Terror groups are increasingly using new tactics, notably armed suicide or kamikaze drones, according to a government statement released following several attacks on cities in western Mali on 1 July.
The use of commercially available small civilian drones for strikes by terrorist and armed rebel groups is not limited to Mali, and has become prevalent throughout the Central Sahel. Separatist and terror groups in the region likely draw inspiration from the successful use of drones by regular armies in other conflict zones, such as Libya and the Middle East.
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The weaponisation of civilian drones represents a shift in asymmetric tactics as armed groups circumvent the conventional military superiority of the region’s armed forces. The result is increasingly severe human and structural damage, and fear among soldiers.
In Burkina Faso, over a dozen kamikaze drone strikes have been reported since February. In May, the extremist group Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) deployed drones during violent assaults on the towns of Djibo and Diapaga in the north and east of the country.
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Niger is also affected. On 25 May, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara used kamikaze drones for the first time against an army position in Eknewan near the border with Mali, killing 64 soldiers.
Weeks earlier, the Azawad Liberation Front, fighting for independence from the central government in Bamako, used suicide drones to attack a Malian Armed Forces command centre and Wagner headquarters in Léré, southwest of Timbuktu.
Central Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
Since 2022, drones have been used primarily to spy on military and security forces or create propaganda videos. However, over the past two years, their adaptation to enable the dropping of improvised explosive devices on military positions has soared.
This shows how the tactics of armed groups adapt and evolve to meet the increase in military equipment and resources deployed by governments in the region. The trend poses heightened risks to defence and security forces, and could exacerbate a conflict that has persisted for over a decade.
It also raises concerns about the safety and protection of civilians in combat zones, who bear the brunt of the violence and collateral damage.
By using kamikaze drones, armed groups are emulating the tactics of Sahelian armies, which have started using military-grade Turkish Bayraktar Akinci and Tb2 drones. This has delivered significant successes for the region’s armies, and yet the militants remain undefeated.
In September 2023, the JNIM coalition used drones against positions held by the Dogon self-defence militia Dan Na Ambassagou, in Bandiagara in Mali’s Mopti region. JNIM also uses these drones in Burkina Faso as a tactical response to the trenches dug around towns to impede their access via motorcycles.
Azawad rebels have been using homemade weapons since July 2024, notably during the battle of Tinzaouaten in Mali’s Kidal region, where they inflicted heavy losses on the Malian army and Wagner.
In September and October 2024, small drones were reportedly used to drop explosive charges on Wagner troops stationed in Goundam and Léré, in the Timbuktu region. On 5 May a kamikaze drone attack was attempted against the Malian army in Amachache, in the Kidal region, and near the Algerian border.
The Azawad rebels and associated terror groups modify civilian drones by equipping them with improvised launching systems, allowing more effective strikes. These drones are readily available in West Africa – sold in local shops for various purposes including agriculture, event management and communication. Due to their small size, they are easily concealed and trafficked in a region with porous borders and limited cross-border cooperation by governments.
Given that Sahel states lack the capacity to control and monitor their borders effectively, these groups acquire drones relatively cheaply for modification and deployment against designated targets. Drones enable them to conduct ranged attacks that, while lacking precision, inflict damage and provoke panic among troops.
The strengthened capability of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger’s armies may help them stand up to insurgents, but also encourages militants to use armed drones to target camps, checkpoints and military convoys. The Sahelian countries lack adequate means to detect and neutralise the drones, which are small, swift and capable of flying low.
This emerging threat warrants serious attention from Sahelian governments. As armed groups increasingly shift away from direct confrontations with military forces, favouring surprise attacks and harassment tactics, defence and security forces must overhaul their strategies. Even though they are costly, anti-drone systems are needed to protect critical infrastructure and civilians.
Members of the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) and Economic Community of West African States agreed on 22 May to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. They should consider measures to regulate the widespread sale and use of civilian commercial drones in the region.
They could draw on the provisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which governs the export of dual-use goods and technologies, to establish appropriate regulatory frameworks for commercial drones.
Beyond military responses, sustainable non-kinetic solutions are needed. These include weakening the armed groups by encouraging defections among their fighters, and tackling the many socio-economic challenges that increase the vulnerability of local populations.
Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, Project Manager, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
