Ukraine: From outcomes to opportunities, By Uddin Ifeanyi

Ultimately, though, prioritising outcomes over opportunities is not a benign socialist attribute. It lies at the core of totalitarianism. When the Soviet Union enquired of Boris Pasternak, “On whose say so are you a poet?”, it was a question that Dmitri Shostakovich had already included in his “prison suitcase”…And one that Osip Mandelstam answered through his death in the gulag. Man, free and independent ought to make his own choices, so long as these do not hurt others.

In the two months since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, talking heads the world over have been busy. It has not helped that the externalities of this war have implications across mankind’s lived experiences. It is not just likely to change how wars will be fought in future (the armoured tank looks like past its sell-by date), it has implications for the global financial architecture that should see the plumbing sprout leaks in the immediate future.

The poles in most of the argument have alternated between the macabre and the strategic. At one end, we find Mr Vladimir Putin, who either believes or would prefer that onlookers believe that he has not led Russia into a war with Ukraine in which thousands of Ukrainians, including women and children have died and are still dying. But is, instead, peddling the myth of a “special operations” in Ukraine, designed to rid the latter of Nazis. Unlike the fable around his “little green men” in the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, this new lie cannot explain the thousands of lives Russia has equally lost in Ukraine in the last two months.

Explaining the rationale for the invasion has been no less easy ― and so the poles of this conversation have been more antipodean. Forgetting that there was a point at which Vladimir Putin suggested Russia might join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as part of the process of its post-Soviet normalisation, a very vocal local cohort have blamed NATO’s expansion into previously Soviet states ― provoking Russia in the process ― for the invasion. According to this perspective, Mr Putin is simply correcting the West’s intrusion into Russia’s “sphere of influence”.

Nonetheless, it is self-evident that Vladimir Putin’s Russia may be justified in its claim to the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) “sphere of influence”, only if we deny to other former Soviet states a right to that patrimony. An argument that no ex-Soviet state may now make, giving the great show of inter-state solidarity that was a hallmark of the defunct USSR. Additionally, it could be argued that by renouncing the USSR heritage, as most former east European states now firmly aligned with the West have, these new states have foresworn any claim to their Soviet inheritance. Still, it is doubtful if this then is enough basis for Russia’s current overarching claims.

…the experience of most of its satellite states was ugly: the hunger from famines brought about by the de-kulakisation process; the violent suppression of local expression on a daily basis ― gulags in Siberia that make rendition to Guantanamo Bay look like a tea party ― and 1956 Hungary and 1968 Czechoslovakia. These experiences explain why as soon as they were rid of the USSR in 1991, most former Soviet satellite states sought the reassurance of strong relationships with the West.

For in the end, the USSR was about socialising the means of production, as it was totalitarian. And the experience of most of its satellite states was ugly: the hunger from famines brought about by the de-kulakisation process; the violent suppression of local expression on a daily basis ― gulags in Siberia that make rendition to Guantanamo Bay look like a tea party ― and 1956 Hungary and 1968 Czechoslovakia. These experiences explain why as soon as they were rid of the USSR in 1991, most former Soviet satellite states sought the reassurance of strong relationships with the West. No one really voluntarily returns to slavery.

This is the explanation of Ukraine’s resilience in the war against Russia’s much mightier army. The shocking incompetence with which the Russian military high command has prosecuted the war is another reason for sane folks to avoid associating with the country. Unable to fight effectively, it was never going to protect its people’s best interest, not to talk of those of its allies. Besides, despite its talk about its Soviet heritage, no two states could be more different ― one socialist, the other led a pretend capitalist economy led by oligarchs.

Yet in many ways, Russia shares as much in common with the old USSR. In the latter years of that socialist experience, it was common to hear the argument that government should focus on the equality of opportunities, rather than of outcomes. Presumably because socialists, in collectivising agricultural practices and otherwise expropriating the bourgeoisie, purported to aim at prosperity for all: From each according to her ability and to each according to his need. And because the desired outcomes, laudable, though they were (and still are) resulted simply in the collectivisation of misery.

Ultimately, though, prioritising outcomes over opportunities is not a benign socialist attribute. It lies at the core of totalitarianism. When the Soviet Union enquired of Boris Pasternak, “On whose say so are you a poet?”, it was a question that Dmitri Shostakovich had already included in his “prison suitcase”, which he packed every night before going to bed awaiting the secret police’s visit. And one that Osip Mandelstam answered through his death in the gulag. Man, free and independent ought to make his own choices, so long as these do not hurt others.

This is Ukraine’s argument, today.

Uddin Ifeanyi, journalist manqué and retired civil servant, can be reached @IfeanyiUddin.