Security and economic cooperation in West Africa was dealt a blow by the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January. The three countries are governed by coup leaders, and in September 2023 formed an alternative security partnership – the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Pragmatic bilateral cooperation between AES and other West African countries, such as Senegal and Togo, has taken place, and in May the AES and ECOWAS agreed on the need to jointly tackle terrorism. These are positive steps, but don’t match the benefits of institutional security alliances in a volatile region.
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Many parts of West Africa are affected by cross-border terrorism, organised crime and localised conflicts between communities in border regions. The Global Terrorism Index 2025 ranks Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger among the world’s top five countries most affected by terrorism, and the violence is spreading southwards.
This deteriorating security landscape underscores the urgent need to revitalise regional cooperation. Two platforms besides ECOWAS could help achieve that: the Accra Initiative and the Conseil de l’Entente.
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The Accra Initiative includes Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and was created to tackle terrorism and transnational organised crime. It is built on three pillars: joint military operations, intelligence and information sharing, and the training of security and intelligence personnel.
However, the initiative has been largely inactive in recent years. Its last joint military operation was in 2021, with no plans for future actions. Activities related to the other two pillars have largely ceased, and member state representatives stationed at the Executive Secretariat in Accra have returned to their home countries.
Several factors have contributed to its inactivity, including dynamics within the organisation. Diplomats interviewed by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) identified mistrust between AES states and their coastal neighbours stemming partly from ECOWAS decisions to establish a regional force to counter coups. This was after the overthrows in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in July 2023.
After Niger’s coup, ECOWAS threatened to intervene militarily to restore constitutional order. In September 2023, relations deteriorated after Niger accused Benin of authorising deployments to restore deposed president Mohamed Bazoum to power.
Despite these challenges, cooperation remains essential. ISS research shows that violent extremist groups in the Sahel are using illicit networks that operate through coastal states. Disrupting these resource flows would significantly weaken the groups, offering mutual security benefits for both Sahelian and coastal countries.
Given a weakened ECOWAS and an inactive Accra Initiative, the Conseil de l’Entente is a promising alternative for renewed collaboration. Based in Abidjan and founded in 1959, the organisation includes nearly all members of the Accra Initiative – excluding Ghana. Mali has observer status.
Like the Accra Initiative, the Conseil has three main organs: the Conference of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers and Committee of Experts. Its core objectives include promoting peace, security and stability.
One of its defining principles is the sovereign equality and independence of member states. Unlike ECOWAS, it does not suspend or sanction members following coups or constitutional crises. This politically neutral stance has likely contributed to Burkina Faso and Niger’s continued membership, alongside the need for economic integration. Notably, its deputy executive secretary is from Niger.
This commitment to neutrality is reinforced by the Conseil de l’Entente’s discreet consensus-based diplomatic style. It often engages member states at the highest political levels on sensitive issues while avoiding public pressure. A diplomat told ISS that this approach fosters long-term trust and confidence, ensuring that member states see the organisation as a partner rather than an enforcer.
The Conseil has experience in convening regional stakeholders to discuss shared security challenges. Since 2016, it has held annual meetings of security ministers, preceded by expert consultations involving heads of police, gendarmerie and border management agencies. These gatherings have addressed the growing threat of violent extremism in both the Sahel and coastal regions.
Beyond national governmental engagement, the organisation has supported knowledge and experience sharing among local government officials, civil society actors and other stakeholders affected by violent extremism. With technical support from ISS and funding from Switzerland, the Conseil organised regional workshops on preventing violent extremism in Abidjan (2018), Ouagadougou (2019) and Lomé (2023).
Given its neutrality and sustained connections with both AES and coastal states, the Conseil is well-positioned to initiate mediation that could gradually restore cooperation. Plans along these lines are already underway, alongside ministerial and expert meetings in 2025 to review the implementation of national strategies to prevent violent extremism.
There are also ongoing discussions about Ghana potentially joining the organisation. This would create a membership base similar to the Accra Initiative – though with a broader mandate and a different operational approach. Ghanaian representatives, including the current Special Envoy to the AES states, have previously participated in Conseil de l’Entente activities.
Burkina Faso and Niger’s continued participation in the Conseil suggests a degree of confidence in its neutrality and an openness to renewed dialogue. That means the Conseil is uniquely positioned to facilitate the revival of sustainable regional security cooperation.
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However, a comprehensive independent assessment of both bilateral relations within the organisation and its institutional capacity to mediate ongoing tensions is essential. The findings could inform the design of targeted support to strengthen the Conseil de l’Entente’s role in regional peace and security.
Sampson Kwarkye, Project Manager, Littoral West African States, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
Research for this article was funded by the governments of Denmark and The Netherlands, and the Bosch Foundation.
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
