In January, Nigeria officially designated Lakurawa as a terrorist organisation. Its deadly attacks in the country’s northwestern region first grabbed public attention in 2024, and between November 2024 and September 2025, nearly 100 people – mostly community members – were killed.
Lakurawa was the target of the United States’ (US) Christmas Day 2025 air strikes. While official outcome assessments remain unavailable, sources with direct access to the group say at least 136 fighters died, with dozens more injured and about 200 missing.
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But sporadic airstrikes alone are insufficient. Degrading the group requires sustained action that combines strikes with operations by ground forces that can hold territory. Lakurawa fighters must also be prevented from regrouping and seeking sanctuary along Nigeria’s borders with Niger and Benin. Joint local prevention and suppression activities are needed by all countries affected.
Lakurawa isn’t just another jihadist group. It is a hybrid organisation that combines religious extremism with organised crime.
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This explains its rapid expansion and membership from Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso, and why containment is a major counter-insurgency challenge.
Villagers first reported sightings of Lakurawa in north Sokoto State, near Nigeria’s border with the Niger, in 2018.
The group presented itself as a protector, receiving invitations from community leaders to confront bandits. It then turned insurgent.
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Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research reveals that Lakurawa was started when two armed networks merged. The Malian contingent comprises former fighters from the Salafist jihadist group Macina Liberation Front (now part of Jama’t Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin or JNIM) and a Nigerien faction with roots in defending the herding community.
Lakurawa’s jihadist past explains its initial arsenal and ability to fight bandits, as well as its dawah (Islamic proselytising) activities and religious fundamentalism.
Lakurawa tri-border expansion in Nigeria, Niger and Benin.
The group took advantage of weak state presence and security gaps in the Nigeria-Niger-Benin tri-border area. Due to its effectiveness in repelling bandits, Lakurawa earned legitimacy among local communities, which sought the group’s protection. This showed a worrying pattern of normalising security services provided by non-state actors.
From Sokoto and Kebbi states, Lakurawa has expanded southeast into Niger State’s Borgu axis, which borders northern Benin.
The lack of state presence in this area enabled the group to establish parallel governance structures, appoint local imams, levy taxes and enforce extreme religious practices on the villages. Sources in contact with Lakurawa fighters told ISS that its operational leadership was now based in Borgu.
Beyond Nigeria, Lakurawa is embedded in the central Sahel countries of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali under an overall leader, Amir Tajudeen, who reportedly moves between Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Chad.
This underscores the group’s multinational character and capacity to exploit poorly governed border areas.
Lakurawa preys on communities economically in the name of religious doctrine. It imposes a rigid social order, punishing youth who shave or listen to music, and enforces a strict dress code. It extorts money from farmers and herders under the pretext of zakat (obligatory alms). Lakurawa uses radical Islam to justify social control and brutal repression of dissent.
The group recruits by exploiting socio-economic and security vulnerabilities. It offers livelihood support in the form of money, agricultural items (including fertiliser and seeds) and water pumps in exchange for allegiance. Communities fear reprisals if they report these activities to authorities.
Lakurawa has around 2 000 members and is growing fast. Given its hybrid nature, relationships could be forged with other criminal groups and possibly Boko Haram factions. In 2024 for example, Lakurawa sent a letter to the notorious bandit leader Bello Turji, based in Zamfara State in north-west Nigeria. The letter urged him to end his criminal activities – a strategy of co-option rather than confrontation.
After a period of limited state pressure, Nigerian operations against Lakurawa intensified from late 2025, particularly in Kebbi and Niger states.
Security sources link this to a reassessment of the threat, which has quickly spread across states and involves high-profile abductions.
Other sources say last November’s kidnapping and transfer of Papiri school children to a Lakurawa camp in Borgu brought the group under sharper intelligence scrutiny.
The incident was reminiscent of Boko Haram’s infamous abduction of the Chibok girls in 2014.
CThis episode reinforces ISS research findings that Lakurawa has operational ties with both Boko Haram’s Jamatu Ahli Al-Sunna lil Da’wa Wal Jihad (JAS) faction and non-ideological bandits, who conducted the Papiri abduction.
Financing patterns also reflect the convergence of jihadist insurgency and organised criminal violence. Like JAS and bandit networks, Lakurawa has increasingly become involved in kidnapping for ransom as a core revenue stream.
This is a shift from their early days when locals reported that their predatory behaviour was limited to extorting farmers and pastoralists with zakats.
Since the US airstrikes targeting Lakurawa bases in the Bauni Forest area in Sokoto State, sources with access to the group suggest Lakurawa is anticipating reinforcement from the Sahel. Locals report ongoing violence and extortion.
To combat the group effectively, prevention and counter-terrorism efforts must be localised to address the deep socio-economic, political, and governance divides that allow such groups to gain community support and thrive.
Regional security cooperation should be strengthened by reopening and institutionalising intelligence sharing and joint operations between Nigeria and Niger, and Niger and Benin. Tense relations with Niger following its 2023 coup hamper security cooperation and block crucial joint initiatives. This tension must be resolved for Lakurawa to be defeated.
READ ALSO: How Lakurawa terrorists killed currency traders at Sokoto border market
Targeted military action to dismantle Lakurawa’s leadership, networks and logistics must be combined with opportunities for rank-and-file fighters to surrender safely and participate in a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme.
Finally, communities must be at the heart of responses. This involves empowering traditional and religious leaders and youth to promote tolerance, share information safely, counter extremist narratives and restore confidence in state protection.
Célestin Delanga, Research Officer, Taiwo Adebayo, Researcher and Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Lake Chad Basin, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
Read the full ISS report: Lakurawa – a hybrid jihadi-criminal group on Nigeria’s fragile borderlands, here.
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
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