On 27 January, the governors of Borno in Nigeria and Cameroon’s Far North Region inaugurated a livestock market in Banki, once a major hub of cross-border trade between the two countries. The Amchidé-Banki border post, like several others between Cameroon and Nigeria, was closed in 2014 at the height of Boko Haram activity in the region.
In early 2014, the violent extremist group had moved to Banki, where it planned attacks on Cameroon. Nigeria closed the border to prevent further incursions. Cameroon closed the Fotokol-Gambaru border crossing after the 2015 Gamboru battle and attacks on other nearby border posts.
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As military operations and the region’s stabilisation strategy improved security, the Amchidé-Banki border was reopened in 2019, followed by the Fotokol-Gambaru crossing in 2021.
The closures had disrupted the booming cross-border market that sustained the border communities’ economy. For most of its neighbours, Nigeria is the region’s leading economic and trade partner. Goods from Nigeria pass through Amchidé, Limani and Fotokol on their way to Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic.
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The three towns are therefore important transit centres and warehouses for local traders, creating jobs and revenue through taxes that local authorities can use for development initiatives.
Overall, reopening the borders has contributed to Cameroon’s national economy through customs duties. Far North customs data reviewed by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) revealed that before Boko Haram attacks started in 2013, the most profitable office in the region was Limani, which generated annual revenue of XAF1 114 791 860 (around $1,900,000). In 2024, after reopening the borders, revenue reached XAF2 201 420 676 (around $3,800,000). In Fotokol, XAF1 519 630 651 ($2,600,000) was collected in 2024.
But Boko Haram has not been defeated, and still presents a security threat to both countries. While reopening borders has undoubtedly revitalised the regional economy, it has also benefitted the insurgents – allowing them to regroup and target traders and local communities.
The now thriving Amchidé-Banki market enables border communities to trade in livestock and food products. But it can also, as in the past, serve as a source of supplies for Boko Haram and give fresh impetus to the militants’ economy of violence. Boko Haram could, for example, use the newly inaugurated cattle market in Banki to resell stolen cattle, an activity that has become a major source of the group’s income.
The Lake Chad Basin Commission member states – Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger – initiated the 2019 Regional Stabilisation Strategy to enable the recovery of livelihoods in areas afflicted by Boko Haram. The strategy involves maintaining security and providing essential services and immediate means of subsistence to affected communities.
The revival of cross-border trade and economic activities has greatly contributed to the stabilisation process by strengthening local communities’ resilience. It also led to a substantial return of displaced people to their communities of origin because of the prospect of renewed socio-economic opportunities.
But since traffic across the northern Nigeria-Cameroon borders has resumed, traders and transporters have increasingly been targeted by the terrorists. Attacks and ambushes aimed at traders and transporters on the road, and night raids on communities, occur almost daily in both countries.
According to ISS data, between September and November 2024, at least 29 ambushes or attacks were launched against vehicles transporting trade goods from Banki or Amchidé. Trucks are often emptied of their contents and burnt, while drivers and traders are kidnapped or killed.
The roads linking Banki-Amchidé-Limani and Fotokol-Maltam to National Route No. 1 are rutted and unpaved, passing through bush for several kilometres. Boko Haram often places improvised explosive devices on this stretch of road.
The Banki-Amchidé-Limani and Fotokol regions are threatened by the two major Boko Haram factions – Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) operating around Fotokol in the north, and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), based in the Mandara Mountains in the south. Boko Haram’s presence threatens the progress and stability enabled by the reopening of the trade route.
Recent reports also show large-scale ISWAP attacks on military posts in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, aimed at weakening the security apparatus, stocking up on weapons and taking advantage of the booming cross-border trade. This upsurge in terrorism could undermine the confidence of communities in their countries’ security forces. It also heightens the vulnerability of locals, often leading them to cooperate with the insurgents in return for improved safety.
It is paramount that Cameroon and Nigeria reinforce physical security and augment intelligence to detect and disrupt terror operations. A proactive strategy could prevent the spread of Boko Haram cells along borders and major trade routes, as was the case with past military efforts.
In 2015 and 2016, operations by the Cameroonian army, supported by Cameroonian and Nigerian contingents of the Multinational Joint Task Force, dismantled Boko Haram hideouts and suicide bomber training bases in Nigeria’s Ngoshié and Kumshé villages.
These operations should involve the air force and Operation Hadin Kai, led by the Nigerian army. Joint operations should aim to dismantle Boko Haram cells that are targeting cross-border traders, their vehicles and local community members.
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A military escort system dedicated to securing goods convoys is also needed to protect trade flows and deter Boko Haram activity. Military escorts would also help limit illicit trafficking and prevent any infiltration by Boko Haram agents attempting to resupply.
Road infrastructure must also be improved. Cameroon’s Far North Region special reconstruction and development programme should prioritise upgrading the Mora-Amchidé and Fotokol-Maltam roads as has been requested by local authorities.
Célestin Delanga, Research Officer, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
