Far more lasting, though, is all that has to be done to remove the motive for citizens joining or tolerating these gangs. Call this the livelihoods and justice obstacles course. Along this path, the immediate deliverable is to boost rural livelihoods and youth employment in high-risk states, through investment in public works, the creation of agro-value chain jobs, supporting apprenticeships in towns, and conditional cash transfers for the most vulnerable.
“After the incident, the DSS and the military were involved in the rescue effort. They got in contact with the bandits to release the captives unharmed…The security agencies have a way of contacting these people. They (bandits) know the consequences of not acquiescing to government demands. They know they could be pummelled”, thus went the president’s spokesman on how the kidnap victims from the church in Eruku, Kwara State, obtained their freedom. The soundness of this narrative is charming on the face of it, but ultimately threatening to how the state is organised. Not too long ago, the government’s sole ownership of the capacity for violence meant that local actors included in their decision to resort to violence against the Nigerian State, deep consideration of government’s ability and readiness to extract a disproportionate penalty.
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This dynamic was upended a while back, with the advantage shifting remarkably in favour of armed non-state actors. Over the last two decades, the spate of kidnappings (including mass school and community abductions) in the country has surged, with the victims count reaching the hundreds of thousands annually, driven mainly by criminal gangs and bandits who profit from ransoms and operate where the state is thin. Almost at the same time, violent extremist groups (Boko Haram splinters and ISWAP) began to control or contest territory in the North-East and they sometimes linked up with local bandits.
The “Why?” of this deterioration in the Nigerian state’s ability to keep domestic law and order is clear. Over the period that this erosion in state capacity has occurred, poverty has spread with the virulence of the harmattan fire in parched grassland, and governance presents all the failings of a six-cylinder vehicle going uphill with only two cylinders firing. Our porous borders, literally and metaphorically, have fed both recruitment into these groups and criminal collaboration with them.
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…Mr Onanuga’s wish that government’s ability to “pummel” armed non-state actors in the country will function as a disincentive to criminal behaviour won’t be granted without the creation of multi-agency (military, police, DSS, immigration) intelligence cooperation centres at state and municipal levels. With proper civilian oversight, these centres may then deploy intelligence to pre-empt kidnappings…
Despite Mr Bayo Onanuga’s Pollyannaish tale, the “What should we do?” question is more nuanced. Imagined in terms of law enforcement and security only, then, we could try to fix the problems by simply shrinking the space within which criminals are currently able to operate (by improving security and intelligence gathering), building legitimate local capacity, so that communities do not rely on ransom or vigilantes (this is a governance and rule of law goal), and respecting rights in order that we no longer alienate communities and create new recruits (look for the equilibrium quadrant in a two-by-two matrix with “human rights” and “accountability” as the coordinates).
Far more lasting, though, is all that has to be done to remove the motive for citizens joining or tolerating these gangs. Call this the livelihoods and justice obstacles course. Along this path, the immediate deliverable is to boost rural livelihoods and youth employment in high-risk states, through investment in public works, the creation of agro-value chain jobs, supporting apprenticeships in towns, and conditional cash transfers for the most vulnerable. Solutions to farmer–herder disputes will require local land and infrastructure reforms, including the states’ establishment of grazing reserves, water points, and clear, enforceable local dispute resolution mechanisms. In conjunction with the modernisation of livestock value chains, these should grant pastoralists legal markets.
Still, Mr Onanuga’s wish that government’s ability to “pummel” armed non-state actors in the country will function as a disincentive to criminal behaviour won’t be granted without the creation of multi-agency (military, police, DSS, immigration) intelligence cooperation centres at state and municipal levels. With proper civilian oversight, these centres may then deploy intelligence to pre-empt kidnappings, rather than pursuing purely reactive raids as is currently the case.
Since low conviction rates encourage repeat offending, the only way to ensure kidnappers are arrested and convictions increase is to train and reform police and prosecutors for criminal investigations (improve forensic investigation skills, strengthen witness protection programmes, and broaden case management systems). These reforms to the criminal justice system should happen alongside a crack down on ransom banking and money flows.
The security and law enforcement dimension of this problem calls for further action along the following lines. The Nigerian government will not degrade militant non-state actors’ capacity to act against the state and its citizens without significant investment in intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and mobility (drones, signal intelligence, rapid reaction units, secure radios) vehicles targeted at criminal hotspots. This will allow the armed forces to quickly find gang encampments and hostages. The cross-border provenance of some of the actors implicated in the kidnapping and terrorism cases means that whatever intelligence gathered locally must be shared and operations to interdict these elements coordinated with neighbouring states (Niger, Chad, Cameroon) and Sahel partners, to disrupt cross-border movement and arms flows. The use of diplomatic channels and regional mechanisms (ECOWAS, AU) for wider counter-extremism and stabilisation support follows naturally from this.
Since low conviction rates encourage repeat offending, the only way to ensure kidnappers are arrested and convictions increase is to train and reform police and prosecutors for criminal investigations (improve forensic investigation skills, strengthen witness protection programmes, and broaden case management systems). These reforms to the criminal justice system should happen alongside a crack down on ransom banking and money flows. Anti-money laundering monitoring of cash flows will need to be reinforced. And banks and mobile money operators required to report suspicious transfers, and freeze accounts linked to known networks.
In summary, there is so much to be done, and none of it will happen in television studios.
Uddin Ifeanyi, journalist manqué and retired civil servant, can be reached @IfeanyiUddin.
