ANALYSIS: Nigeria’s deep insecurity demands more than an emergency declaration

Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu has declared a national security emergency, ordering the recruitment of more security personnel alongside other far-reaching measures.

The 26 November announcement reflects mounting pressure on the government following soaring insecurity marked by increased Boko Haram brutality and mass abductions by bandits. Violence in the country continues to expand southward, as seen in attacks in the previously unaffected Kwara State.

Mr Tinubu’s declaration also follows United States President Donald Trump’s claims on 21 November that Nigeria has lost control of its security, and that the country is tolerating a Christian genocide. Nigeria’s government and experts have rejected the genocide claim as a one-sided oversimplification of a complex problem.

The situation indeed calls for immediate action, which should include addressing long-standing challenges that weaken the country’s ability to tackle the violence.

The declaration orders the Nigeria Police Force to recruit an additional 20,000 officers. That would bring planned recruitment for 2025 to 50,000 – only a fraction of the 190,000 recommended by Inspector-General of Police Kayode Egbetokun in 2023. The police force currently totals around 370,000 members.

Mr Tinubu also ordered the army to recruit more personnel, although no number was mentioned. A few days earlier, Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu announced plans to recruit 24,000 soldiers.

The president further instructed police officers on VIP-guard duty to be withdrawn, undergo rapid retraining to deliver more efficient policing, and be redeployed to areas affected by violence and insecurity.

He asked the State Security Services (SSS) – the country’s internal intelligence agency – to immediately deploy trained forest guards to combat bandits and terrorists. He also requested the National Assembly to amend the 2020 Nigeria Police Act to permit the establishment of independent state police forces.

These measures are a step in the right direction and reflect an apparent attempt to address a key challenge – understaffed security outposts responsible for wide and largely inaccessible areas, particularly in the northeast and northwest. However, recent abductions and terrorist violence reveal long-standing intelligence, operational and capacity deficiencies that limit Nigeria’s response to banditry and violent extremism.

These deficiencies were illustrated by the abduction of more than two dozen students by armed bandits in the northwestern Kebbi State on 18 November. Multiple accounts, including by the state’s governor, suggest the SSS shared intelligence about the planned attack with the state government and other security services. Army personnel were deployed but eventually withdrew, enabling the abductors to strike 30 minutes later.

Three days later, on 21 November, Nigeria experienced its worst mass abduction since 2020 when gunmen took over 300 students and staff from St Mary’s School in Niger State. Before the attack, families of students worried about possible abductions reportedly appealed to the police, military and civil defence corps for protection. This, along with the redeployment of personnel in Kebbi, suggests that overstretched security forces leave schools and communities vulnerable.

Boko Haram’s 15 November kidnapping and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba, commander of the 25 Task Force Brigade, also exposed Nigeria’s security sector challenges. The group ambushed his convoy following a patrol in Borno State, resulting in the death of four security personnel, including two soldiers.

The ambush suggests security forces were not aware that Boko Haram – relying on its knowledge of the terrain and possibly a network of informants – had tracked the convoy’s movement and booby-trapped the area. When Boko Haram noticed Mr Uba was missing from the ambush site, the lack of reinforcement for the convoy meant they had time to search for him, ultimately capturing and executing him.

These challenges are evident in the repeated failure of security services to detect, disrupt or prevent attacks. Fighters travel many kilometres on motorcycles, eluding detection largely because of limited intelligence and surveillance capacity at various levels. This is despite the potential to work with communities that could provide valuable information about insurgents’ movements and activities.

Deficiencies in detection and prevention enabled Boko Haram’s factions to overrun more than 15 military outposts in 2025.

Security force capacity is constrained partly due to the limited use of technology for operational planning, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This, together with weak human intelligence, forced the troops in Mr Uba’s convoy into hurried defensive positions. They responded only when the Boko Haram fighters had reached their trenches in the area.

The situation was compounded by a lack of secure communication during the failed attempt to rescue Mr Uba. Security forces relied on commercial cellphone networks and WhatsApp messaging to coordinate their movements, making them vulnerable to interception.

On top of this, the Lake Chad Basin’s forests, mountains and islands make navigation by security forces difficult and provide hideouts for groups. There is also evidence that some groups, particularly Boko Haram’s Islamic State West Africa Province faction, are increasingly using modified commercial drones and other technologies for their operations.

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To effectively tackle the country’s violence and insecurity, Nigeria must go beyond declaring a national emergency and recruiting more security personnel. Investments are needed in strengthening the intelligence and technological capacities of the police and military.

Relations with communities in affected areas are vital to enhancing human intelligence, which ultimately enables the detection, disruption and prevention of terrorist and bandit attacks. Secure communications and the use of modern technological tools for surveillance are also essential.

Sampson Kwarkye, Project Manager, Littoral West African States, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel, and Taiwo Adebayo, Researcher, Lake Chad Basin, ISS

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).