Last month, The Sentry, a United States (US) organisation that exposes ‘multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy’, issued a report asserting that Wagner had failed in Mali.
The report’s conclusions made waves in Africa and beyond – especially Europe. The notorious Russian mercenary/private security company’s entry into Mali in 2022/23 was regarded with alarm, including by pro-Western African states.
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Wagner’s arrival was seen in the West as the spearhead of Russia’s determined strategy to displace Western, particularly French, influence in the Sahel and beyond. Wagner was invited in by the Assimi Goïta-led military junta that ousted Mali’s civilian government in 2020, and expelled French troops that had been helping repel jihadists and separatists for a decade.
The Sentry’s report was no doubt reassuring to Western eyes, as it painted a picture of an organisation that seemed less threatening to Western interests than they had feared.
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Wagner’s main mission was to defeat the insurgents and rebels. Though France helped prevent these forces from capturing the capital and the country in 2013, French and Malian troops failed to follow through in succeeding years, and their enemies bounced back.
The failure of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s government in Bamako and its French allies to bring security to Mali contributed to the 2020 and 2021 military coups that brought Mr Goïta to power. He replaced the French with Wagner in 2022. But after some initial battlefield successes, Wagner gradually found itself just as unable to defeat the insurgents as the French.
In fact, The Sentry says security is now worse than before Wagner’s entry, with an increase in attacks on civilians and civilian casualties. The Economist recently cited Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) that shows jihad-related deaths averaged 3,135 annually between 2022 and 2024 – after Wagner entered – compared to 736 annually over the previous decade. This year, almost 2,000 have been killed.
The Sentry attributes Wagner’s failure to various reasons, from arrogance (including treating Malian soldiers with racism and contempt), to incompetence (saying many were recruited from prisons), to brutalising civilians, which has cut off informant intelligence.
The Sentry also notes that Wagner hasn’t replicated its Central African Republic success, where it gained control of considerable natural resources. It says Wagner withdrew from Mali in June to be replaced by the Africa Corps – a unit of the Russian army under tighter control.
One Malian military officer told The Sentry: ‘Wagner are worse than the French … we have gone from the frying pan into the fire.’
The report concludes that Wagner has not been ‘the infallible fighting force and successful economic actor it pretended to be.’ It says this ‘should be a warning to other African clients who are considering bringing in the [Russian] Ministry of Defence-backed Africa Corps.’
This warning seems mainly directed at Niger and Burkina Faso, which also recently experienced military coups, and subsequently expelled France and other Western security support, establishing close ties with Moscow. So far, Wagner does not appear to have a combat presence in the two countries.
The Sentry says Wagner’s failure should send a message to Europe that it ‘may be operating on an outdated understanding of Wagner’s strength and tactics.’ The military group’s failure opens opportunities to exert some diplomatic influence with the Sahelian juntas, according to The Sentry.
ACLED Senior Analyst for West Africa Héni Nsaibia believes Russia’s pivot from Wagner to Africa Corps is partly a shift from battlefield engagement towards regime stabilisation, infrastructure protection and strategic influence – though it will still conduct combat operations.
But the shift is ‘in line with Russia’s overall goal of being seen as a reliable alternative to Western military partners, especially by governments affected by insurgencies or political isolation. The Africa Corps model is more sustainable and politically controllable than Wagner’s riskier, high-profile deployments.’
But will it be any better than Wagner? If Africa Corps is more disciplined and less inclined to abuse the Malian military and population, perhaps it will do better. But many believe Wagner was just the Russian military in disguise, so expecting much more from the Africa Corps could be illogical.
Maria Kucherenko, an analyst at Ukraine’s CBA Initiatives Centre, believes Wagner was never really independent. She told the US Congress last year that ‘Russian intelligence services, often operating under the guise of so-called private military companies, help their state to support dictatorial regimes and to additionally invest in blurring the rules that would regulate the functioning of this world in a peaceful way.’
She added: ‘Research conducted by the Come Back Alive Foundation has traced Wagner’s presence – along with its affiliates in the General Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – to operations in over 70 countries.’
This included ‘propagandists, military advisers, and media operatives – spanning the full spectrum of military and non-military influence. Their name may change – Wagner, Africa Corps, or something else – but the mission remains the same: creating logistics networks designed to destabilise global security.’ Ms Kucherenko told ISS Today in Kyiv in June that of those 70 countries, 44 were in Africa.
If the Africa Corps fails, who do Malians turn to? Perhaps, as The Sentry suggests, Mali’s failure creates an opportunity for Western states to reopen the door to a renewed role in helping the country stabilise.
There seems to be little appetite to bring the French back – either among Malians or in Paris. Asked by journalists in July if France could envisage a renewed role in the Sahel, Mali’s Secretary of State for la Francophonie and International Partnerships, Thani Mohamed-Soilihi, said the security crisis was no longer a matter for his government.
However, The Economist says the US has sent officials to Bamako and other regional capitals to discuss security assistance and mineral deals. It reports that Turkey and the Gulf states also seem interested.
Some analysts suggest that the external partner’s identity is not the most important factor in determining success or failure, but rather the strategy used to combat terrorism. They say combat and non-combat military tactics, such as intelligence and training, and longer-term complementary development approaches, are needed.
It also seems in Mali’s interest to diversify its military and other support as much as possible, though current geopolitics could preclude that.
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It must also be true that the endpoint should be a return to democracy. This is more likely to sustain stability and development than propping up authoritarian governments as Russia has been doing – largely, it seems, to frustrate Western interests.
Peter Fabricius, Consultant, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Pretoria
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
