A Pan-African economic negotiation framework is not anti-West or anti-China. It is pro-Africa. It says Africa will no longer negotiate like 54 isolated islands, but like a continent with leverage, resources, a young population, and a future worth defending… If Africa can agree internally, enforce its own standards, implement its trade integration, and insist on local value addition, then the era of being “on the menu” can finally end. The continent can move from extraction to production, from dependency to partnership, and from endless potential to real, measurable prosperity.
In a recent interview granted by Dr Kayode Fayemi, former governor of Ekiti State, on the African Renaissance Podcast in South Africa, he spoke on a wide range of issues. He touched on the posture of the United States towards Africa under President Trump, the controversial genocide accusations against South Africa and Nigeria, and broader questions about how Africa should engage with the world.
|
|
What stood out most for me, however, was his reflection on how African countries consistently negotiate with the West and China from their weakest positions. Listening to him, I found myself framing his argument as what I would call a Pan-African Economic Negotiation Model. It struck me deeply, and I believe it is an idea Africa must examine seriously and holistically if the continent is truly interested in economic restoration and long-term emancipation.
What struck me was not just the range of topics he covered, but the clarity of his warning. Africa keeps showing up to global negotiations as fragmented states, and that fragmentation is exactly why the continent keeps getting the short end of the stick.
|
|
|
|---|
The world is reorganising itself. Power is shifting. Old alliances are being tested, and new players are rising. Yet, Africa is entering this moment from one of its weakest collective positions, not because it lacks resources, talent, or ideas, but because it lacks coordination and, more importantly, the courage to act as one when it truly matters.
As I listened to him, I could not help thinking about how history keeps repeating itself when lessons are ignored. A multipolar world can present opportunities, but it can also trigger a fresh scramble. When major powers are competing for strategic minerals, markets, and influence, they will not patiently wait for Africa to “get organised.” They will do what powerful actors have always done: pursue their own interests aggressively. And when Africa remains divided, it becomes easy to pit one country against another, reward one today, threaten another tomorrow, and keep the continent permanently negotiating from weakness.
Mr Fayemi did not sugarcoat this reality. In very simple terms, he explained that this is how Africa ends up “on the menu,” rather than at the table. That phrase stayed with me because it perfectly captures how Africa is often treated in global conversations, as a site for extraction, not as a partner with agency.
One of the most practical, and frankly uncomfortable points he made was about Africa’s love for invitations. China-Africa summits, US-Africa summits, EU-Africa meetings, Gulf-Africa forums. We attend them all. Fifty-four heads of state, ministers, delegations, and entourages. It looks impressive. It feels like relevance. But then the real question arises: What do we actually do when we get there?
According to him, we arrive without a shared agenda. We do not meet among ourselves beforehand. We do not agree on minimum demands or common red lines. We do not align around strategy. Instead, we scramble for crumbs, with each country trying to secure its own deal, even when that deal ultimately weakens the continent.
That is not diplomacy. That is disorganisation dressed up as engagement.
This is where what I now think of as the Pan-African Economic Negotiation Model became my biggest takeaway.
The idea is simple. If Africa is negotiating with powerful blocs and superpowers, then Africa must behave like a bloc too, especially on issues where it holds real leverage.
Fayemi reminded listeners of something we often forget or pretend not to see. Africa is not poor in resources. It is resource-rich, but it does not negotiate like it understands its own value. Cobalt, platinum, manganese, gold, bauxite, the minerals the world needs for batteries, electric vehicles, advanced manufacturing, and modern technology. The world is hungry for them, and Africa holds a significant share. Yet, Africa continues to export these resources largely in raw form and buys them back as finished products, at prices that keep its people poor.
He proposed something bold, but long overdue. Africa should begin to behave like coordinated producers, much like OPEC does with oil. Not by copying OPEC blindly, but by adopting the mindset: collective strategy, collective leverage, and collective benefit.
In his framing, if partners want Africa’s critical minerals, then Africa should negotiate processing, value addition, and industrial investment on African soil. If battery plants are needed, they should be built in Africa. If refining must happen, it should be in Africa. Joint exploration is fine, but Africa should set the terms. Crucially, African countries must first agree among themselves, and decide what goes where, based on infrastructure, power supply, skills, and regional balance, not desperation. That is how you stop divide-and-rule economics.
His illustration using Nigeria’s oil experience made the issue painfully clear. Nigeria produces crude oil, yet for years imported refined products because its refineries collapsed. This is the same trap many African countries face with minerals: sell raw materials cheaply, buy back finished products expensively, and then wonder why development never arrives.
He referenced major industrial projects like the Dangote Refinery, not as a celebration of one businessman, but as proof of a principle. Value addition changes everything. Local refining and processing create jobs, build skills, strengthen supply chains, and keep wealth circulating within the continent.
For me, the wider lesson is simple. Africa’s biggest export is not its resources. Africa’s biggest export is the value it fails to capture. Until that changes, aid, conferences, and fine speeches will remain noise.
Another point that stayed with me was his argument about Africa not even knowing how rich it truly is, especially when billions leave the continent every year through illicit financial flows. When money bleeds out through weak systems, corruption, and poor enforcement, Africa then goes into negotiations presenting itself like a poor beggar. You cannot negotiate from strength, while refusing to confront your own leakages.
This is why the Pan-African negotiation framework cannot be only about dealing with external partners. It must also involve internal discipline: stronger institutions, better transparency, coordinated policies, and leaders willing to treat theft from public resources as sabotage of the continent’s future.
I also appreciated how he framed the climate and energy debate. While the world talks about transition, data centres, and net-zero targets, much of Africa is still struggling with basic electricity for cooking, lighting, and schools.
He put it bluntly: if hundreds of millions of Africans still cook with firewood, what exactly are they transitioning from?
Africa cannot outsource its development priorities to global fashion. It must negotiate climate justice alongside energy justice. No continent can industrialise in darkness. No economy can build factories without power. Energy poverty must therefore sit at the centre of Africa’s engagement with the world, not as an apology, but as a legitimate development demand.
He also spoke about Africa’s free trade ambition under AfCFTA as a massive idea that still remains largely on paper. That resonated deeply. The continent keeps launching frameworks without implementation.
A Pan-African negotiation model only becomes credible when Africa integrates its own market seriously. If Africa cannot trade efficiently with itself, it will always struggle to negotiate confidently with external blocs. Free movement for entrepreneurs, smoother cross-border trade, shared standards, regional infrastructure, and payment systems that reduce friction, are not optional extras. They are the foundation of bargaining power.
One of his closing thoughts is the one I keep returning to. Pan-Africanism cannot remain a belief system practised only by politicians at conferences. It must leave politics and enter everyday economics. It must be driven by examples across enterprise, academia, industry, technology, and civic leadership. It must show up in real systems and practical cooperation, not just in archived documents at the African Union.
I agree with him completely. If Pan-Africanism stays as a slogan, Africa remains a market. If Pan-Africanism becomes a strategy, Africa becomes a player.
My personal take away from Fayemi’s interview is this: Africa’s restoration will not come from being liked by global powers, being invited to their tables, or being praised in their speeches. It will come from Africa taking itself seriously enough to coordinate, negotiate, and insist on value.
A Pan-African economic negotiation framework is not anti-West or anti-China. It is pro-Africa. It says Africa will no longer negotiate like 54 isolated islands, but like a continent with leverage, resources, a young population, and a future worth defending.
If Africa can agree internally, enforce its own standards, implement its trade integration, and insist on local value addition, then the era of being “on the menu” can finally end. The continent can move from extraction to production, from dependency to partnership, and from endless potential to real, measurable prosperity.
Kayode Adebiyi, a public affairs commentator writes from the UK.
