Continued voter disinterest undermines democratic governance in Benin

Just two months after a coup attempt, Benin’s new Members of Parliament (MPs) were sworn in on 8 February. They were elected in January and will serve a seven-year term, in accordance with the new constitution promulgated on 17 December 2025.

These election results are key ahead of the April 2026 presidential polls, which will mark the fifth democratic change of leadership in Benin since the start of multiparty democracy in 1990. They will also affect the country’s future political landscape.

The combined parliamentary and local elections were held one month after the foiled 7 December coup. The widely condemned coup attempt cast doubt on whether the election would go ahead, and raised concerns that instability could affect voter turnout. At 36.74%, turnout was indeed low. But most observers agreed the election proceeded peacefully.

Incidents such as the late opening of several polling stations, may have dampened some voters’ enthusiasm, but the Constitutional Court didn’t feel they compromised the election’s integrity and transparency.

To strengthen the credibility of the electoral process before the April 2026 presidential polls, the Independent National Electoral Commission should undertake a rigorous analysis and incorporate relevant recommendations from various observer missions.

President Patrice Talon’s chosen successor, Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni, will face off against Paul Hounkpè, leader of the so-called moderate opposition. Hounkpè’s candidacy was made possible only through a political deal with the ruling coalition, which gave him the sponsorships needed to meet the legal requirements for the race.

One of the main issues at stake in the presidential election is voter turnout, which will determine the elected president’s perceived legitimacy. A low turnout has been a trend since Talon took office in 2016.

In the 2023 legislative elections, only 37.79 per cent of voters cast their ballots. Talon’s government has often been criticised for adopting bold institutional and constitutional reforms, some of which are considered controversial and non-consensual. These include the 2024 Electoral Code and the new constitution adopted in December 2025. This could contribute to continued voter disinterest, ultimately undermining democratic governance.

The January 2026 election was the first test of the new Electoral Code, which has reinforced mistrust among some political elites. The code maintained the requirement that a party must receive 10 per cent of votes at the national level to secure seats in Parliament. But it added that each party would also need at least 20 per cent of the votes in each of the country’s 24 electoral districts.

Beyond these high thresholds, the code raises the sponsorship quota (provided by mayors or MPs, or both) required to run for president and vice-president to 15 per cent (up from 10 per cent). The new rate equated to the exact number of sponsorships held by the main opposition party, Les Démocrates.

That fuelled speculation that the change was tailored to put the party in a precarious position if internal divisions occurred. The legislative elections were contested by: the Progressive Union for Renewal (UPR) and Republican Bloc (BR); the pro-government Movement of Elites Committed to the Emancipation of Benin; former head of state Thomas Boni Yayi’s Les Démocrates (LD); and Forces Cauris pour un Bénin Émergent (FCBE), which claims to be part of the moderate opposition.

Among them, only the UPR and BR crossed the 20% threshold in each of the 24 electoral districts, winning all 109 seats in Parliament, with 60 and 49 MPs respectively. They also share all 77 mayors, so they control all 186 elected officials who can sponsor potential presidential candidates for the 2033 election.

The FCBE, the only so-called moderate opposition party to have participated in the January elections, obtained 6.65 per cent of the vote nationally, below the 10 per cent required to be allocated seats. This new parliamentary configuration is reminiscent of 2019, when only the two main parties of the presidential movement, the UPR and BR, held all seats.

This situation raised questions about the legitimacy of a National Assembly entirely devoted to the executive branch, and about the separation of powers.

Although the LD party obtained around 16 per cent of the vote nationally, which is above the required 10 per cent, it failed to reach the 20 per cent threshold in 13 of the 24 electoral districts. Because the party’s members opposed entering into a parliamentary coalition with the ruling parties before the elections, it couldn’t obtain any seats in Parliament.

While the LD secured many votes, its electoral performance and internal leadership and loyalty crises undermined the party. Six of its 28 MPs defected to the ruling coalition before the January polls, leaving the party with 22 sponsors, below the legal requirement to submit a candidate for the presidential election.

If the electoral rules – including that ‘a deputy [MP] or a mayor can only sponsor a candidate who is a member or a designee of the political party on whose list they were elected do not change, and if the party doesn’t ally with the ruling majority, it could be excluded from the presidential race until 2040.

The failed 7 December 2025 coup revealed some discontent in army ranks. It also highlighted the fragility of the country’s democratic achievements.

The Government must avoid situations in which controversial laws and the opposition’s feelings of exclusion serve as a pretext for actors seeking to destabilise the country through coups or other forms of unrest. It should also avoid creating an environment where social frustrations are expressed outside the law. All these issues could affect the country’s stability in a region at a crossroads.

In consultation with relevant stakeholders, the legislature should conduct a thorough assessment of laws passed over the past decade, including the amended constitution and Electoral Code, identify shortcomings and propose amendments.

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The Economic Community of West African States, whose intervention through its standby force helped thwart December’s coup, seems to be learning from its missteps in past responses to coups. It must continue to encourage Benin’s government and civil society to resume dialogue – a key condition for easing socio-political tensions and consolidating the economic gains of the past 10 years.

Jeannine Ella Abatan, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).