’ of political coalitions around Aliyu Makama Bida, the deputy leader of the NPC; Aminu Kano, leader of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU); and Joseph Tarka, leader of the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), thus bringing together Northern ruling and opposition groups (except the Borno wing) into the National Movement, the first phase in the formation of the NPN.

With the North united as the most formidable base of the NPN, southern politicians from the South-West, South-East and Niger Delta were then integrated into what was presented as the winning team. Meanwhile, stringent conditions had been introduced into the Constitution to disallow the registration of parties that only had a regional base, so the NPN was the “only” party that could dominate the political arena.

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There was, however, an unsurmountable problem: the key leaders that joined the national movement – Awolowo, Azikiwe, Aminu Kano, Tarka, etc., all had expectations that they would emerge as the presidential candidate. They believed the NPC group had already had its turn in power and the time for rotation had come. However, when they read the tea leaves, they realised that the party was firmly in the hands of its creators from the NPC cabal, and all, except Tarka, left to set up their own parties.

To the shock of the NPN, the new parties were successful in both getting registration and doing well in the 1979 elections. The NPN got only 168 seats in the House of Representatives, 36 in Senate and seven out of 19 governors. The UPN got 111 seats in the House, 28 senators and five of the 19 governors. NPP got 78 seats in the House, 16 in the Senate and three of the 19 governors. The Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) got 47 seats in the House, seven senators and two out of the 19 governors, while the Great Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP) won 43 seats in the House, eight in the Senate and two of the 19 governors.

The NPN got very frightened of a “gang-up” of all the parties against it, and turned to a strategy of killing the idea by setting up a government of national unity with the NPP. Within two years of the government of national unity, the NPN convinced three NPP ministers to decamp – Chief Okoi, Professor Ishaya Audu and Ademola Thomas.

Even more important was the perception of ordinary citizens that the ruling party was both excessively corrupt and an unfair bully seeking to destabilise the legitimate aspirations of opposition parties to contest in a free and fair election. It is easy for parties in power to think that they control all the cards. As we have seen in the case of the NPN, there are other cards that can come into play.

The NPN also encouraged the development of factions within the other four parties and was able to get the electoral commission, FEDECO, to recognise the NPN allied factions, to finish all opposition and establish a one-party state. When President Shehu Shagari made the famous Gboko Declaration in 1982, at the start of the campaign for the 1983 elections, he invited leaders of the other parties to decamp to the NPN, whose umbrella, he said, was wide enough to absorb the entire opposition.

There was a massive backlash against the NPN and in the 1983 elections, they were performing worse than they did in 1979, before they took the decision, in panic, to massively rig the 1983 elections. The 1986 Babalakin Commission of Inquiry on the 1983 Elections stated in black and white that the NPN, in collusion with the Nigerian Police Force, the National Security Organisation (NSO) and party thugs, printed results sheets and substituted them with the ones that came from the collation centres. It was the NPN that invented rigging by declaration way back in 1983.

Our learning from the politics of the Second Republic is that the NPN got many to decamp but the decampees lost the support of their constituents and could not deliver. Ondo State went up in flames over the imposition of Omoboriowo as governor and the election became the definition of election without credibility or legitimacy. It was a pyrrhic victory for NPN, as three-months later, Major General Muhammadu Buhari announced his coup because the election was not free, fair and credible.

To go back to the idea of setting up a “You Chop I Chop Party”, the idea does not work because there are simply not enough resources to give to everyone. NPN leaders that did not get ministerial and other appointments because the positions were given to NPP members that joined, were bitter and undermining the party from within. As more people from the opposition decamped to the NPN, more barons from within that had worked to build the party felt excluded and joined in undermining the party.

Even more important was the perception of ordinary citizens that the ruling party was both excessively corrupt and an unfair bully seeking to destabilise the legitimate aspirations of opposition parties to contest in a free and fair election. It is easy for parties in power to think that they control all the cards. As we have seen in the case of the NPN, there are other cards that can come into play.

A professor of Political Science and development consultant/expert, Jibrin Ibrahim is a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Democracy and Development, and Chair of the Editorial Board of PREMIUM TIMES.