A draft decision to endorse former Senegalese president Macky Sall’s candidacy for United Nations (UN) Secretary-General has been rejected by the African Union (AU). In a 27 March statement, the AU said 20 of its 55 member states either objected or requested an extension of the 24-hour deadline.
Rather than signalling African disunity, the outcome highlights the AU’s ability to manage and regulate the endorsement of African candidacies for international positions.
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The failure of the draft decision appears to end an atypical diplomatic sequence surrounding Africa’s only candidacy to succeed António Guterres. A key factor was the absence of formal backing from Mr Sall’s own country, Senegal, where his political legacy continues to be contested.
The bid was submitted to the UN on 2 March by Burundi, whose President Évariste Ndayishimiye took over the rotating AU chairmanship on 14 February. The submission blurred the line between a national initiative and a continental endorsement. Its timing, just two weeks after the AU summit, may have created the impression of formal AU backing, prompting some confusion in Addis Ababa.
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AU procedures require candidacies to be submitted and reviewed by the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Ministerial Committee before reaching the Executive Council for a decision by consensus or a two-thirds majority. This ensures a collective review, based on consultations among member states.
In this case, Mr Sall’s name was not on the list of African candidacies presented to the Executive Council at the February AU summit and was not formally discussed by heads of state. Burundi’s submission of the draft decision to the UN and AU member states appears to have been a late attempt to secure formal continental endorsement.
The initiative relied on a ‘silence procedure’ – a mechanism widely used across multilateral institutions whereby decisions are adopted in the absence of formal objections within a specified timeframe. Typically reserved for routine or administrative matters, it is used to streamline processes between summits rather than resolve substantive or political questions.
In this case, the draft decision set a 24-hour deadline and a threshold of one-third of eligible member states – that is, countries which are up to date with their AU contributions and not under suspension. According to a Senegalese high official, this amounted to 49 eligible states.
In total, 20 countries broke the silence, including Algeria, South Africa, Liberia, Nigeria and Rwanda. Fourteen raised formal objections, while six, including Egypt, requested an extension of the 24-hour deadline. Senegal distanced itself from the process, saying it had not been associated with Burundi’s initiative. After the deadline, Egypt and Liberia withdrew their positions, without affecting the outcome.
The objections focused primarily on procedural grounds. Several states felt the silence procedure was inappropriate for a substantive decision, citing limited scope for discussion and the short timeframe. The one-third threshold also departs from established practice, which allows just one or more objections to suffice.
Beyond these concerns, using the silence procedure to decide a political candidacy introduced a degree of ambiguity. It required opponents to come forward publicly, while effectively treating the 35 silent states as supporters, despite their possible positions ranging from active backing to tacit acceptance or unexpressed reservations.
This uncertainty was exacerbated by the UN’s informal regional rotation principle, which favours Latin American and Caribbean candidates to succeed Mr Guterres, as reflected in Nigeria’s objection.
Using the silence procedure limited the scope for discussing Sall’s candidacy. A more open process would have allowed states to weigh Sall’s strengths against questionable aspects of his record and AU governance standards. It would have enabled an assessment of the diplomatic costs of backing a candidate not endorsed by Senegal.
Mr Sall has a high-level political and diplomatic profile. An experienced former head of state, he served as AU chair in 2022, where he was a key advocate for greater African representation in global governance and helped secure the AU’s G20 seat. He served as French President Emmanuel Macron’s Special Envoy for the Paris Pact for People and the Planet after leaving office.
At the same time, his domestic record is contested. His final 2019-2024 term was marked by significant political tensions and judicial controversies. Following his departure, questions were raised about his management of public finances.
The failure of the draft decision has been widely interpreted as a rejection of Mr Sall’s candidacy, and as evidence of Africa’s inability to speak with one voice. While sensitivities around Mr Sall’s perceived diplomatic alignment with Morocco and the UN’s regional rotation principle likely shaped positions, this episode ultimately highlights the resilience of the AU’s selection processes.
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Faced with an attempt to secure implicit endorsement, the AU’s internal mechanisms averted a contested outcome that could have divided member states and cost the institution dearly.
By allowing a sitting AU chair to endorse a candidate for a major international post outside established procedures, the move risked setting another damaging precedent for AU decision-making. In 2025, the former chair, Angola’s President João Lourenço, appointed Burundi’s president as Special Envoy to the Sahel, a prerogative vested in the AU Commission chair rather than the AU chair.
The failure of Burundi’s initiative thus helped preserve the integrity of the AU’s multilateralism. It also reinforced the Ministerial Committee as the primary channel for advancing African candidacies within the international system.
At a time when multilateral organisations are under stress, the commitment shown by African member states to AU procedures is encouraging. Ultimately, the AU has done well to pass this stress test.
Djiby Sow, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
