Recent efforts to resolve the M23 crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have taken a new turn. After the breakdown of the Angola-led Luanda talks in mid-December 2024, a joint East African Community–Southern African Development Community attempt to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes started in early 2025.
However, Qatar ultimately facilitated the April Doha dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group with its political affiliate Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). Then, on 27 June, regional talks spearheaded by the United States (US) led to a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda.
|
|
The US-brokered negotiations aim to secure the Rwandan forces’ withdrawal from eastern DRC and end Rwanda’s support to AFC/M23. The incentive for doing so is the DRC’s commitment to neutralising the Forces Démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) armed group – Rwanda’s main security concern in east DRC.
Despite its significance, the deal faces criticism for trading Congolese sovereignty for US access to critical minerals, as part of a transactional form of peace mediation. Previous agreements that bargained Rwandan withdrawal in exchange for actions against the FDLR failed after they were repeatedly violated, leading to more violence.
|
|
|
|---|
The current plan for FDLR neutralisation and Rwandan withdrawal was developed initially under the Luanda process – before M23’s takeover of Goma and Bukavu – making it outdated. It fails to address the question of military operations against the FDLR in rebel-held territory, and doesn’t deal with the Rwandan and rebel presence far outside zones of FDLR influence.
Congolese and US efforts to obtain a Rwandan withdrawal before signing the deal failed, making Rwanda’s retreat conditional on anti-FDLR measures. Given the FDLR’s deep entrenchment and the lack of clear criteria for ‘neutralisation’, these terms risk prolonging both Rwandan and rebel occupation, rather than ending it.
AFC/M23 leadership has called the Rwanda-DRC peace agreement a ‘useful, but limited, step.’ The deal is meant to provide leverage for a settlement with AFC/M23, which Kinshasa hopes to sign before a Washington heads of state summit in July. M23 has announced new rounds of talks, though progress had stalled. AFC/M23 accuses the DRC government of refusing concessions, while Kinshasa questions the rebellion’s willingness to withdraw.
Stay Ahead with Premium Times
Follow us on Google News and never miss breaking stories, investigations, and in-depth reporting.
Add as a preferred source on Google
Although AFC/M23 says confidence-building measures are needed to start talks, it ultimately favours a political settlement that ensures its long-term influence in eastern DRC. Kinshasa, however, prefers rebel integration on a case-by-case basis, seeing AFC/M23 as largely beholden to Rwandan interests – an assessment consistently backed by United Nations reports.
The challenge is that a Rwandan withdrawal, while necessary for a domestic peace process, might also bury the deal’s prospects, as Rwandan backing has been central to M23’s strength in any negotiations.
Domestic political complexities further complicate peace talks, particularly since former president Joseph Kabila resurfaced. The difficult relationship between President Félix Tshisekedi and the AFC/M23 is shaped by internal power struggles with Mr Kabila.
After a bargain with Mr Kabila brought Mr Tshisekedi to power in 2019, political control largely remained with Mr Kabila. To compensate for this, Mr Tshisekedi relied on regional diplomacy, enhancing security and economic cooperation with Rwanda and initiating dialogue with exiled M23 leaders. When he broke with Mr Kabila in 2020 and consolidated power, Rwandan cooperation and M23 dialogue ended, enabling the group’s resurgence in November 2021.
The collapse of this power-sharing arrangement prompted Corneille Nangaa, former electoral commission chair and facilitator of the 2019 deal, to form the M23-aligned AFC. This hardened Kinshasa’s stance, reinforcing its refusal to negotiate and efforts to weaken the exiled Mr Kabila, considered the architect of the AFC/M23 alliance.
In late 2024, Mr Kabila reemerged with fellow Katangan politician Moïse Katumbi to oppose Mr Tshisekedi’s proposed constitutional reforms. They made joint calls for national dialogue alongside opposition figures like Martin Fayulu, who was sidelined by the Kabila-Tshisekedi 2019 power-sharing deal.
Kinshasa used legal and political means to target Kabila. He returned to the DRC in May 2025 via rebel-held eastern territory, where he remains.
Mr Kabila’s motives remain speculative, ranging from a sincere desire for peace to personal and political gain. He positions himself as a key actor in an eventual peace process by engaging in local dialogues with communities, religious and customary leaders, and rebel authorities in the eastern DRC.
Inspired by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that ended the 2002 Second Congo War, Mr Kabila hopes a national dialogue would allow for renewed political bargaining, reversing political and legal actions against him, his family and allies.
One setting for such a dialogue is the National Episcopal Conference of Congo-Church of Christ in Congo (CENCO-ECC) peace initiative, which proposes a broad conversation on the root causes of conflict in the east, potentially involving rebel groups.
However, the government seeks to exclude AFC/M23 and its allies. Encouraged by Mr Fayulu’s recent outreach to form a ‘camp de la Patrie,’ Mr Tshisekedi is framing national dialogue around a divide between a ‘republican front’ and a ‘rebel front’ linked to Rwanda, the AFC/M23 and Mr Kabila. He hopes the peace deal with Rwanda will strengthen his domestic position and lead to a unity government opposed to the country’s balkanisation.
Mr Kabila’s relations with M23 and Rwanda remain ambiguous. While both might consider him useful for gaining leverage, past experiences make them wary. He also lacks regional backing. Ugandan military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba recently blamed Mr Kabila for regional instability and opposed Mr Kabila’s call for foreign forces to withdraw. Instead, Uganda signed a bilateral agreement expanding military operations in eastern DRC, aligning with Tshisekedi despite Uganda’s ambiguous stance on M23.
While Mr Kabila may use the M23 crisis to reassert his political relevance, Mr Tshisekedi’s approach appears driven by a desire to sideline him. The result is growing political fragmentation that could undermine peace prospects.
Yet the alternative – broad political inclusion – carries risks too, potentially providing legitimacy and political payoffs to insurgent violence. The question of inclusion must be approached cautiously, drawing lessons from past peace deals that prioritised integration but failed to resolve underlying issues.
For the Rwanda-DRC deal to provide a route to peace, implementation must be thorough, requiring sustained US engagement and pressure.
Peace efforts must also acknowledge the deeply political nature of the eastern DRC crisis. That includes the fallout from the collapsed power-sharing deal between Messrs Kabila and Tshisekedi, growing polarisation, democratic backsliding and deteriorating governance.
READ ALSO: At BRICS Summit, Tinubu calls for reevaluation of global governance structure
Nonetheless, the Doha process and particularly the CENCO-ECC initiative should not become politicised by the struggle between Messrs Kabila and Tshisekedi. A CENCO-ECC-led national dialogue could examine how insurgent violence and politics have become so intertwined, enabling a shift from a culture of impunity to a path of justice, accountability and peace.
Bram Verelst, Senior Researcher, Nirvaly Mooloo, Research Officer and Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
Discover more from Premium Times Nigeria
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
More News
