The media must now hold INEC to account by minutely and doggedly inspecting and reporting its preparations, refusing to be baited by cliches or self-congratulations. Never again should Nigerians be treated to preventable institutional collapse where the loser is Nigerian democracy. The obvious starting point should be the Strategic Plan 2022–2026, which gives the media an unusually strong tool to turn INEC’s promises into a public ledger and insist on receipts.
On 3 January, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Nigeria’s electoral umpire, denied having published the 2027 election schedule.
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As it often happens, the Nigerian mass media was eager to affirm, “Not me!” But equally ready to quote and take the power’s word for it, many outlets widely published the denial.
But INEC was wrong, and so were the outlets that broadcast its claim — particularly Daily Trust, The PUNCH and The Guardian — because in March 2018, INEC put its 37-year election calendar in place, making the front pages.
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That calendar was not invalidated by the Electoral Act 2022, which provides that INEC should publish election notices not later than 360 days ahead of an election.
INEC’s denial of a new schedule did not suggest that it even remembered its existing schedule.
Former INEC chairman, Mahmood Yakubu, had told political party chairmen: “In 2019, the dates are February 16 and March 2; in 2023, the dates are February 18 and March 4. In 2027, the dates are February 20 and March 6; in 2031, it is February 15 and March 1…in 2055, it is February 20 and March 6.”
The purpose was to “engender certainty in our electoral calendar,” Yakubu said, “allow for long-term planning by the commission and stakeholders, and bring Nigeria’s democracy in line with the best practice around the world.”
Again, and sadly, none of the newspapers that I read last week contextualised their reporting with that calendar, or asked questions beyond the commission’s bulletin.
This is precisely the danger that yet another Nigerian election faces: haphazard institutions, including journalists quoting officials and bulletins, rather than their own reporting and recall.
Last week, for instance, new INEC chairman, Joash O. Amupitan, was widely asserting his commission’s commitment “to deliver free, fair and credible elections.” That the chairman finds it necessary to make that declaration in 2026 is a red flag and a confession that it suffers widespread public distrust.
There is nothing in the value statement of INEC that suggests anything other than credibility.
Still, nobody asked an official who should not enjoy the benefit of the doubt he has not earned, “How will you do it?”
Following 2023, INEC should be considered a repeat offender until it clears its name by means of a resounding, internationally acclaimed performance.
INEC’s boisterousness does not confer credibility, and if it is preparing in 2027 for a contest, as opposed to a coronation, it must demonstrate and not proclaim its preparedness.
What do we know?
In 2023, local and international observers criticised its opacity, weak explanations, and institutional defensiveness. Among the foreign organisations were the European Union, the Commonwealth, NDI/IRI.
The INEC Strategic Plan 2022-2026 shows that the commission knows its weaknesses. The media’s role, then, is simply to force external accountability against INEC’s own benchmarks.
This is because INEC’s operational failures in 2023 stemmed partly from inadequate media scrutiny of its preparations, the EU report noting that “closer to the polls, some started to doubt INEC’s administrative and operational efficiency.”
By then, it was too late.
Nigeria does not lack plans, laws, or technology. The problem is that plans without adversarial oversight collapse into self-congratulation.
The media must now hold INEC to account by minutely and doggedly inspecting and reporting its preparations, refusing to be baited by cliches or self-congratulations.
Never again should Nigerians be treated to preventable institutional collapse where the loser is Nigerian democracy.
The obvious starting point should be the Strategic Plan 2022–2026, which gives the media an unusually strong tool to turn INEC’s promises into a public ledger and insist on receipts.
But before that, and with the elections just over one year away, the media must alter its mindset and, over these 12 months before the first ballot is cast, strategise to cover the elections differently from the international media, which naturally arrives on the eve of the crime. Don’t accept INEC’s proclamations for preparations, or volubility for competence!
The media plan must begin with the Guild of Editors and the Broadcasting Organisations of Nigeria, creating a collaborative coalition with civil society organisations, technology experts, and academic institutions.
Objective: to independently monitor, test, and audit electoral technologies before 2027. This will represent significant resource commitments beyond regular news-gathering operations, so they should seek support, now, from international media development organisations and democracy-support foundations.
And because no organisation is big enough to cover the election thoroughly nationwide, there is immense room for cooperation. Establish specialised investigative teams to track, document, and expose illicit money flows, vote-buying, and campaign finance violations throughout the electoral cycle.
Build a joint media–civil society election security and impunity tracker. Part of this must involve election security arrangements for reporters, including insurance protection.
The media should extract from the commission’s plan, its five strategic objectives, key actions, and KPIs, and republish them as a simplified public scorecard.
The plan should include tracking implementation monthly, naming what INEC said it would do, what it has done, what is delayed or unimplemented, and which officials or departments are responsible.
The media should map out INEC’s plan commitments on ICT capacity-building, integration of EMS/ERM/EOSC into EMSC, and IT governance as testable claims, not press-release material.
Don’t quote officials on accomplishments without their systems being publicly tested repeatedly. Remember INEC’s own admission that in the previous plan cycle, only 37.8 per cent of its activities were fully implemented. That’s a terrible grade.
The Commonwealth report noted, for instance, “INEC was not sufficiently forthcoming regarding the procurement process for electoral technologies” and failed to provide adequate testing.
The media merely accepted INEC’s promises. The EU similarly reported, “closer to the polls, some started to doubt INEC’s administrative and operational efficiency.”
By then, it was too late.
In response, the media must outpace election managers and even manipulators by introducing an Election Technology Watch system to focus on BVAS technology, that ace that became a menace, results transmission architecture, server redundancy, network coverage, and contingency protocols.
This must be a continuous investigative beat, not an election-week spectacle. Some Nigerian tertiary institutions have excellent higher technology departments: get up and collaborate!
Keep in mind: INEC is a politician, not a performer; a talker, not a doer. Even in its Strategic Plans 2012–2016 and 2017-2021, it talked long and loud about “improved deployment and utilisation of ICT,” but also admitted its outdated infrastructure, poor connectivity, and lack of audits.
Yet, despite the armada of human, technological and financial resources available to it thereafter, all it gave Nigerians in 2023 was a “go to court” argument.
EU and NDI/IRI reports identified the 2023 technology collapse as a trust-destroying event, not merely a technical glitch.
Let INEC execute its constitutional duty. Robust, sustained media scrutiny of its preparations is also constitutional. Among other measures, implement standardised media scorecards to track voter registration processes, PVC distribution rates, staff training completion, technology procurement transparency, and logistics planning.
Organise monthly interviews with INEC commissioners in all 36 states, demanding specific progress metrics and regular independent audits of voter registration. Focus on delays that INEC itself admits recur due to procurement bottlenecks, over-centralisation, and late cash releases. Question all, gentlemen, and question early.
Because this election is too important to be left to the electoral commission.
