The core of the crisis in West Africa is poor governance and the realisation by citizens that they are not seeing the dividends of democracy due to corruption by the political class. The people of West Africa expect their governments to provide for their security and welfare, and that is the key challenge that has to be addressed. State capacity to provide services to the people must improve steadily to meet their expectations… These are the key issues ECOWAS must face to ensure its forthcoming Special Summit on the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa is successful.
This week, I am in Accra attending an ECOWAS consultative meeting in line with the organisation’s concern that it is facing an existential crisis, and that a year-long grassroots consultation process should be organised to prepare a pact for the future of a re-energised body that is able to pursue its regional integration project and repair the cracks to its democracy consolidation normative framework. This followed the coups in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea, and the rise of the Alliance of Sahelian States, which posed, in a very direct manner, the existential crisis for ECOWAS as an organisation and its democratic model. The fabled leading regional organisation in Africa could collapse and democratic recession was already setting in, with four out of fifteen members out of step. The fear has been that more might follow quickly. The populist nature of the mobilisation strategy of the putschists, in singling out French neo-colonialism as the evil that must be destroyed, has also revived support within young West Africans of the assumed advantages of military vanguardism. This has been supported by an effective disinformation strategy supported by deep fakes extolling the virtues of military rule.
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We should, however, not forget that West Africa has a history of resilience to the risks and threats it has been confronting. The people fought for and obtained the return of democracy in the early 1990s, in response to the debilitating authoritarianism and conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s. Democracy returned with new constitutions, political parties and regular elections. The questions that were then posed were who are the beneficiaries of this return of democracy? Did the national conferences restore the broken social contract between the states and citizens? How have the lives of the people changed in comparison to the previous military or one-party regimes that ran the tyrannical systems the people had revolted against? Few can deny that there has been some progress but the change in people’s lives has not been significant enough. The optics of democratic rule were dramatically weakened by the corruption, electoral fraud and lack of level playing field displayed by the political class. Opposition parties were frustrated by ways in which their pathways to winning power democratically were blocked by the ruling parties, even when they had popular support. That was the context in which ideas started to emerge that if this democracy is not producing results for the people, what is the point of resisting or opposing coup d’états in principle? This remains a critical issue today.
The crisis of democracy of the region is linked to its political sociology, that the leaders do not resemble the people. West African citizens have always had a profound commitment to democracy, which their leaders have lacked, and it is that spirit that has kept the democracy project alive over the decades, as successive leaderships have removed democratic gains placed on the table by citizens. The ongoing battle in the region is between efforts at state capture by the political class and citizen’s attempts to entrench an inclusive democratic culture. The result of the history of an irresponsible political class misgoverning the region has been the emergence of a youth bulge that is too excluded for peace to reign, and the emergence of violent extremism, both of which have negative impacts for democracy.
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The ECOWAS democracy building project had started with the adoption of the Declaration of Political Principles (1981), which reaffirmed the commitment of ECOWAS member states to guarantee fundamental human rights, individual freedoms, the rule of law, alongside responsive and responsible governance to their citizens. The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (24th July, 1993) conferred the status of supranationality on ECOWAS to improve its organisational coherence. The Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (21 December, 2001) was adopted to reinforce the Declaration of Political Principles and it sets out the constitutional convergence criteria to be fulfilled by community members, based on the principles of good governance – respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, the promotion of non-partisan and responsible press organisations, and the democratic control of the armed forces. It also commits member states to ensuring poverty alleviation, while upholding, defending and promoting international norms regarding basic human rights, including the rights of minorities, children, youth and women.
In our discussions in Accra, the consensus that emerged is that ECOWAS should remain steadfast in maintaining its constitutional convergence principles and zero-tolerance for changes of government through non-constitutional means. For this to make sense, ECOWAS must stand firm against those presidents that change their countries’ constitutions to continue in power. The definition of the coup d’état must be extended beyond military intervention and should include opportunistic changes to the constitution by sitting presidents.
ECOWAS has a number of notable achievements – the establishment of democratic governance as a core value for membership, the effective implementation of a regime of the free movement of people and goods within the community, and significant institutional development of the organisation itself. Its core challenges have been the spread of terrorism in its Sahelian part, with the real risk of this spreading to the Gulf of Guinea part; the devastating impact of climate change; crippling pandemics – Ebola and COVID-19; in addition to debilitating poverty and youth unemployment that have fuelled rising conflicts and violence.
The core weakness of ECOWAS is the erosion of its normative framework by some presidents who are at the same time at its highest-level leadership – members of the Authority of Heads of State. When the issue of tenure elongation started putting strains on its normative framework, ECOWAS decided to include in its Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance – a provision disallowing tenure elongation beyond two terms. When it was moved for adoption in the 2015 Summit, the presidents of Togo and the Gambia opposed it. ECOWAS brought the same proposal back in the 2022 Summit, and this time the presidents of three countries – Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo – opposed it and scuttled the idea. This means that the Secretariat is not always able to carry its leadership along, because some of them have developed political objectives that directly contradict the normative framework they had developed for the organisation.
In our discussions in Accra, the consensus that emerged is that ECOWAS should remain steadfast in maintaining its constitutional convergence principles and zero-tolerance for changes of government through non-constitutional means. For this to make sense, ECOWAS must stand firm against those presidents that change their countries’ constitutions to continue in power. The definition of the coup d’état must be extended beyond military intervention and should include opportunistic changes to the constitution by sitting presidents. This is the only way of saving the organisation. ECOWAS should openly acknowledge that the erosion of democratic practices observed in recent years have emanated from the unfortunate actions of some its leadership in the Authority of Heads of State and take pro-active measures in changing such practices. In this regard, it needs to ensure that the Supplementary Protocol of Democracy and Good Governance is amended to make it illegal to spend more than two terms in office.
ECOWAS must work towards improving the integrity of elections in the region by carrying out constitutional and legal reforms that will secure operational and financial autonomy for the electoral commissions. This is in addition to encouraging political parties and improving their capacities to campaign for and obtain a more level playing ground for elections.
The real force behind democratic struggles and successes in West Africa is the civil society. Trade unions, student unions, non-governmental organisations, women’s organisations, cultural unions, religious organisations and the mass media have all played decisive roles in influencing public opinion, making demands for political liberalisation and the protection of human rights, and sustaining these demands by organising strikes, demonstrations and protests. ECOWAS should engage more with the civil society, provide it support and collaborate with it in supporting democratic struggles at the country level.
ECOWAS must work towards improving the integrity of elections in the region by carrying out constitutional and legal reforms that will secure operational and financial autonomy for the electoral commissions. This is in addition to encouraging political parties and improving their capacities to campaign for and obtain a more level playing ground for elections. Also, standardising electoral processes and adopting best practices, including the registration of voters, provision of voter identity cards with embossed photographs, and transparent ballot boxes, as well as the representation of party agents in registration, voting and collation centres.
The core of the crisis in West Africa is poor governance and the realisation by citizens that they are not seeing the dividends of democracy due to corruption by the political class. The people of West Africa expect their governments to provide for their security and welfare, and that is the key challenge that has to be addressed. State capacity to provide services to the people must improve steadily to meet their expectations.
These are the key issues ECOWAS must face to ensure its forthcoming Special Summit on the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa is successful.
A professor of Political Science and development consultant/expert, Jibrin Ibrahim is a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Democracy and Development, and Chair of the Editorial Board of PREMIUM TIMES.
