ISWAP’s elaborate propaganda was aimed at winning over local communities to boost its recruitment and revenue drives.

Military operations are needed, but haven’t stopped Boko Haram attacks. Complementary non-kinetic efforts must be considered.

In its quest to expand beyond north-east Nigeria, clashes between the JAS and ISWAP factions are not in the global...

Mass defections crippled JAS, one of two Boko Haram factions, but the same fate is unlikely to befall ISWAP.

Disrupting the financing and local economies of violence is crucial to defeating terrorist groups.

Nearly a decade of experience managing Boko Haram defectors is invaluable for West Africa and the Sahel.

Deploying drones and other technology might change the conflict dynamics, giving violent extremists the upper hand.

Violent extremism has outlived three Nigerian presidencies – will Bola Tinubu be the leader who ends the onslaught?

High-profile attacks expose the Nigerian government’s inability to contain the expansion and potency of violent extremists and bandits.

Low confidence in governments allows terrorists to insert themselves into society and further undermine the state.