In this piece, I want to pay critical attention to the reform significance of the relationship between what has been called the “cult of the generalists,” on the one hand, and the necessity for more of a cadre of specialists or professionals, given the imperative and demand of the knowledge age, on the other. This discourse might appear academic at first glance. However, we immediately grasp its significance when we understand that a civil service system that must anticipate the challenges of the future needs to adequately articulate a governance, strategic and operational managerial framework that has the capability of preparing the civil service for such a future. How does this distinction affect the way we think about development on the continent? It does because it is intimately connected with the evolving nature of work, and how work mediates the significance and urgency of national productivity. The nature of work in the twenty-first century has changed drastically. Work is no longer place-based and a full-time/lifetime vocation. It is now more remote-based, and attended by all sorts of dynamics.
This, therefore, brings to the fore the imperative of connecting this changing workplace with the traditional understanding of the public service in public administration studies. How a public service performs, therefore, has a lot to do with how the business model of the public service is organised and connected with the developmental framework of the state. When the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 was submitted, as part of the reform effort to transform the operational basis of the British Civil Service, it was founded on one of four significant premises:
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Entrants should not be recruited for life into a specific department but would enter a Home Civil Service that would facilitate inter-departmental staff transfers. Civil servants, therefore, would need to have had a general education and to be generalist rather than specialist in their knowledge and experience.
One critical implication of this development was the emergence of the cadre system which served as the basis for the establishment of a generalist class — administrative, executive and clerical — as the top administrative echelon of the civil service system in a descending hierarchical order of responsibilities and qualifications. This elite administrative echelon was solely responsible for policy initiation and implementation.
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In its Nigerian incarnation, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) offers three streams of general management courses, for professionals and administrators, that appeals to the lower, middle and top management cadres. These courses are “general” in the sense that they have nothing to do with the specialized training that participants and officers have as professionals before attending. The assumption behind the general management courses is that while an officer could remain a specialist until she gets to GL 14, advancing to the top management position requires taking on more general management responsibilities that demands more multidimensional financial, human and managerial imperatives. Thus, whether a generalist-administrator or core professional, becoming a top management officer is a status that leans more to general management, and is preparatory to becoming a permanent secretary — a position that makes the officer simultaneously a chief administrative officer, chief policy adviser and chief accounting officer.
The relationship between the cult of generalists that the Nigerian civil service system inherited from the British and the necessity of specialised and professional competence is one significant tension that the system has to contend with in terms of institutional reform. The colonial structure of the civil service was first addressed by the Gorsuch Commission of 1956 which recommended the creation of a cadre division of civil service personnel corresponding to general education standard of the period. The four divisions were: sub-clerical and sub-technical; clerical and technical; executive and higher technical; and administrative and professional. Each of these divisions was further divided into cadres. The professional class contained cadres like engineering, education, law, accountants, medical, etc. On the other hand, the contribution of the 1959 Newns Commission was the introduction of a Westminster organisational model which is more compatible with a ministerial framework. The Newns Commission recommended the grafting of the ministerial structures on the colonial departmental structure. This new arrangement, for instance, created the position of the permanent secretary on whom the Minister could depend on all decisional and administrative matters, especially those bothering on specific technical needs that require liaising with the professional heads of department.
Unfortunately, however, this wholesale transplantation of the Westminster model — the most significant underlying structural arrangement of the Nigerian civil service system till date — has constantly frustrated almost all reform intentions and implementation because it failed to take the peculiarity of the Nigerian context into consideration. The cadre system created a subsisting conflict between the generalists and the specialists, and this inevitably led to the tension that subverted service delivery efficiency in the departments. Within this system, key operational tasks are undertaken by generalist officers who have no expertise in the area. And this leaves the system weakened in terms of the urgent need for a specialist section with requisite professional qualification that matches competence with specific job and task. To cite a rather critical example, a very large proportion of the workforce at the Federal Civil Service Commission is made up of pool of generalist-officers who are without sufficient knowledge and expertise that could enable them deploy fundamental concepts and models in the field of HRM and public administration to bring professionalism to bear on their job. And this leaves a significant gap in terms of professionally trained and certified HR practitioners that are trained to take on specialised functions and tasks. Working under the influence of the Fulton Report of 1968, the Udoji Commission report made a valiant effort to dislodge the cult of generalists by recommending — under the burden of performance management, central to the managerial revolution sweeping public administration — the infusion of the public service with new professionals and specialists whose competences can be contracted to specific performance task within a result-oriented management system. The fundamental dimensions of the Udoji Report dealing with managerial dynamics were not implemented, unfortunately.
The generalist-specialist controversy is not unique to public administration. It pervades the entirety of the managerial structure of both the public and private management, as well as executive government. And this is because it impinges on workplace efficiency and performance management. Within public administration, government organisations possess a strong preference for recruiting public officers with broad-based and multidisciplinary knowledge over those public officers — the specialists — with professional expertise and competences in specific fields and areas. This “cult of generalists” derives from a general belief in management and administration that a generalist approach is superior for managing complex policy issues and navigating diverse government functions, even when highly technical knowledge might be required. In the private sector, the concern is not different. The workplace of the twenty-first century is leaning more in the direction of multidimensional expertise — a sort of Jack-of-all-trade. Indeed, there is the argument that generalists provide “marginal value” — the extra value that people are willing to pay, far above the value that specialist create. And this is because generalist appeal more to the general population, and specifically the general managerial requirement of any institution or organisation. In both the public and the private sectors, the general manager is denoted by six fundamental tasks: (a) shaping and reshaping the workplace and its many environments, like dictating the performance standard, business concepts and personnel values; (b) designing strategic vision and mission; (c) strategically putting the available resources together; (d) attracting and harnessing the high performing managers and staff; (e) dealing with structural, institutional and organisational dynamics, decisions, and problems that anticipate future challenges; (f) supervising day-to-day operations and implementation of organisational decisions.
I suspect, however, that no matter the acclamation for a generalist orientation in the public and private sectors, or even the argument for the specialists in government, arguing for either of them is in bad taste. Every organization or institution requires both. It is as simple as that. The reality of effective managerial presence in the public service requires that the generalist and the specialist possess a bit of competences required in the other’s domain, and this involve a range of subsidiary skills, for instance in policy analysis and project management. For instance, there is no generalist that would have any justifiable excuse not to have some significant and specialist expertise aside the general management skills. This is the core reason why core bureaucratic skills that were the competences of generalist administrators are now actively being professionalised. These include economists, planners, procurement, records management, financial management and accounting systems, Human Resources, organisation, operations and management research and management research, knowledge and talent management, training administration, HR information system, ICT, policy research and analysis, statistics and data management, decision science, investment planning and promotion, project management, negotiation, crisis and conflict resolution, strategic planning, pension management, PPPs, and so on.
And on the other hand, to be an efficient professional public manager and administrator demands some significant generalist competences not only in people management but also some core establishment issues, especially in the management of the policy process and strategic planning. Such a specialist public administrator must have significant experience and expertise in the management of the five Ms of management: men (HR), money (finance), methods (management techniques), machine (technology), and materials (inventory, stocks and procurement).
To offset the low efficiency and performance quotient of the system as well as the diminished managerial creativity of public officers, we need to insist, as a matter of regulatory gatekeeping, that every officer aspiring to top leadership positions in the civil service must acquire core specialist and generalist competency, and the system must see to it that officers are sufficiently rounded in these skills as part of professional development and leadership pipelining to top administrative level positions. This is a recognition of the fact that on the one hand, the civil service is not just an academic/intellectual space where candidates dazzle with erudition and breathe of intellectual rather than getting things done which is the core of bureaucratic professionalism. And on the other hand, running the business of government demands a whole multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary cocktail menu of a mix of strategic, tactical and operational skills.
The reform program and strategy that must undermine the fundamental structural bases of administrative and managerial operation in the Nigerian civil service system must factor this understanding of the generalist-specialist dynamics and relationship into consideration. Taking them as adversarial opposites will not work for reform.
Tunji Olaopa is chairman, Federal Civil Service Commission, Abuja; E-mail: [email protected]
