At least 15 confirmed Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) attacks have targeted military outposts across the Lake Chad region this year. Common to this campaign, which the group calls Camp Holocaust, is that the targets were isolated, under-resourced, and often in border zones where state presence is lacking.
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research shows that in May, ISWAP overran Nigeria’s 27 Task Force Brigade in Buni Gari and 50 Task Force Battalion in Marte, and mounted a twin assault on the Nigeria-Cameroon joint base in Wulgo and Cameroon’s Soueram outpost.
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These locations – like those hit earlier this year in Malam Fatori and Goniri, among others – were civilian communities situated far from fortified urban centres. Many had been virtually destroyed by insurgents, and military outposts were set up there to facilitate stabilisation and resettlement. Poor roads, the risk of ambush and improvised explosive devices, and vast, ungoverned terrain make them vulnerable and difficult to reinforce.
Sites of ISWAP attacks on remote military bases
These outposts have become ISWAP’s softest targets and a strategic weak point in regional counterinsurgency efforts. Analysis of the group’s tactical trends reveals a pivot to fast-moving assaults by large numbers of fighters with light but sophisticated weapons, nighttime raids, and modified commercial drones to drop explosives to shock troops into disarray.
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Recent defectors undergoing a government deradicalisation programme in Maiduguri told ISS that ISWAP’s tactical prowess had been aided by at least six trainers from the Middle East deployed by the Islamic State. Military targets are attacked in order to seize weapons to reduce reliance on smuggling and consolidate territorial control, allowing for extortion of civilians and securing resources for operations and expansion.
Two Nigerian Boko Haram war veterans said the outposts were ‘in the middle of nowhere’ and undermanned, yet needed to cover a wide area. Where battalions should have around 800 personnel, many have far fewer, or are under-resourced for the area size and number of sub-units.
Political officials across the Lake Chad Basin are aware of the problem. Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum has repeatedly raised the alarm, and the Nigerian Senate recently urged the military to redeploy troops in response to renewed attacks. However, without mass recruitment, this is difficult. The military is already overstretched and engaged in counter-insurgency operations countrywide.
Geography presents another challenge. Lake Chad’s islands, swamps, and porous borders offer ISWAP natural cover and operational flexibility, while complicating the various states’ military logistics. The governments of the four Lake Chad Basin countries – Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria – have ceded much of this territory as they lack adequate amphibious or naval capabilities.
Nigeria has used air power for the lake areas and hard-to-reach dry lands. But ISWAP has adapted by digging bunkers at their homes and bases on Lake Chad’s islands, where they live with their families, to avoid detection and airstrikes, ex-fighters told ISS. On dry land, airstrikes are delivering blows, but are infrequent.
Reinforcements often arrive too late because of the outposts’ remoteness, the distances between them, and limited human and logistical resources. In one of its most devastating attacks, ISWAP attacked Nigeria’s 149 Battalion in Malam Fatori on the Niger border on 24 January, killing at least 20 soldiers, including the commander.
Survivors said the fight lasted three hours, but no reinforcement came – neither from nearby units nor via air support, allowing the insurgents to strip the base of arms.
This illustrates the breakdown of a standard response tactic, which, say military insiders, should involve each unit holding its ground, buying time for backup via ground or air. But these outposts lack the human resources and equipment to sustain such resistance, say Nigerian politicians.
The implications are profound. Not only is ISWAP bolstering its arsenal, but it is also expanding its territorial control in a region where governments are already thinly present. The cost is not just strategic; it is financial and political. The attacks have resulted in heavy equipment losses for Nigeria and Cameroon, and replacing them is costly and slow. Moreover, repeated base attacks damage troops’ morale and public trust in states’ capacity to protect.
The neglect of infrastructure and services leaves remote outposts dangerously exposed. If terrorists were to capture a city like Maiduguri, they would achieve a symbolic triumph that would cost Nigeria’s government politically and at the polls. However, allowing ISWAP to consolidate control on the rural fringes is just as dangerous, as these areas could serve as staging posts for terror attacks on urban centres.
A major rethink is required. States, especially Nigeria, which is the worst-hit and main theatre, must reconsider deployment density and resourcing in remote rural areas. One model is creating well-resourced ‘paired garrisons’ – bases close together to enable quick reinforcement.
A similar arrangement exists in Dikwa, Nigeria – but when Marte, 25 km away, was attacked on 12 March, Dikwa could not respond as it was under-resourced, according to ISS field data and sources familiar with the formations. Therefore, increasing outposts is not enough; they must be well-resourced, with sufficient deployments of troops and equipment, and be rapidly mobile.
In addition, strengthening and expanding naval and amphibious capabilities and formations is critical as a more proactive strategy. ISWAP’s sanctuary in the Lake Chad islands – where rival Boko Haram is also strong – cannot be dislodged through airstrikes alone or by overstretched ground forces. The Multinational Joint Task Force’s naval units could disrupt militants’ activities and apply pressure in locations the insurgents use as command centres.
Another critical gap is civilian cooperation, which has weakened due to human rights abuses committed as part of state counter-terrorism responses, and local communities’ fear of insurgent reprisals. In some cases, such as the January Malam Fatori attack, residents had seen militants gathering or advancing much earlier, but did not alert the military.
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This demonstrates civilians’ lack of trust in the military and a weak intelligence pipeline, underscoring the importance of strengthening both. Working with communities through safe reporting and informant protection protocols is vital for this.
Given the frequency of nighttime attacks, Nigerian and Cameroonian troops must prepare accordingly. Heightened surveillance, a real-time communication system between outposts and air units, and constant preparedness can improve response and reinforcements.
Taiwo Adebayo, Researcher, Lake Chad Basin, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
(This article was published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
