The damage is not to Governor Ademola Adeleke or the opposition party. The damage is to President Tinubu. It invites the central question every overzealous enforcement action provokes: Did the President authorise this — and other similar actions, including judicial manoeuvres?
After the bishops’ recent closed‑door meeting with President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Cardinal John Onaiyekan made a striking claim: that presidential aides are shielding the President from the true suffering in the country, presenting a false “rosy picture,” and that Tinubu already appears desperate about winning the 2027 election.
As a writer and observer of governance, I share that concern. A president who controls the instruments of state, commands a united party, and faces a divided opposition has little rational cause for electoral anxiety — unless overzealous handlers are manufacturing threats where few exist.
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The question therefore deserves to be asked plainly: What exactly is President Bola Ahmed Tinubu afraid of?
The EFCC’s freezing of the Osun State Government’s accounts barely a week before the July 2025 governorship election — citing a court order later reversed by the President himself — was not merely a legal misstep. It was a political signal of ‘over‑sabi’ — that familiar Yoruba expression for excessive, misdirected overzealousness — gone disastrously wrong. It also raised a question that goes beyond Osun’s finances and cuts to the heart of governance in Abuja: Are these the deliberate choices of a confident presidency, or the panicked manoeuvres of handlers who have convinced the President that 2027 is a battle he might lose?
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Because by any honest reading of Nigeria’s political landscape, the evidence for such fear is astonishingly thin.
Tinubu enters the 2027 cycle with structural advantages unmatched in recent democratic history.
He controls the executive machinery of the Federal Government with unusual cohesion. The CBN and FIRS — custodians of national treasury and revenue — and the full architecture of anti‑corruption agencies operate within a Presidency facing no internal rebellion. The security services — police, SSS, and the military — answer to the Commander‑in‑Chief. INEC operates within a constitutional framework that any well‑resourced incumbent can navigate with relative ease.
Why should he entertain fear? His party, the APC, has absorbed opposition defections at a rate that has reshaped the electoral map. Several governors elected on opposition platforms in 2023 have since crossed over, weakening the institutional backbone of any credible challenge. The PDP, Labour Party, and other formations remain fractured — much like 2023, when the split between Atiku Abubakar, Peter Obi, and Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso arguably delivered the presidency to Tinubu on the platter of gold. Has he forgotten that blessing in disguise?
Tinubu won the 2023 election under conditions far more hostile than anything he faces today. President Muhammadu Buhari was not enthusiastic about his candidacy. Vice President Yemi Osinbajo, Senate President Ahmed Lawan, ministers, and other APC heavyweights were either rivals or reluctant supporters. Yet Tinubu prevailed.
He now enters 2027 with those internal rivals neutralised and with the incumbency advantage he lacked in 2023.
So why are his handlers suddenly desperate — even flirting with anti‑democratic impulses?
Should a president who survived 2023’s turbulence now need anti‑corruption agencies freezing a state’s accounts one week before an election to prove loyalty?
Governance under Tinubu is mixed — but not devoid of genuine achievements. Abuja, under the politically abrasive but undeniably effective Nyesom Wike, has witnessed accelerated infrastructural development: roads, housing schemes, and urban renewal projects visible to anyone who drives through the city. One may dislike his crude politics, but his performance as minister rivals the El‑Rufai era. Had these — and other ministerial achievements — been properly documented and consistently communicated, wouldn’t they have formed a persuasive counter‑narrative to critics?
The Ministry of Information and National Orientation has also done strategic work in countering the internationally amplified “Christian genocide” narrative — a framing that ignored the Muslim communities devastated by banditry and terrorism in the North‑West and North‑East. Doesn’t the lobbying that produced a more balanced posture from Washington — including under President Donald Trump — reflect a sophistication in foreign‑policy communication that deserves amplification?
The administration has increased military remuneration, strengthening loyalty to civilian command. The foiling of a reported coup attempt further consolidates military alignment with the presidency. Do these achievements justify political panic?
One under‑analysed dimension of Tinubu’s political arithmetic is the legacy of the Muslim–Muslim ticket. The Tinubu–Shettima pairing was controversial in 2023, with critics warning it would alienate Christian voters. Yet, paradoxically after the victory, the administration has appointed Christian technocrats to some of the most economically sensitive ministries and key security portfolios — alongside many Yoruba appointees. Whether by design or necessity, hasn’t the Muslim–Muslim ticket ended up delivering significant Christian representation at the apex of federal governance?
Retaining Shettima for 2027 follows the same logic: Consolidate the Muslim North — especially the core North that delivered decisive margins — while Christian appointments counterbalance the optics. It is a defensible strategy. But doesn’t it require sophisticated communication — which has not always been forthcoming?
Back to Osun: The real danger. The EFCC’s freezing of Osun’s accounts days before an election was legally arguable but politically indefensible. The timing made it impossible to interpret as anything other than partisan interference. The President‑ordered reversal after the alleged court order only confirmed what the optics had already declared.
The damage is not to Governor Ademola Adeleke or the opposition party. The damage is to President Tinubu. It invites the central question every overzealous enforcement action provokes: Did the President authorise this — and other similar actions, including judicial manoeuvres?
If yes, it suggests a president anxious about 2027, despite overwhelming structural advantages — or one willing to compromise institutional integrity for marginal electoral gain. If no, it suggests something equally dangerous: that agencies are acting in his name without his knowledge, and that the Presidency is unable to control institutions under its authority.
Neither interpretation flatters the presidency. Both are politically corrosive.
Nigeria has seen this pattern before. Weaponising anti‑corruption agencies does not strengthen incumbents. It delegitimises institutions, hardens opposition resolve, generates sympathy for targeted figures, and provides ammunition to international observers already sceptical of Nigeria’s democratic governance.
Does the arithmetic of intimidation ever favour the intimidator?
Tinubu is not a political novice. He is one of the most strategically sophisticated political minds Nigeria has produced. The Lagos model — whatever its imperfections — demonstrates his ability to build and sustain political structures over decades.
Which makes the question more urgent: Who is advising him that these manoeuvres are necessary? Are they genuinely trying to secure his re‑election? Or are some exploiting his perceived anxiety for their own selfish interests?
Because the greatest threat to a Tinubu second term is not Atiku Abubakar, Peter Obi, or Kwankwaso. It is the growing perception that a confident Presidency is behaving like one that is not.
Yushau A. Shuaib is the author of MNI Versus MNIPR in NIPSS on Tackling Institutional Bullying. [email protected]
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