The Sahel is one of Africa’s most climate-vulnerable areas. The region increasingly experiences extreme weather such as floods and droughts, and ongoing land degradation, depleting the natural resources vital to local economies.
Between 1979 and 2010, average temperatures in the region rose by 0.6°C to 0.8°C, and further increases of 3°C to 6°C are projected by the end of the 21st century.
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Recent Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research examining the nexus between climate change and insecurity reveals that rural Sahelians have long relied on indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms to address climate-related tensions. The effects of climate change and rapid population growth have intensified competition over arable land, water and pasture – often leading to local conflicts.
Historically, the peaceful management of such tensions ensured the equitable use of scarce resources during periods of climatic stress. However, the intensification of jihadist violence in the Sahel is eroding social cohesion in several localities. That makes it more difficult for communities to resolve resource-based tensions and in doing so, withstand the effects of climate change.
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Tillabéri in Niger and Fada-Ngourma in Burkina Faso
ISS research in Tillabéri and Fada-Ngourma (see map) reveals that natural resource management is traditionally based on the coexistence of three production systems – pastoralism, agriculture and fishing, particularly around the Niger River.
These systems often compete for limited resources. They have coexisted through codified practices and norms grounded in customary law that govern interactions among socioeconomic groups. This approach represents a complex social architecture overseen by lineage heads, land chiefs, village chiefs and religious leaders, who monitor resource access and resolve disputes. Their authority maintains harmony within families, clans, casts and ethnic groups.
Nonetheless, the study found that resource-based conflicts continue in the context of increasing resource scarcity. These disputes include tensions between sedentary and nomadic herders, farmers, transhumant herders and farmers, and breeders and fishermen. The most frequent conflicts – particularly during periods of scarcity – arise between farmers and herders.
In response, Burkina Faso and Niger have established structures to arbitrate these natural resource disputes. In Niger, the Rural Code enabled land commissions at regional, departmental, communal and village levels. In Burkina Faso, legislation on rural land tenure created a Village Land Conciliation Commission in each village. But these entities – typically headed by prefects, governors or central government officials – struggle to manage tensions effectively.
In both ISS case studies, most interviewees expressed greater trust in customary institutions than in the state’s formal dispute resolution structures, which were often perceived as lacking legitimacy, impartiality and transparency. Concerns about corruption also undermine their credibility. In contrast, the strength of traditional institutions lies in their proximity to local communities and their ability to avoid cumbersome bureaucratic processes.
Trust in these institutions is rooted in two factors. First, the moral legitimacy of customary figures such as religious leaders, land chiefs and village heads, who are widely recognised as guardians of social order. Second, their conciliatory approach to dispute resolution, which prioritises the preservation of communal harmony and familial ties.
This traditional governance structure has long supported community resilience to climate shocks. However, it is increasingly threatened by the growing influence of violent extremist groups and the overly militarised counter-terrorism responses of Sahelian states.
Groups such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara have frequently attacked communities and local religious leaders. With their deep-rooted authority and strong influence, these leaders are targeted for several reasons.
First, to weaken their influence and impose the jihadist groups’ authority by subjugating dissenters. Second, because the leaders represent a community order that the groups seek to dismantle. This is either because the hierarchical structures of customary or religious leadership conflict with the extremists’ egalitarian vision of Islam, or because the local leaders are viewed as state collaborators.
Many community leaders have been killed, threatened or displaced, leading to a loss of authority and a reduced capacity to mediate social tensions. In some areas, jihadist groups impose governance systems based on oppressive rules that directly challenge the legitimacy of traditional land tenure systems and destabilise local governance.
Several leaders and fighters within extremist groups originate from the Fulani community. Generalisations implying widespread Fulani sympathy for jihadist groups have fuelled retaliatory attacks, cycles of violence and social exclusion. In turn, these dynamics have led some Fulani individuals to join armed groups – either as a means of self-protection or to seek revenge against security forces.
State-led security initiatives have sometimes aggravated local tensions. In Burkina Faso, the recruitment of civilian volunteers for counter-terrorism operations has inadvertently exposed some communities to jihadist reprisals, further eroding public trust in the state to provide security.
These ongoing cycles of violence and deteriorating local governance undermine the social consensus needed to manage natural resources. Ultimately, it is not just resource scarcity that threatens climate resilience in the Sahel, but the breakdown of the traditional systems that once ensured their equitable management.
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The Sahel crisis underscores the need for a multidimensional approach to regional stability. While climate adaptation strategies must include technical interventions such as agronomic innovations, long-term resilience demands that the underlying drivers of insecurity are addressed. These drivers fuel the region’s political, humanitarian and environmental fragility.
Strengthening community resilience to climate change requires strengthening local governance structures. Sahelian governments – particularly in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – must go beyond military responses and invest in restoring social cohesion.
A sustainable future also depends on meaningful support for community dialogue, conflict mediation and empowering traditional institutions as part of a comprehensive strategy for peace and stability.
Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, Sahel Project Manager, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
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