After months of diplomatic impasse and military advances of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a diplomatic breakthrough occurred in April.
First, under the auspices of Qatar, the DRC and AFC/M23 jointly committed to work towards a ceasefire. Second, foreign ministers from Rwanda and DRC signed a declaration of principles in the United States (US), signalling renewed bilateral dialogue.
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Caution is necessary given the repeated failure of past commitments. But it is important to note the absence of African actors from these developments. It is mainly US and European sanctions and Washington’s diplomatic engagement that seem to have curbed AFC/M23’s advance and dampened Rwanda’s assertiveness.
For various reasons, the DRC and Rwanda were not convinced that current African initiatives would be effective. In February, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) endorsed coordination between the Luanda and Nairobi processes, leading to a joint East African Community-Southern African Development Community (EAC-SADC) initiative overseen by a panel of five facilitators.
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Yet, two months after the fall of Goma and Bukavu, the joint initiative had not achieved a ceasefire. Despite the dire humanitarian and security situation, it appears more focused on managing competition between the two regional blocs than solving the conflict.
Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé’s appointment in April as AU Mediator has only added to the confusion. The institutional relationship between Gnassingbé and the panel appointed by the EAC-SADC initiative to mediate the conflict remains undefined. The panel’s facilitators are former presidents from Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa and the Central African Republic.
It is also unclear what specific issue the EAC-SADC process must resolve, considering that a ceasefire and eventually a peace agreement is expected to emerge from Doha and Washington, DC.
While the AU and regional bodies promote the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’, the lack of tangible results in the Great Lakes casts doubt on the viability of this slogan-made policy. The Great Lakes conflict epitomises the crisis of African solutions, also visible in the Sahel and the management of coups.
The African Peace and Security Architecture’s failure in the region is multi-dimensional. Diplomatically, the AU’s Luanda Process failed to normalise relations between the DRC and Rwanda after more than two years of efforts. This resulted as much from methodological flaws as from political constraints.
The initial focus on heads of state meetings was to the detriment of technical consultations, which kicked off only later. Politically, it is debatable whether presidents and foreign ministers should be managing day-to-day mediation processes.
Militarily, both the SADC Mission in the DRC and the EAC Regional Force have withdrawn from the DRC. While the SADC mission ended in military defeat, the East African force withdrawal stemmed from political disagreements between Kinshasa and troop-contributing countries regarding the mission’s mandate.
The AU has been unable to aptly coordinate the various regional initiatives despite its primacy, as stated in the Protocol establishing the PSC. The Quadripartite process, initiated by the AU in 2023 to coordinate peace initiatives, has instead revealed the AU Commission and PSC’s weaknesses.
The principle of subsidiarity, which implies resorting to AU-level intervention when regional efforts fail, has only exacerbated competition between the AU and regional organisations.
The dysfunction of the EAC-SADC process also reflects deeper political divergences among member states and institutions. Moving from two distinct mediation frameworks (the Nairobi and Luanda processes) with their respective facilitators to an undefined merged or aligned process with a panel of five facilitators and one mediator is challenging.
The initiative appears more like a political compromise between rival organisations than a streamlined framework for brokering a ceasefire and facilitating dialogue.
This dysfunction also questions the AU’s relevance in today’s evolving security landscape. Historically, the AU and regional bodies were praised for their rapid crisis response – often outperforming the bureaucratic pace of the United Nations (UN). But in the Great Lakes, they have fallen short on conflict prevention and crisis management, casting doubt on their ability to act as first responders.
The AU Commission and its different organs have not developed a creative cooperation strategy with the various UN institutions in the region, particularly the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC and the Office of the Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region. Some in the AU Commission see the UN as a competitor rather than a genuine partner.
In an era of strained multilateralism and geopolitical competition, dwindling donor support, and American disengagement from peace operations, the African Peace and Security Architecture must evolve.
It must shift from input-based legitimacy rooted in intentions and political representation to output-based legitimacy grounded in results and operational effectiveness. Without performance, the slogan ‘African solutions to African problems’ means nothing.
New AU Commission leaders must undertake a candid and critical review of why recent African-led efforts have fallen short.
The DRC’s membership of the EAC, SADC, Economic Community of Central African States, and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region makes it a natural arena for institutional rivalry. This occurs between organisations and among member states, making the AU’s primacy not only legitimate but vital.
Recognising this principle isn’t enough. An AU Strategy for the Great Lakes is needed to reconfigure the continental body’s presence in the region. This will require a significant investment in the Bujumbura-based AU Liaison Office for the Great Lakes and a coherent AU position on revitalising the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and region.
Strengthening the AU Commission’s crisis management capacity is also essential. This includes reinforcing the Mediation Support Unit and redefining the mandate and operational capacities of AU Special Representatives and their offices. In the short term, the current EAC-SADC-AU mediation framework should be simplified.
Without these reforms, the AU risks remaining a bystander in resolving African crises, especially in the Great Lakes.
Paul-Simon Handy, Regional Director East Africa and Representative to the African Union, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Addis Ababa
Research for this article was funded by the European Union.
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
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