The recently concluded BRICS Leaders’ Summit in Rio took place against the backdrop of great geopolitical flux. After years of growing relevance, the group appears to be struggling to maintain forward momentum. As its expanded membership grapples with their own internal contradictions and an increasingly unpredictable international system, a hard reset may be needed to get back to basics.
In recent years, BRICS has enjoyed a resurgence. In 2022, the Ukraine war and fatigue with Western-dominated global governance and finance institutions bolstered interest in alternative power centres, particularly among Global South countries.
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The group’s utility for its five core members has centred around shared interests, South-South cooperation and progressive internationalism. Global events bolstered the club’s attractiveness as countries worldwide grapple with their geopolitical hedging strategies, seen, for example, through multi-alignment and active non-alignment behaviours.
This was clear at the 2023 Johannesburg summit, which unexpectedly (and perhaps prematurely) led to BRICS’ expansion. Invitations were extended to six new members – five officially joined, including Indonesia in 2025. Saudi Arabia has yet to formally accept. At the 2024 Kazan summit, the new ‘partner country’ model allowed 10 more states to participate in annual summits with limited influence on declarations and outcomes.
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BRICS’s expanding membership
Source: ISS
The group has become a vital platform for geopolitical recalibration among member states. Kazan, for example, led to a considerable strategic thaw in Indo-China relations following the first formal bilateral meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in over five years.
Despite this positive momentum, concerns over BRICS’ continued relevance in shaping the international order have intensified. This is mainly due to the bloat of its growing agenda, internal contradictions of its increasing membership, and lack of a robust normative bedrock. Without this foundation, members will struggle to agree on a strategy to reform global governance and financial institutions.
This year’s summit appears to have dimmed the group’s prospects further. Two of the five core members’ heads of state did not attend in person. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s absence due to a ‘scheduling conflict’ arguably points to Beijing’s preoccupation with domestic priorities, as it grapples with mounting economic stresses. This was the first time Xi had not attended (either virtually or in person) since assuming office over a decade ago.
Russian President Vladimir Putin participated online, due to his International Criminal Court arrest warrant for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. This is reminiscent of South Africa’s quandary as an ICC Rome Statute signatory and BRICS summit host in 2023.
While this approach has seemingly become accepted by BRICS members, it points to deep contradictions in their respective international legal commitments – another impediment to pursuing global institutional reforms for a more just world.
Also absent were the Egyptian, Iranian and United Arab Emirates presidents, who sent senior representatives. Two other core BRICS members, South Africa and host Brazil, appeared preoccupied with preparations for hosting other upcoming multilateral summits: the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Johannesburg and the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Belém.
External pressures compound these challenges. President Donald Trump’s administration had warned the bloc against initiatives to displace the United States (US) from its dominant position in global affairs. Mr Trump asserted during the summit that ‘any country aligning themselves with the anti-American policies of BRICS will be charged an additional 10 per cent tariff.’
Mr Trump had threatened earlier that any moves to replace the US dollar with a BRICS-backed reserve currency would be accompanied by 100 per cent tariffs, perhaps forcing a more circumspect approach from BRICS members. BRICS support for de-dollarisation, led by China and Russia, is high on the group’s agenda – but internal disagreement around achieving it reveals fractures in the bloc’s strategic unity, geopolitical strategist Velina Tchakarova told ISS Today.
The German Marshall Fund’s Garima Mohan also highlighted these tensions, telling ISS Today: “Given strained ties between two of its major founding members, India and China, it seems unlikely that the grouping will be able to speak in one voice or provide a credible critique of the current system of global governance.
“Additionally, China seeks to promote its own model – within BRICS and in other international formats – which is not more representative/democratic than the system we have in place today. This raises the question [of] whether BRICS is the right kind of platform for the reforms we need today.”
With its core members spread so thin, it is unsurprising that this year’s summit produced no fireworks. Expectations were limited to institutional developments focused on consolidating BRICS membership and thematic focus areas relating to cooperation on global health, trade and finance, climate change and artificial intelligence.
The leaders’ declaration contained several (fairly predictable) statements on global policy issues, and the outcomes largely validated the mild expectations for the Rio gathering. In sum, BRICS’ approach this year has been to simply keep things turning over.
This logic may not be entirely misplaced. Samir Puri, Chatham House’s Centre for Global Governance and Security director, says: “BRICS has not emerged as a loud challenger to the controversial steps being taken by the second Trump administration, prompting questions over whether the platform has any worth.
“But a low-key BRICS summit may prove to be [smarter]. The BRICS countries are playing the long game, and there’s little gain in provoking a loud clash with a conflictual US president.”
However, this could equally be viewed as a missed opportunity. For all its flaws, BRICS remains uniquely positioned to represent global realities. Its diversity, non-ideological cooperation and growing economic heft allow coordination among nations that don’t always agree – but share common interests (not values). BRICS offers a platform that is pragmatic, strategic and unconstrained by the bureaucratic inertia of other multilateral bodies like the UN.
While BRICS’ incremental institutionalisation is a net positive, it will not move the needle in the prevailing global environment.
The group’s members are grappling with the weaponisation of trade policy, unilateral military interventionism, surging global defence expenditure, and the impact of all this on the global institutional order. In this context, how will BRICS chart a new way forward for international cooperation?
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For the moment, it seems content responding to the volleys being served from Washington DC, rather than pre-empting major geopolitical developments, or placing other powers on the back foot.
Against the headwinds of a revisionist US, a shaky Western alliance and a global system in crisis, bold and decisive moves by BRICS leaders are needed to usher in a more multipolar order. Simply keeping the ball rolling won’t be enough.
Ronak Gopaldas, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Consultant and Signal Risk Director and Priyal Singh, Senior Researcher, Africa in the World, ISS Pretoria
(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).
