Ukraine and the Bucharest Memorandum, By Femi Mimiko

The bottomline in all of these is that President Zelensky of Ukraine has not demonstrated enough purchase on statecraft. The man didn’t come into office with the requisite cognate experience; and thus, he has conducted his country’s diplomatic engagements from a very dangerously unrealistic standpoint that has now thrown it into a mess… what Zelensky should seek, and very quickly too, is an end to this needless war, with a view to salvaging what remains of his country.

So much is being made of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which formed the basis of divesting Ukraine of its nuclear arsenal, in exchange for security guarantees for the former Soviet republic. It was negotiated by U.S., U.K., Russia and Ukraine – in conformity with the nuclear non-proliferation principle. The February 24 invasion of Ukraine by Moscow is, in several quarters, now being touted as tantamount to a violation of the sanctity of the Memorandum. This is a note of analysis and caution on this.

First, the Budapest Memorandum was negotiated and adopted within a specific context. The nuclear arsenal stationed in Ukraine, while the Soviet Union lasted, couldn’t have been seen, by any stretch of imagination, as belonging to Ukraine upon the collapse of the USSR. Rather, Russia was and remains, legally and strategically, the successor state to the defunct USSR, and thus the one country that could legitimately take possession of, and house such formidable nuclear forces. All the parties to the Bucharest Memorandum knew this. It was indeed the basis of the negotiations in the first instance. So, Ukraine was not doing Russia, or indeed anyone, a favour by turning over the bombs to Moscow. Its action was simply a recognition of the reality of the moment, defined as unequal power capabilities between and among the contending nations.

Secondly, while technically the Budapest Memorandum was supposed to guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty, even this was not without some caveats. None of the parties to the agreement would have expected Russia to keep clutching the Budapest Memorandum, when a new government in Ukraine – from the mid-2000s – set at some dangerous political manoeuvres, which Moscow kept decrying as constituting existential threat to its own national security. Meanwhile, there are precedents in contemporary diplomatic history of how countries of comparable power capability to Russia, dealt with similar security situations and challenges in the past. To expect Russia to stand akinbo and look on, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) steadily prosecuted its agenda for expansion into Ukraine, was unrealistic. And this is not necessarily a justification of the expanding scope of Russia’s extant military campaign in hapless Ukraine. It isn’t.

The foregoing has implications for Nigeria, as Africa’s largest country inches towards the election of a new president, early in 2023. It speaks to the dangers associated with investing inexperienced, mentally immobile, irascible individuals, and extremists, who lack the ability to think things through, with ultimate power. And a compass on this, there is, in the Bible, in Ecclesiastes 10: 16 – “Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child, and thy princes eat in the morning!”

Thirdly, what the Budapest Memorandum expressly guaranteed was the commitment of all parties to Ukraine’s aid, if after giving up the nuclear arsenal, it came under NUCLEAR attack. It wasn’t an open cheque of support, as it were – regardless of the circumstances – that the country got.

The bottomline in all of these is that President Zelensky of Ukraine has not demonstrated enough purchase on statecraft. The man didn’t come into office with the requisite cognate experience; and thus, he has conducted his country’s diplomatic engagements from a very dangerously unrealistic standpoint that has now thrown it into a mess. Even now, more than three weeks after the guns started booming, with the critical infrastructure of his country laid to waste, and the palpable but understandable reluctance of the U.S. and NATO to enter into direct armed confrontation with Russia, what Zelensky should seek, and very quickly too, is an end to this needless war, with a view to salvaging what remains of his country. Extant pretences on his part, with him decked in olive green vests, and seeking to cut the image of a victim-hero, are misguided. Even when he is being edged on by the West, and its powerful news media with their extensive global reach, the Ukrainian leader’s good sense should have led him to an incontrovertible truth: that he was leading his country on the path to destruction; in a manner not unlike what, in a different context, the much hated Saddam Hussein did, at least twice in his very tortuous and highly discredited career. Zelensky should, therefore, seek a quick way out of what, to all intents and purposes, is a quagmire, and save his proud and heroic people from extant trauma.

The foregoing has implications for Nigeria, as Africa’s largest country inches towards the election of a new president, early in 2023. It speaks to the dangers associated with investing inexperienced, mentally immobile, irascible individuals, and extremists, who lack the ability to think things through, with ultimate power. And a compass on this, there is, in the Bible, in Ecclesiastes 10: 16 – “Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child, and thy princes eat in the morning!”

Femi Mimiko, mni, is professor of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife; and a member of the National Institute. E-mail: femi.mimiko@gmail.com; Twitter: @FemiMimiko