The United States of America’s (US) retreat from multilateralism has put the financing of multinational peacekeeping to the test. This is most vivid in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2719 – a hard-won measure meant to address chronic funding shortfalls for African missions. It remains unimplemented two years after adoption.
With terrorism and other forms of armed conflict ravaging populations, economies and infrastructure in Africa, this implementation bottleneck must be cleared urgently.
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UNSCR 2719, passed unanimously in December 2023, created a hybrid funding model for African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (PSOs). It permits up to 75 per cent of costs to come from UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis, with the remainder to be mobilised jointly by the AU and UN. This set-up demands joint planning, adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights standards, and Security Council authorisation.
It builds on decades of lessons learnt from experiences of African peace missions and policy advocacy for reliable funding. The AU and sub-regional actors have deployed 38 PSOs. The lack of reliable funding cuts across all its missions – from earlier Organisation of African Unity attempts to more recent AU missions.
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Various policy efforts have been underway to address this chronic challenge. In 2008, the report of the AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations recommended two new financial mechanisms for AU-led PSOs. The first was based on UN-assessed funding and the second on a voluntary-funded multi-donor trust fund.
This was reaffirmed, including in the 2017 UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, where the organisations expressed willingness to consider options to secure predictable funding for AU-led PSOs, easing reliance on ad hoc donor support.
The UN Secretary-General’s report on financing AU PSOs and the AU’s consensus paper on financing AU peace and security activities both reasserted the need for predictable, adequate and sustainable funding for AU PSOs through UN-assessed contributions.
However, three main obstacles persist in blocking its implementation: UNSC internal political barriers, the UN’s liquidity crisis caused by member states failing to pay their mandatory assessed contributions in full and on time, and delays in implementing the AU-UN roadmap for operationalising the resolution.
The lack of US political backing is the biggest challenge, evident in the failed attempt to apply the resolution to the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Near-universal support among council members to activate the resolution to the already struggling mission collapsed against US opposition.
The US stated that the proposed ‘hybrid model’ to fund both the UN Support Office in Somalia and AUSSOM would mean UN contributions exceeding 75 per cent. This shows that the resolution is vulnerable to the interests and political will of key UNSC members.
The UN’s current financial strains add another layer of difficulty. Entering 2025, the organisation faced a $135 million shortfall in peacekeeping assessments, with arrears topping $760 million – primarily from major contributors like the US.
By late 2025, unpaid dues had climbed to nearly $1.6 billion, prompting Secretary-General António Guterres to propose a 15 per cent cut to the 2026 peacekeeping budget in November, which would eliminate over 18 per cent of jobs.
These constraints limit appetite in the short run for new commitments, making council members hesitant to activate a new mission under Resolution 2719 and risk further budgetary pressure. For African-led missions, the result is more immediate operational strain, exacerbating the broader funding crisis in peace efforts, especially for AUSSOM, as it curtailed alternative means of funding the mission.
Implementing the hybrid funding mechanism also requires close AU-UN coordination, following the various milestones outlined in the joint AU-UN roadmap for the resolution’s operationalisation. Coordination has advanced but remains uneven, and the UN and AU are yet to finalise all the tasks set in the joint roadmap beyond deadlines.
These challenges have already impeded the resolution’s implementation, and now its momentum risks fading as global attention turns to increasing crises in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine, among others.
Still, signs of goodwill endure. Despite budget cuts, the UN’s Fifth Committee approved six new posts dedicated to 2719, signalling sustained backing. Similarly, the European Union reaffirmed its commitment at the November 2025 AU-EU Luanda summit, declaring support for the resolution in a joint statement.
To overcome these barriers, a set of targeted policies becomes essential.
First and foremost, binding deadlines for completing the joint AU-UN roadmap should be reestablished through regular, inclusive working sessions between the two organisations.
These discussions must prioritise tackling unresolved gaps in key areas and hasten implementation – including logistics support, budgeting and financial alignment, joint UN-AU decision-making processes, and compliance benchmarks related to human rights, conduct, and accountability mechanisms – without awaiting perfect political conditions.
This proactive approach would foster institutional coherence, reduce inconsistent interpretations across departments and between the organisations, and create credible readiness for applying the resolution in future contexts.
Second, the AU should move beyond Somalia as a test case and take the lead in proposing new missions under UNSCR 2719. This should be achieved by preparing and presenting multiple scenarios to enforce possible peace agreements in current hotspots, such as Sudan, the Sahel or eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Third, the AU Peace Fund requires bolstering through its current review process, aiming to reach its $400 million endowment target. The most recent proposal to raise it to $1 billion is a step in the right direction. However, similar bold measures are needed for the AU to be a reliable partner in sharing the financial costs for its PSOs.
Fourth, the AU should exert targeted diplomatic efforts to show the value of activating 2719 to the US, especially in addressing terrorism. A new US National Security Strategy has given short shrift to Africa. Yet the strategy affirms that combating the ‘resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa’ remains a priority.
Practically, this can be achieved through high-level bilateral meetings between AU commissioners and US State Department officials, joint counter-terrorism dialogues that highlight shared terror threats, and advocacy campaigns to align proposals with goals.
The future of UNSCR 2719 depends on navigating a harsh funding landscape and complex geopolitical context with resolve. The path forward requires the UN and AU to maintain persistent collaboration, adopt adaptive strategies, and renew their shared commitment to making sustainable financing for African-led peace a reality.
Tamrat Zeyede Haile and Dawit Yohannes, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Addis Ababa
(This article was published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish.)
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