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Nigeria’s former military president, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB), admitted that one of his biggest mistakes in office was failing to retire Sani Abacha from the army. Mr Abacha was the chief of defence staff who seized power less than three months after Mr Babangida “stepped aside”.
The retired army general said although he and Abacha were good friends, it was clear that Abacha was also a “complex character” that mobilised negative opinions against him within the military.
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“I was alarmed to discover that he and a handful of others mobilised negative opinions against me within the military, portraying me as the problem,” Mr Babangida wrote in his autobiography titled “A Journey in Service”.
In the book, Mr Babangida said Mr Abacha plotted to violently remove him as president. Yet, the former army general said he chose not to retire Abacha to avoid “bloodletting” within the military.
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“The military was so factionalised that any move against Abacha at that time would have, to put it mildly, been problematic,” Mr Babangida said. “The situation was so unstable that any wrong move on my part could have led to a bloodbath of a military coup.”
He also said that there were moments he was concerned about his safety and the safety of those dear to him. “I had sleepless nights, fearful that the situation could even degenerate into a needless civil war.”
“June 12 and opposition to civil rule’’
Mr Babangida acknowledged that mistakes were made in handling the June 12 elections, one of which was his underestimating the opposition to civil rule within the military’s top hierarchy.
Although he takes responsibility for everything that happened under his stewardship, Mr Babangida blamed Mr Abacha for the annulment of the 1993 presidential election.
“I knew that Abacha was ambivalent about a return to civil rule. But I thought, in retrospect now, naively, that he would support our transition to civil rule programme,” Mr Babangida said.
“And even more bizarre for me was my discovery of the loathing that Abacha had for the person of MKO Abiola, whom I thought had a good relationship with him.”
While “some highly professional soldiers like the then Chief of Army Staff, Salihu Ibrahim”, advocated a return to civil rule to preserve the integrity of the military, Mr Babangida said several top officers favoured an indefinite military rule.
“THERE WAS NO question that mistakes were made in the handling of the June 12 elections and their aftermath, for which I take full responsibility as President and Commander-in-Chief. One of my biggest mistakes was failing to firmly secure the support and firm commitment of my military colleagues to the Transition programme from the beginning.
“We completely underestimated the deep opposition to civil rule within the military’s top hierarchy. We underestimated the damage that the extended stay in the political arena, with all its perks, had done to the military psyche and the psychological shock that would accompany an eventual withdrawal from such temptingly appealing political positions,” the retired army general said.
“We further underestimated what it would take to return the military to the barracks and its non-political and non-partisan role. Even the lessons we learned from the errors of the military’s sudden and rapid departure in 1979 didn’t seem to avail. To avoid that mistake, we decided to implement the transition process in planned phases, which explains our use of diarchy in our journey to achieving complete democratic rule.”
ING in the aftermath of the June 12 annulment
Having failed to sell the idea of a fresh presidential election to the two political parties, SDP and NRC, Mr Babangida came up with the idea of an Interim National Government (ING).
“After several protracted deliberations covering a wide range of topics, the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), in close collaboration with representatives of the two main political parties settled for an Interim National Government (ING).
“Without question, the idea of an ING was a contraption, something of a compromise between the fierce Abacha-led opposition to the June 12 election results and the position that the election results be allowed to stay, one that will succeed our government after the August 27, 1993, exit date,” Mr Babangida said.
“To legally actualise that decision, the government directed Professor Ben Nwabueze and Clement Akpamgbo to draft an enabling law, Decree 61 of 1993, the legal framework for the ING. Although the political parties had suggested a few other names for headship of the ING, we, as a government, were okay with letting the Transition Council Chairman, Chief Ernest Shonekan, head the ING.”
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On August 17, 1993, Mr Babangida signed Decree 61 into law and ‘stepped aside’ as President and Commander in Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. “The outgoing regime also felt that it would be proper for the Service Chiefs to retire, namely Lt-General Ibrahim, Air Vice-Marshal Akin Dada, Vice-Admiral Dan Preston Omatsola, and Aliyu Attah.”
Why Abacha retained his position
Mr Babangida said he foresaw that Mr Shonekan would have a tough time on the job and feared the interim President might lack the political astuteness to handle the impending national challenges.
“The situation was further complicated because, like Abiola, Shonekan was an Egba-Yoruba, which meant the new Interim government would be unpopular in Abiola’s strongest hold, southwestern Nigeria.”
Mr Babangida said he decided to provide adequate support to the new government by retaining critical top military officers from the outgoing Transitional Council he had headed, essentially as ‘enforcers’ for the new interim government.
“Accordingly, Lt-Generals Joshua Dogonyaro (as Chief of Defence Staff), Aliyu Muhammed Gusau (as Chief of Army Staff), and Brigadier John Shagaya (as GOC First Division) were retained.
“Problematic as it seemed, General Abacha also retained his position as the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and, presumably, as Transition to Civil Rule and the June 12 Saga enforcer-in-chief for the new government! But as we all now know, that was a grave mistake.”
Mr Abacha eventually toppled the interim government in November 1993 and died in office in June 1998.
