Eight years ago, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) helped end over two decades of dictatorship in The Gambia, setting the stage for the country’s transition to democracy. Today, ECOWAS’ active support remains critical to stability in The Gambia.
In December 2016, then-president Yahya Jammeh’s refusal to accept electoral defeat led to mediation and the threat of military intervention by ECOWAS. With support from the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN), these efforts saw Mr Jammeh’s departure and the inauguration of President Adama Barrow in January 2017.
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At the core of the country’s transition and stabilisation is revising the 1997 constitution to enable important institutional reforms that will redefine The Gambia’s politics and governance frameworks. This process is also key to the country’s security sector reform and transitional justice efforts, particularly in meeting the needs of victims of Mr Jammeh’s rule.
But although the political and civil spaces have become less restrictive under Mr Barrow’s administration, constitutional reform remains elusive.
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Disagreements among political actors over the new draft constitution persist. A five-year stalemate followed the National Assembly’s rejection of the draft in 2020. A revised version, published by the government in August 2024, has been criticised by opposition parties and civil society.
Dubbed the ‘Barrow Constitution’, it is silent on whether or when the clause on presidential term limits will apply to Mr Barrow. Unlike the 2020 version, the latest draft strengthens executive power by removing clauses requiring parliamentary approval of ministerial nominations and appointments to key state institutions. The draft retains presidential power to appoint five National Assembly members.
Political actors and civil society representatives told the Institute for Security Studies they believed the latest draft would make Mr Barrow eligible to run for two more terms. These would be in addition to the two he would have already served by 2026 when the next presidential elections are due.
Although the draft received its first reading in the National Assembly on 23 December 2024, and a second is being prepared, there are real risks of rejection. The main opposition United Democratic Party has vowed to vote it down. These entrenched positions necessitate a reactivation of ECOWAS involvement.
As a key supporter of Gambian stabilisation efforts, the regional organisation could relaunch its mediation efforts led by former Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan. Aiming to build consensus on key clauses, the talks started in Banjul after the rejection of the 2020 draft constitution and continued in Abuja. Negotiations ended when the parties could not reach consensus.
Beyond failing to adopt a new constitution, The Gambia has struggled to register real progress towards transitional justice. The Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission report recommends prosecuting individuals for human rights violations and international crimes committed from 1994-2017, and providing reparations for victims.
A few convictions and sentences have been handed down through Gambian courts, including that of former local government minister Yankuba Touray for ex-finance minister Ousman Koro Ceesay’s murder. Yet Gambian law does not provide for prosecutions of crimes with international dimensions – a lacuna that could be addressed with external support.
Some prosecutions and convictions have occurred outside The Gambia. The most recent example is a German court’s sentencing to life imprisonment of Bai Lowe, a former member of Mr Jammeh’s ‘Junglers’ unit, for participating in his opponents’ assassinations. Another example is a Swiss court’s sentencing in May 2024 of former interior minister Ousman Sonko to 20 years in prison for crimes against humanity.
Recognising the utility of an externally supported court to hold perpetrators accountable, ECOWAS leaders approved the establishment of the Special Tribunal for The Gambia in December 2024. This hybrid court can conduct trials inside or outside the country.
Whether it succeeds will depend on the availability of the necessary human and financial resources, much of which ECOWAS could provide. Notably, the court could enable the country to obtain support from ECOWAS member states such as Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone – the last of which operated a similar court in the past in The Hague.
The continued support of ECOWAS is also vital for effective security sector reform. This notwithstanding Gambians’ increasing calls for the departure of ECOWAS’ military Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG). The mission was deployed in January 2017 to protect key state institutions and support security sector reform, but its continued presence has implications for the country’s sovereignty.
Although the National Security Strategy and Security Sector Reform Strategy were adopted in 2020, no other major advances have been made, including rightsizing the defence and security forces.
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Underpinning this lack of progress is the continued distrust between the presidency and the military – particularly the army. This situation has made the presidency reliant on ECOMIG forces for security. The ECOWAS mission is increasingly seen as a protection force for Mr Barrow’s regime, but should instead help the country finalise its security sector reform in the short term.
Given the slow pace of reform in The Gambia and the tense socio-political context, ECOWAS’ support remains necessary. The regional bloc’s decision in December 2024 to assess the financial implications of maintaining ECOMIG is a chance to launch a new cycle of dialogue between the political players.
To give greater weight to its actions, ECOWAS should involve the AU and UN. All three organisations helped launch The Gambia’s stabilisation process in 2017. They now need to support the adoption of a new constitution – an essential requirement for the security and judicial reforms necessary for the country’s stability.
Aïssatou Kanté, Researcher, Paulin Maurice Toupane, Senior Researcher and Sampson Kwarkye, Project Manager, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
