The W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) Complex is a vast wildlife sanctuary spanning the intersecting borders of Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger. With one of the most diverse ecosystems in West Africa’s savanna belt, it is a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation World Heritage Site and shelters threatened species such as cheetahs, giraffes, wild dogs, elephants, lions and leopards.
But the WAP’s million hectares of remote landscape is also a hub for organised transnational crimes, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and people.
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Weapons smuggling is the most prolific illegal activity in the WAP, says Juliana Appiah from the University of Ghana’s Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy. Carried out mainly by armed groups who exploit the park’s rugged terrain and porous borders, the flow of weapons and ammunition facilitates terrorism, poaching, banditry and communal violence.
Arms trafficking is also intertwined with Sahelian conflicts. These are driven by ethnic tensions, jihadist insurgencies and criminality, says Institute for Security Studies Sahel Programme Senior Researcher Hassane Koné.
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Five extremist groups are largely responsible for arms trafficking in the region, says Mr Koné. They include Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Ansaroul Islam, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Islamic State Sahel Province. Trafficked weapons include assault rifles, light machine guns and pistols, with AK-47s favoured for their firepower and portability.
Fidel Owusu, an analyst at the Conflict Research Consortium for Africa, told ISS Today that local criminal networks supplied arms to the highest bidder, using motorbikes and animals to move large quantities of weapons along paths through the bush. Using their knowledge of the region’s rough terrain, current and former militants, professional transporters and corrupted security force members buy, sell and transport firearms.
Weapons enter the WAP through various channels. Ms Appiah says that most are diverted from government stores and poorly guarded stockpiles. Benin is both a destination and transit country, while Niger serves as a transit zone for arms from Libya en route to Mali.
Regional governments are committed to stopping the weapons flow, though Owusu believes efforts to manage stockpiles, enforce laws and control arms transfers remain inadequate.
Government responses to arms smuggling in the region have been mainly militarised. In 2014, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and African Union reactivated the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria to address trans-border crimes and create a safe environment in terror-affected areas. Niger withdrew from the MNJTF after the country’s July 2023 coup, which Owusu says has led to more weapons flowing through the WAP into the Sahel.
While the MNJTF remains active at a low level, international support shifted to another option. In February 2017, France, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger launched the G5 Sahel Force with ECOWAS’ support. The force aimed to combat insurgencies and arms trafficking in the Sahel, including the WAP.
However, accusations of French dominance led to the suspension of the G5 Sahel Force after Mali withdrew in May 2022, followed by Niger and Burkina Faso in December 2023. Chad and Mauritania announced the force’s termination on 6 December 2023.
In April 2023, with renewed political support from ECOWAS, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) enhanced its engagements in the WAP area to counter the rising threat of violent extremism. Although this intensified operational phase – which also involved the French-led Task Force Takuba – marked a shift in dynamics, security in the WAP and Sahel did not improve.
The United States’ support for the MNJTF and G5 Sahel was also withdrawn, with anti-West protests and the region’s intractable conflicts forcing Western countries to pull back from the Sahel.
Mali then turned to Russia’s Wagner Group to help combat extremists and tackle insecurity. But this hasn’t stopped arms flowing through the WAP, says Edmund Foley, head of Public Law at Ghana’s Institute of Management and Public Administration.
In September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States – partly to fill the vacuum left by the G5 Sahel Force, and also in response to a potential ECOWAS intervention after Niger’s July 2023 coup. By January 2024, all three states had indicated they would withdraw from ECOWAS.
In 2017 the Accra Initiative was launched by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo to prevent terrorism from spreading from the Sahel to coastal countries in the region. In 2019, Mali and Niger were admitted as observers. Member countries conduct joint military operations and training and share intelligence.
In March 2024, an Accra Initiative delegation visited Maiduguri in northern Nigeria – an area that has been on the front line of violent extremism – to study the Borno Model, a post-conflict reconciliation programme that offers amnesty to Boko Haram militants who surrender to the military. However, Mr Foley says there are concerns over its applicability in the highly profitable trafficking environment of the WAP.
Initiatives targeting arms trafficking specifically remain limited in the WAP Complex, despite clear links between arms traffickers, organised criminals, jihadist groups and insurgents. Regional and international actors have focused on security-centric responses with little success.
There is no doubt that strengthening regional cooperation, intelligence sharing, border patrols and targeted search missions would reduce the illicit arms flow in the WAP. But security responses should form part of a broader intervention targeting both supply and demand drivers of illicit arms.
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It is crucial that social and economic vulnerabilities are addressed, and community mediation is supported. The Sahel Resilience Project offers a pathway forward. This ambitious initiative aims to tackle interconnected challenges in the region, including youth unemployment, food insecurity and the impacts of climate change, all of which contribute to the conditions that fuel insecurity.
However, the project faces significant challenges, including slow disbursement of funds, coordination issues between implementing partners and ongoing security threats. Overcoming these hurdles will ensure the project’s success in building resilience and contributing to long-term peace and stability in the WAP region.
Feyi Ogunade, West Africa Organised Crime Observatory Coordinator, ENACT, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), West Africa
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies in partnership with INTERPOL and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
