Votes, violence and validity: Nigeria’s 2023 sub-national elections, By Jibrin Ibrahim

The conduct of these elections was also impacted by the increased levels of violent incidents and vote trading recorded. The patchy deployment of security personnel in states such as Bayelsa, Enugu and Bauchi reduced the ability or willingness of security agencies to intervene to prevent critical incidents of violence has further undermined the credibility of this poll. Across the country, 8% of observers noted that there were no security personnel at their polling units.

On 18 March, following a one-week delay by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to enable it to comply with a Court of Appeal judgement, Nigerians returned to the polls to cast their ballots in governorship and state Houses of Assembly elections. Voters in 28 states had the chance to elect new, or returing governors in the 18^th of March vote, with the remaining eight states having off-cycle polls, three of which are scheduled to take place later this year. This is a summary of the report of the Election Analysis Centre of the Centre for Democracy and Development on the elections.

BVAS was largely deployed and functional across the country for accreditation. Linked to the improved deployment of BVAS, the uploading of declared polling unit results to INECs results viewing platform (IReV) was significantly improved, in comparison with what happened during the 25 February polls, with 23% of declared polling unit results available on the platform by 6:10 p.m. on election day. By 2:00 p.m. on 19 March, that had increased to an average of 85% and ranged from 98% in Oyo State to a low of 68% in Kano State. This provided real results for political parties and citizens to follow the distribution of votes. Nonetheless, diminished trust in the electoral institution shaped wider perceptions when it came to the acceptance of the results returned, particularly in races where narrow margins of victory were recorded or where patterns of the presidential results were not replicated at the sub-national level.

The conduct of these elections was also impacted by the increased levels of violent incidents and vote trading recorded. The patchy deployment of security personnel in states such as Bayelsa, Enugu and Bauchi reduced the ability or willingness of security agencies to intervene to prevent critical incidents of violence has further undermined the credibility of this poll. Across the country, 8% of observers noted that there were no security personnel at their polling units. Voter suppression, voter intimidation and the destruction or theft of election materials, predominantly by political party agents and politically aligned thugs, were recorded across all the six geopolitical zones of the country. These violent incidents were often focused in the political strongholds of the opposition or perceived opponents, which suggest that the use of BVAS – which limits overvoting when properly used – has resulted in a more concerted effort at styming citizens who are casting their votes in strongholds of their opponents, than stuffing ballot boxes to rig the outcomes of some elections.

The threat or use of violence – not just offline but also online through the use of identity driven misinformation and disinformation on social media – in some polling units to intimidate, suppress and destroy election materials had a multiplier effect, further reducing voters’ appetite to cast ballots, a reality that likely shaped engagement with the process in states like Lagos and Rivers in these latter elections. In the first six hours of polls being open on 18 March, CDD’s war room team came across a flurry of voter intimidation videos, particularly from Lagos State, which were ensconced in rhetoric about belonging and ethnic identity – an illustration of the ways that voter intimidation took place both online, as well as offline.

In zones across the country, vote trading was more pronounced than during the presidential election, with both cash and goods used by all political parties in the effort to entice voters to cast their ballots in their direction. In total, 25.3% of observers noted vote buying at their polling units across the country, with the highest figures reported in the South-East (41.4%) and North-West (35.4%). In Anambra State, party agents were observed using materials, phones and other souvenirs to entice voters. In the South-South, multiple party agents reported the desire for voters to show proof of their votes before being paid, with party agents reportedly compiling a list of their voters in Esan Central LGA of Edo State.  In Kano, the value of goods shared, if not cash, was as high as N5,000, with 90% of observers reporting incidents of vote buying in the polling units they observed. In polling units in Dutse, Ringim and Birnin Kudu LGAs of Jigawa State, observers highlighted that some voters were actively soliciting funds in exchange for their votes. Vote buying, the violence and intimidation that many voters experienced in casting their ballots and the mistrust that many voters have in the capabilities of INEC, following the 25 February elections, despite improvements this time, cannot be disassociated from the outcomes from the 28 governorship and 36 state Houses of Assembly races.

Nigeria’s identity divisions have been more pronounced in these elections, with narratives amplified by online discourses further contributing to accentuating this. Whether to promote conventional zonal arrangements or to whip up ethnic concerns to support voter bases, these have played a significant part in heightening a sensitive political climate and they led to an acrimonious voting process.

APC candidates have been returned in fifteen states: Gombe, Jigawa, Katsina, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Yobe, Sokoto, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Ebonyi, Benue, Niger, Borno, and Cross River. The party was able to return incumbents in five of these states – Gombe, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun and Yobe – and retain control of states that it had lost during the presidential election – Gombe, Katsina, Sokoto and Yobe, which were earlier won by PDP, and Lagos that won by Labour Party (LP).

PDP candidates have so far been successful in: Akwa Ibom, Oyo, Bauchi, Delta and Enugu States, which the party controlled before the elections, with an incumbent re-elected in Oyo despite losing the state to the APC during the presidential election. The New Nigeria People’s Party was also able to parlay its strong showing in the presidential election to win the governorship election in Kano State, while LP won in Abia. The elections produced a governorship setup with five parties producing governors (in addition to the All Progressives Grand Alliance in Anambra). This mirrors the multi-party configuration in the National Assembly.

Initial analyses of the results reinforce the unique nature of local politics. Available results show a correlation between the governorship and state Houses of assembly results among declared states. Of note is the incumbency factor, with six of the 11 incumbents seeking re-election being returned elected. Greater interest in state politics is also reflected in emerging data. Turnout for the three states there is full data for show increases when compared to the presidential poll: Akwa Ibom 27.8% versus 24.9%, Jigawa 44.8% versus 40.6%, and Katsina 39.4% versus 31%. While a different average can be expected when all the results have been formally declared, it appears the direct impact of governors on citizens, the high number of term-limited governors and the decision of state party chapters to respond to the presidential result, led to increased turnout. 

Nigeria’s identity divisions have been more pronounced in these elections, with narratives amplified by online discourses further contributing to accentuating this. Whether to promote conventional zonal arrangements or to whip up ethnic concerns to support voter bases, these have played a significant part in heightening a sensitive political climate and they led to an acrimonious voting process. Instances of systematic disenfranchisement on the basis of ethnicity, and the expectation that will translate into votes for another party, will also lead to more partisanship and division in incoming administrations.  

A lot of the challenges confronting electoral democracy in Nigeria are the direct results of illegal and often criminal actions taken by key members of the political class and their surrogates, who violate the Electoral Act and other laws and regulations; and engage in violence, murder, fraud, disruption of elections, hate speech and so on. Accountability for such actions is important…

The development of electoral democracy in Nigeria confronts regular and determined efforts by some members of the political class to undermine it for their selfish interests. It therefore requires continuous reforms to strengthen and build its resilience. We recommend the following measures:

1. A lot of the challenges confronting electoral democracy in Nigeria are the direct results of illegal and often criminal actions taken by key members of the political class and their surrogates, who violate the Electoral Act and other laws and regulations; and engage in violence, murder, fraud, disruption of elections, hate speech and so on. Accountability for such actions is important and the long-standing proposal by the Uwais Electoral Reform Committee to establish the Electoral Offences Commission should be implemented as soon as possible;
2. There is need to establish a Political Parties Regulatory Commission, which will focus on building the strengths and capacities of parties, so that INEC can focus exclusively on the organisation of elections.
3. Democracy-promoting institutions should be strengthened, including the Independent National Electoral Commission, which requires more autonomy, especially in relation to the appointment of its members and related support institutions, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the National Human Rights Commission, which serve as guardrails of competitive party and electoral politics:
4. A National Cohesion and Integration Commission needs to created to promote inter-ethnic and I=inter-religious understanding with functions and powers modelled on the Kenyan commission with the same name;
5. An independent committee has to be established, which will be like the Uwais Electoral Reform Committee, to look into  improvement of election management in the country.

A professor of Political Science and development consultant/expert, Jibrin Ibrahim is a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Democracy and Development, and Chair of the Editorial Board of PREMIUM TIMES.