When civil war started in Sudan in April 2023, the United Nations (UN) warned that the conflict could seep through the country’s borders and spread. The likelihood of that happening is increasing with the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) recent threats against its neighbours, Chad and South Sudan.
Last week, SAF Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Yasir al-Atta, said Chad’s airports in Amdjarass and N’Djamena were legitimate targets for Sudan’s army. His statement was made against a backdrop of continued external support for the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
|
|
Sudan’s neighbouring countries initially maintained a neutral position on its war, but a 2024 UN Security Council report confirms Chad’s support of the RSF and its involvement in the conflict.
The SAF accuses Chad of serving as a logistical hub and siding with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to supply weapons and military equipment – including drones carrying guided missiles – to the RSF through Amdjarass International Airport. The UAE and Chad deny Sudan’s allegations.
|
|
|
|---|
In response to Mr al-Atta’s remarks, Chad’s Foreign Affairs Ministry declared its readiness to retaliate. Other prominent Chadian figures, including former prime ministers, government ministers and senators, echoed this belligerent rhetoric. On 29 March, the General Staff of the Chadian Armies said it considered the Sudanese general’s remarks a ‘declaration of war against Chad.’ How far could this escalation go, and what might the consequences be?
With their 1,360 km shared border, Sudan and Chad have significant and longstanding cultural, commercial and ethnic ties. But that has not prevented fraught relations and a history of proxy wars, which have come to define interactions between the two administrations.
Chad is emerging from a contested transition sparked by the death of former president Idriss Déby Itno in 2021, and his son’s subsequent takeover. The government is still finding its feet and establishing its legitimacy.
Sudan has gone from a turbulent transition after the coup that unseated former president Omar al-Bashir in 2019, to civil war. The failure of its state-building process is evident, as is the army’s inability to monopolise the use of force. Neither Chad nor Sudan have the means to conduct a regional war, the consequences of which would be catastrophic.
Preventive measures are needed to de-escalate tensions. While the SAF’s statements may simply reflect its renewed impetus after driving back the RSF, a long history of tensions between the two countries is grounds for concern.
Although a full-blown war is unlikely, various scenarios could play out.
The first would be armed conflict between the two countries. With the SAF stronger and re-energised due to its recent battlefield gains, it could expand its military expedition westwards. Short of attacking Chad using ground forces, Sudan could use its drones to threaten Amdjarass’s airport and other towns along the border, and Chad would likely retaliate.
However, even if Sudan had the will to do so, SAF’s current capacity would make it hesitant to open a new front against Chad, considering the current stalemate with the RSF. Sudan’s army of approximately 100,000 troops is overstretched, with contingents battling various armed groups in Khartoum, El Obeid and east of Abyei, in addition to holding the eastern frontier.
While Chad isn’t similarly engaged in a domestic conflict, many security risks remain on its borders. Chad’s National Army – less than half the size of the SAF at approximately 37,000 troops – is battling Boko Haram along its western border and rebel groups in the north and east. Both armies run the risk of overreach in this scenario.
The second (and most likely) scenario would be a return to a proxy war through rebel groups, as occurred under former presidents Idriss Déby and Omar al-Bashir. These proxy wars undermined the security and stability of both countries, with Chadian rebels supported by Sudan striking at the heart of Chad’s capital in 2006 and 2008, and Sudanese rebels supported by Chad reaching Omdurman in May 2008 before being repulsed.
For Sudan, this scenario could mean the SAF uses the Darfur Joint Forces (an SAF-aligned militia) to launch military action against N’Djamena. But the RSF’s siege of El Fasher, where the Darfur Joint Forces are currently positioned, would make this nearly impossible given the RSF’s control of almost the entire Darfur region.
However, the SAF could arm Chadian rebels, an option suspected by N’Djamena for some months. Many fighters from the various rebellions in northern Chad, both active and dormant, could be mobilised by offers of payment. The same dynamics are possible in the Chad–Central African Republic–Sudan border triangle, where several armed groups circulate.
Both scenarios would have far-reaching cross-border consequences for those living on either side. These communities already face limited humanitarian aid, and any further increase in violence would cause more displacement and exacerbate their dire living conditions. Host communities would likely bear the brunt, increasing the chance of intercommunal violence.
READ ALSO: Trouble looms as Cameroon soldiers desert to fight in Ukraine
The third scenario is de-escalation, involving an end to the warmongering, a drop in tensions and a gradual return to normality between the two countries. This is the best-case scenario for Sudan and Chad, but also for a fragile sub-region. However, it cannot happen without diplomatic and political action by a third party.
The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is cognisant of the growing inter-state tensions. It could deploy the High-Level Panel on Sudan, alongside a newly elected Commission Chairperson, to appraise the situation and conduct shuttle diplomacy to mediate between the two countries. Previous regional consultations by the AU panel can be leveraged to bring the two parties together for talks.
These preventive measures could also help Chad and Sudan to deal with long-standing issues such as trans-border migration, humanitarian challenges and transnational organised crime. The result could be a secure and peaceful border favourable to both countries.
Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Central Africa and Great Lakes and Maram Mahdi, Researcher, African Peace and Security Governance, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
