Terrorist financiers are opening bank accounts in women’s names and secretly using them to move illicit funds, according to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU).
NFIU, in its recently released 2025 Annual Report, stated that the tactic was among the emerging terrorist-financing methods identified in its analysis of financial crime trends for 2025.
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It said terrorists’ male commanders and logistics managers secretly control accounts opened in the names of wives, sisters and female associates.
“Terrorist financiers are opening bank accounts in women’s names while male commanders and logistics managers secretly control them.
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“They exploit cultural norms that make women less likely to be suspected by authorities, using wives, sisters, or female associates as fronts to distance illicit funds from the true operatives,” the report stated.
Some of the women whose accounts were used may have remained unaware of the transactions and the volume of funds moving through their accounts, the report revealed.
It also identified disconnected phone registration as another method used by terrorist facilitators.
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The Unit described the practice as identity laundering, saying the men may possess the ATM cards, mobile-banking credentials and PINs associated with the accounts.
“This tactic functions as identity laundering: women’s accounts are managed by men who hold ATM cards, mobile-banking credentials, and PINs, while the women often remain unaware of the transactions and volumes,” it said.
Phone numbers
According to the report, facilitators use phone numbers for mobile banking or account alerts that are not registered to the actual account holder or beneficiary.
The Unit said pre-registered SIM cards, SIMs registered to deceased persons and SIMs connected to gender-based proxies could be used to break the link between the phone number and the actual beneficiary, making it more difficult for investigators to trace the transactions.
“They bypass the security link between SIM cards and Bank Verification Numbers (BVNs) by using pre-registered SIMs, SIMs registered to deceased people, or SIMs tied to gender-based proxies.
“This severs the audit trail: when a transaction is flagged, investigators trace the phone to an unrelated person, letting the real facilitator stay anonymous and continue operations,” NFIU stated.
Coded transaction descriptions
NFIU also said terrorist cells, particularly those linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), use detailed transaction narrations as part of their internal financial accounting.
It said the groups use precise descriptions for logistics-related payments sent from a single source to multiple recipients.
The report said the apparently detailed narrations could create an internal audit trail for the terrorist organisation, even though they appear counterintuitive from a financial-monitoring perspective.
The Unit further identified the use of coded messages in transaction descriptions, saying facilitators use innocuous words, secret codes and alphanumeric strings, sometimes switching languages, to avoid automated filters that could flag terms associated with terrorism.
NFIU said the tactic obscures the purpose of transfers and can allow terrorist financing to continue.
“Facilitators use this coded language, often switching languages to evade banks’ automated keyword filters that flag terms like ‘Jihad,’ ‘Arms,’ or ‘Boko.’
“This practice obscures the true purpose of transfers, preventing detection and enabling continued financing,” the Unit revealed.
Crowdfunding, remittance apps
NFIU also documented a four-stage crowdfunding network through which terrorist funds could be collected and moved to Nigeria.
It said a foreign-based facilitator could launch social-media campaigns presented as humanitarian relief or educational support, directing donors to payment pages or bank accounts.
According to the report, hundreds of sympathisers could make relatively small donations, which NFIU said were less likely to trigger automated anti-money-laundering alerts.
“Hundreds of sympathizer donors contribute $50–$500 each, amounts small enough to avoid most automated AML alerts,” it said.
The funds would then be consolidated in a master account before being split into smaller payments and transferred through international money-transfer operators and remittance applications to a network of Nigerian money mules.
NFIU said students, small-business owners and relatives could be used as money mules in the process.
It added that the recipients could convert the funds to cash, purchase dual-use items or transfer the money through mobile banking to logistics managers and field operatives.
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