NNPC Ltd and the future of Nigeria, By Dan D Kunle

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NNPC Ltd sits at the centre of public finance, foreign exchange earnings, energy security and investor confidence. For decades, petroleum revenues have sustained federal and state budgets, financed imports and provided the fiscal oxygen on which government depends. Agriculture no longer carries the economy as it once did. Manufacturing remains weak. Non‑oil exports are still too small. In practical terms, Nigeria remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbons.

As usual, I am an ordinary citizen, and like many Nigerians, I remain naturally optimistic and hopeful about the possibilities of a better tomorrow, even if such hopes are not always realised. Hope is part of our national character. We endure setbacks, yet continue to believe that renewal is possible.

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But optimism must never become a substitute for reality. It must be tested against evidence, performance and outcomes. It is from that standpoint that I reflect on the future of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPC Ltd) and what it means for Nigeria.

Few institutions matter more to the Nigerian state.

Recent developments underscore just how strategic energy institutions can be when they are properly conceived and executed. The emergence of the Dangote Refinery, despite its well‑known challenges and controversies, has already altered Nigeria’s energy calculus. At a time of heightened global supply disruptions, volatile geopolitics and constrained refining capacity across multiple regions, the commissioning of a large, integrated domestic refinery has begun to reduce Nigeria’s exposure to external shocks, ease pressure on foreign exchange and improve fuel availability. Its impact, even at partial operations, illustrates what competent capital mobilisation, clarity of purpose and scale can achieve for national energy security. It also serves as a reminder that institutional performance, not intent, is what ultimately reshapes outcomes.

NNPC Ltd sits at the centre of public finance, foreign exchange earnings, energy security and investor confidence. For decades, petroleum revenues have sustained federal and state budgets, financed imports and provided the fiscal oxygen on which government depends. Agriculture no longer carries the economy as it once did. Manufacturing remains weak. Non‑oil exports are still too small. In practical terms, Nigeria remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbons.

That is why the future of NNPC Ltd is inseparable from the future of Nigeria.

When the current leadership team, led by Group Chief Executive Officer Bayo Ojulari and the board chaired by Musa Ahmadu‑Kida, assumed office, many expected a decisive break from the past. The hope was that a commercially run company, backed by the Petroleum Industry Act, would finally emerge from the ruins of bureaucracy, opacity and political patronage.

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I shared that hope.

After observing developments over the past year, however, I have become less optimistic and more cautious.
The issue is not personalities. It is structural.

Nigeria has attempted to create a modern national energy company, while preserving an old political control model. That contradiction lies at the heart of NNPC Ltd’s difficulties.

In theory, NNPC Ltd belongs to Nigerians. In practice, Nigerians can only exercise ownership indirectly through the state. The effective governing authority rests largely with the Presidency, which appoints ministers, its directors and senior executives. The result is layered ownership, centralised power and diffused accountability.
Such a model rarely produces transformational institutions.

Boards struggle to exercise independent authority when ultimate political power lies elsewhere. Management teams find themselves constrained by political calculations, competing interests and administrative caution. Commercial logic often yields to state expediency. Decisions that should take weeks can take months. Problems that should be solved commercially become prolonged disputes.

No serious company can thrive under those conditions.

This helps explain why many of the operational weaknesses associated with the old NNPC remain visible in the new NNPC Ltd.

Joint ventures remain less effective than they should be. Technical and financial service agreements are not always managed with sufficient urgency. Asset optimisation remains slow. Internal coordination appears weak. Cost discipline is uneven. A culture of delay still competes with the need for delivery.

The greatest tragedy is that Nigeria is not suffering from a lack of resources. It is suffering from underperformance.

Several producing assets continue to illustrate this failure. OML 18, OML 24, OML 42, OML 123 and OML124 are examples often cited in industry discussions as assets whose potential has not been fully realised. Some remain constrained by evacuation challenges, unresolved commercial disputes, infrastructure limitations or management bottlenecks.

These are not geological failures. They are governance failures.

An oil‑producing nation with Nigeria’s reserves should not be struggling to maximise already discovered and producing assets. Such matters ought to be resolved through competent negotiation, decisive leadership and disciplined execution.

Instead, opportunities are delayed while national needs grow.

The economic cost is immense.

Every barrel not produced is lost revenue. Every gas molecule not commercialised is lost industrial power. Every delayed investment decision weakens confidence. Every unresolved dispute signals risk to international capital.
Investors do not wait indefinitely. Capital flows to jurisdictions where rules are clear, governance is predictable and execution is credible.

Today, Nigeria competes for investment not only with Angola and Guyana, but with the United States’ shale sector, the Middle East and emerging producers across Africa. Sentiment alone will not attract capital. Performance will.

Without deep reform, external investment will remain cautious. Joint ventures will continue to perform below potential. Oil and gas production will remain under‑optimised. Leakages will persist. Revenue pressures will intensify. And when the country’s most strategic commercial institution underperforms, the wider economy eventually pays the price.

This is why the debate around NNPC Ltd must move beyond personalities.

No chief executive, however competent, can fully succeed inside a structure designed to dilute authority and multiply interference. Likewise, no board can deliver exceptional governance if it lacks the power, autonomy or political backing to enforce standards.

Systems matter more than individuals.

It is against this backdrop that the appointment of Mr Fola Adeola to lead a presidential energy task force must be understood. The very creation of such a body is itself an admission of the depth and persistence of failure across Nigeria’s energy sector. A task force is rarely convened where systems are working; it is convened when normal structures have proven inadequate. Yet, the composition of the task force raises difficult questions about continuity of reform thinking. Many of the individuals who played defining roles in Nigeria’s foundational oil and gas reforms of the early 2000s, figures such as Mallam Nasir El‑Rufai, Dr MM Ibrahim and Professor Yinka Omorogbe (SAN) are noticeably absent. Institutions do not reform themselves through goodwill alone; they require memory, precedent and hard‑won experience. How this task force will navigate the full breadth of Nigeria’s energy value chain, reconcile competing interests and translate diagnosis into execution remains unclear. For now, it is an experiment that warrants close observation rather than premature judgment.

Another concern is continuity of reform thinking. Many of those associated with earlier oil and gas reform efforts are no longer present in the current architecture. That is not to suggest reform belongs to any one generation, but institutions need memory. They need continuity of purpose, accumulated learning and consistency of execution.

When reform becomes episodic, progress becomes fragile.

Nigeria should by now be targeting materially higher crude production over time, while aggressively expanding gas supply for domestic power, petrochemicals, fertiliser and exports. With one of the world’s largest gas endowments, the country should be building an industrial economy around energy abundance.

Yet, ambition without institutional capacity is merely rhetoric.

What then is required?

First, governance must be clarified. Ownership and accountability cannot remain blurred.

Second, the board must have genuine authority to govern, not symbolic responsibility without power.

Third, management must be empowered to act commercially within clear performance targets, insulated as far as possible from routine political intrusion.

Fourth, stranded and underperforming assets must be urgently reviewed, restructured and commercialised.

Fifth, transparency, procurement discipline, digital accountability and cost efficiency must become non‑negotiable.

Above all, national interest must prevail over internal turf battles.

To conclude, I am not an incurable pessimist. Nor am I hostile to the current leadership. I remain hopeful that course correction is still possible. But hope must be earned through measurable outcomes.

From all available records and information within the sector, one year is too short a period to fairly and objectively assess the full performance of Bayo Ojulari and his team. The scale of dysfunction inherited, particularly across the upstream and downstream value chain, means no serious transformation could have been completed within such a short time.

To his credit, there are signs of pragmatism. The willingness to move away from endlessly funding troubled refineries and to confront the burden of stranded downstream assets suggests a more realistic reading of Nigeria’s energy challenges.

Yet, realism alone is not enough.

The progress visible so far is insufficient to justify stellar pass marks. But it is also too early to pronounce failure. What is clear is that the harder phase of reform still lies ahead.

My greater concern is whether the approaching political cycle will deny management the policy focus, institutional backing and difficult decisions required to succeed. Reform in Nigeria often slows when politics intensifies.

That must not happen again.

NNPC Ltd remains too important to be trapped between old inefficiencies and new distractions. Its success will strengthen public finance, investor confidence, energy security and national stability. Its failure will deepen pressures already facing the country.

For now, judgment should remain reserved, expectations should remain high, and performance should remain the only true measure.

The future of NNPC Ltd, and in many respects the future of Nigeria, will be decided not by promises, but by what happens next.

Dan D Kunle writes from Abuja.