On his first day in office, United States (US) President Donald Trump signed an executive order to withdraw his country from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement. This latest plunge of the US climate change rollercoaster may be the most impactful yet.
The latest withdrawal will take effect in one year and continue for at least three more, depending on the 2028 US presidential election outcome. Unlike the previous exit, which lasted only 107 days before Mr Biden rejoined the agreement in 2021, there is now a reasonable time for significant harm to global climate action efforts. These impacts will be felt at multiple levels and in four main areas.
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The first is direct funding support. In its continued moves to weaken the United Nations system, US support for other countries and non-state actors to fully implement the Paris Agreement will be limited or seized altogether.
An early casualty might be developed countries’ $300 billion pledge at COP29 in Baku. This may extend to the US being a lower-profile player in replenishing global funds like the Green Climate Fund to the tune of $4 billion, and the new Loss and Damage Fund.
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The US’ dismissive stance on climate change, combined with Mr Trump’s insistence that North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries increase their defence spending amidst heightened global insecurity, may see climate funding reduced in the developing world.
This has grave implications for the mitigation and adaptation ambitions, and in particular, the needs of African countries. An example is the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) which facilitate the movement to low-carbon growth in Africa.
Two African countries, South Africa and Senegal, have operational JETPs, and pilot plans are underway for three more – Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire and Morocco. The outlook for these energy transitions is grave in the short term, as the US has, to date, been a principal partner.
The second impact of the US withdrawal is the gap it will leave in global institutions. After climate change sceptic David Malpass was appointed World Bank president in Mr Trump’s first term, Mr Biden used the position’s vacancy to install climate action embracing Ajay Banga as head. Many progressive policy changes followed, including loan and grant packages for the close-down and repurposing of coal-fired power stations in South Africa.
The World Bank Detox Development report is also highly innovative. It proposes redirecting already dedicated fossil fuel subsidies towards low-carbon energy sources, keeping the subsidies under the energy security banner – but with a renewables and nuclear character. There may also be funding possibilities for the damage caused by climate disasters, and investments in climate adaptation to help vulnerable communities cope.
Mr Trump’s ‘drill, baby, drill’ mantra and its supporting measures put this World Bank proposal at risk. Recent COPs and the 2023 Climate Finance Summit have made it clear that national and especially multilateral development banks should lead the global climate finance drive.
If the World Bank’s climate efforts are arrested, a knock-on effect could occur in many of its partners. Hopefully, there will be sufficient pushback from the European Investment Bank, Asian Development Bank and the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank). If that happens, the African Development Bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa may be encouraged to continue their climate aspirations.
Commercial banks are also vulnerable to policy shifts back to fossil fuel investments. A market opening for fossil fuel chain investments, initially in the US and then beyond, could see the formula for easier profits compared to renewable energy investments becoming attractive to commercial bank investors and shareholders.
The third effect of the US’ Paris Agreement exit relates to the country’s role as an active negotiator in COP meetings while its withdrawal is pending. Given that it questions the UN’s value generally and its climate position in particular, the US could retard already sluggish efforts to secure more commitment for mitigation targets, adaptation financing and reasonable compensation for loss and damage.
This will affect poor countries the most, whose contributions to the global carbon budget are negligible, if any. The impact will go beyond lower levels of financial aid, and into the domains of reduced technical assistance and capacity building. Africa – a vulnerable region with the highest concentration of least developed countries globally – will feel the brunt immediately.
Fourth, Mr Trump’s stance on the climate issue has disturbingly garnered support in other countries. The most visible to date has been Argentina, where President Javier Milei, a self-declared Trump ally, has said he will consider leaving the Paris Agreement. Others may follow, weakening the climate multilateral platform.
The best chance to get this train back on the rails is at COP30 in Belém, Brazil in November. There is still room and hope for a more robust agreement on climate action.
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To achieve this, key countries must galvanise a global climate agenda at plurilateral forums in 2025 – the BRICS summit under the Brazilian presidency in July and the G20 summit under South Africa’s presidency in November. The G20 Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors meeting this week in South Africa will also be significant.
The alternative is reduced climate action and a faster slide to global climate catastrophe – with Africa and the developing world as the first victims.
Dhesigen Naidoo, Research Associate, Climate Risk and Human Security Project, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
