I believe that if that judgment had been accepted with a bit of contrition and humility, and there had not been the rush to foist a different interpretation on it, as is obvious to some of us who have read it, thereby reading into the decision of the court what was not there, we might not be where we are today. I believe a more diplomatic approach might have served as a lifeline for a rapprochement between the senator and the Senate.
Much has been made of Justice Binta Nyako’s judgement in the case of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan v The Clerk of the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and others. Many have argued that it is the ambiguity, non-definitive, and non-declaratory nature of the ‘judgment’ that has led to the confusion that has since then ensued, culminating in the embarrassing public spectacle we witnessed a few days ago.
Having now taken time to review the full judgment, not just the extracts that first came out, I have come to a different conclusion on the matter. Rather, I am of the opinion that what we are dealing with is a case of contrived ambiguity and manufactured confusion. A dispassionate reading can only lead one willing to learn to clarity. There is nothing ambiguous or confusing in that judgment.
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All that is needed is to situate the judgment in the proper context of the circumstances that led to the cause of action, pay attention to the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, bearing in mind that the Court is no Father Christmas, before reading the decisions of the court. That done, it becomes obvious that, but for a deliberate attempt at mischief, there is nothing that should have triggered the confusion that we have witnessed in the matter.
Dial back to the very beginning. The senator had raised hell on the floor of the Senate about the reassignment of seats, insisting on speaking from a seat not assigned to her, while holding on to Order 10 of the Senate rules. Every effort, within and outside the chambers, to make her understand that while Order 10 offers her the privilege to speak at ‘anytime’, that privilege is itself contingent upon speaking from her assigned seat, in accordance with the rules.
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She not only refused to abide by the rules on the day, but she also followed up with a radio interview. A motion was subsequently moved by another senator, stating that his privilege had been breached, leading to the matter being referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges, which then invited her to appear before it. Rather than do so, she opted to approach the Court.
She sought the court to protect her right to a fair hearing and privileges under Orders 9, 10, and 11, arguing that a combined reading of these orders ought to have served as cover for her actions on the floor of the Senate and protected her from being referred to the Ethics and Privileges Committee.
In other words, her suit was virtually a carryover of her argument on the floor of the Senate, and subsequently in public fora, that by virtue of Order 10, she had a right to speak from wherever she chose. It is on the basis of, and around this, that she filed an action seeking six reliefs.
It is instructive that the Court didn’t find merit in any of the reliefs she sought, thereby comprehensively ruling in favour of the Senate, asserting its rights to set its rules, discipline its members, and pointing out that the Senate President is vested with the right to assign and reassign seats. It also affirmed that members can only speak from assigned seats, and that it is within the rights and purview of the Senate to refer the senator to the Ethics and Privileges Committee.
In the words of the court (CAPS mine for emphasis): “In the circumstances of this case, as rightly contended by the Defendants, an invitation to appear before an Ethics Committee of the Senate is a CLEAR MANIFESTATION OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS, NOT A BREACH OF IT. From a careful reading of the Originating Summons, there exists no allegation whatsoever to the effect that the Defendants contravened…statutory or constitutional provisions as the crux of this action is hinged solely on protection of parliamentary privilege on the floor of Senate. It cannot be the intendment of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution that this Court has powers to entertain complaint against any and every discussions/written communication arising from plenary sessions of the 2nd defendant. If it were the case, then this Honourable Court would know no rest.”
It is safe to say that the Court resolved all the issues raised in favour of the Senate (even partly affirming the argument raised by the parliament in its preliminary objection on the lack of jurisdiction). Even on the matter of contempt filed by the Senate President on 5th May, seeking five reliefs, the Court, in protest of the 27th April satirical apology of the senator, found her guilty of contempt, fined and ordered her to issue a public apology.
There is therefore no confusion, from the judgment as seen, that all the direct reliefs sought by the senator were denied and orders to that effect expressly made.
Justice Binta Nyako might have simply wrapped it up, but it is my opinion that, having reviewed the rules of the Senate and out of consideration for the constituents in Kogi State, she then ventured further to offer an opinion on the extensive powers of the Senate, which allows it to suspend a member ad infinitum. Bear in mind that there was no relief directly sought in this regard. The Court only decided to widen the scope of consideration, and in that light, the Justice argued that “to make a LAW THAT HAS NO END IS EXCESSIVE and cannot be the intendment of the law,” thus imploring the Senate to EXERCISE ITS POWER to review the rules and recall the senator.
These are the words of Justice Binta Nyako in that regard. (CAPS mine for emphasis): “On the issue of denial of the Plaintiff to the representation of her Senatorial District without inspiring the function of the NASS, I will give and say due to the gravity of the issue, I have read in its entirety, the Senate Rules under which the Plaintiff was suspended, thus denying the representation of her Senatorial District.
“I believe that the constitution, Legislative House (Powers & Privileges) Act, nor the Senate Rules will not intend for that to happen. I have read with interest, Chapter ix (8) of the Senate Rules and Section 14(2) of the Legislative House (Powers & privileges) Act ix (8) allows the Senate to suspend a senator until a time determined by the Senate ad infinitum while S.14(2) allows for suspension of a member (Senator) in similar terms, even without pay.
“I do not think the constitution envisages this.
“A Senator is expected to represent his people in either Legislative house for a specific number of days per session. If any suspension is UNWARRANTED, then I OPINE that the Act and the Senate Rules should also be specific and not live it at large. A suspension cannot exceed the requisite number of days the member should sit. The constitution says a legislative year is 181 days and the house should sit for this number of days. This makes it at least 36.2 weeks in a year, which is a session. To suspend a member for 6 months means suspension for 180 days and this is half the number of days the member is expected to sit in the House representing his people.
“I do not think this is the intention of the framer of the law. To make a LAW THAT HAS NO END IS EXCESSIVE and cannot be the intendment of the law. I AM OF THE OPINION that the Senate has the POWER TO REVIEW this provision of the Senate Rules and even amend Section 14(2) of the Legislative Houses (Powers & Privileges) Act, both for being over-reaching. The Senate has the power to and I believe should recall the plaintiff and allow her to same time, represent the people who sent her there to represent them.”
I believe that what the Court did was to, out of compassion, offer a lifeline to the senator, in realisation that this was a difficult situation. The court has clearly established the powers of the Senate and that it has not contravened its rules and the law in this instance. I believe that offering that opinion was the Court’s way of asking the Senate to temper justice with mercy.
I believe that if that judgment had been accepted with a bit of contrition and humility, and there had not been the rush to foist a different interpretation on it, as is obvious to some of us who have read it, thereby reading into the decision of the court what was not there, we might not be where we are today. I believe a more diplomatic approach might have served as a lifeline for a rapprochement between the senator and the Senate.
An apology to the Court, as ordered, and an apology to the Senate, as had been requested by the Senate, could have followed suit, and that would have offered an opportunity for a dignified closure to this phase of an embarrassingly mismanaged fight.
I do not see how enlisting the services of social media influencers and full-time activists can help turn a recommendation into an order. There is a time for everything. No matter how far one might have gone in a particular direction, there is always an opportunity to retreat, rethink, and re-strategise.
Simbo Olorunfemi works for Hoofbeatdotcom, a Nigerian communications consultancy and publisher of Africa Enterprise. Email: [email protected]
