Bomb explosion hits Gombe Church

The Police on Thursday confirmed a bomb explosion at the entrance of Tudun Wada ECWA Church, Gombe.

The spokesperson of the state Police Command, Fwaje Atajiri, said a suicide bomber rode on a motorcycle and tried to enter the church a few minutes after 8 a.m.

“He came with a motorcycle and tried to enter the place but as a result of the security measures put in place, he was blocked and the bomb exploded instantly and he was killed,” Mr. Atajiri said.

He called on the public to remain vigilant and also report any suspicious movement around them.

A witness, Aminu Muhammad, whose house is close to the church, said he was indoors when he heard a loud sound.

“When I heard the sound, I immediately came out, and what I saw was horrible,” he said. “I just saw human parts scattered everywhere with blood and pieces of motorcycle which the suicide bomber rode on.”

Abdullahi Isah, the Secretary, Gombe Specialist Hospital, said 10 injured persons were brought to the hospital.

According to him, the victims sustained various injuries and were undergoing treatment. He added that one of them was taken to the theatre for emergency operation. (NAN)


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  • Kay Soyemi (Esq.)

    Only a godless person would even contemplate that on the first day of the New Year.

    God will continue to thwart their efforts as He did with the other7.

    • Okey

      I will use the last blood in my veins to ensure that sharia is practiced all over Nigeria. After all, is it not muslim hands that will be cut? Now they have gone beyond cutting of hands to chopping off heads why should I be held responsible ? Please, continue whitewashing me as the messiah for the moment !

      • Kay Soyemi (Esq.)

        As you wish, @Okey.

      • Don'[MMXV]

        A very thought provoking post..should get all thinkers thinking…those who have the ability to scratch beneath the surface..

    • kamal Kamoru

      It doesn’t make them any more Godly if they contemplate it in the middle of the year..

      • Kay Soyemi (Esq.)

        Fair point, @Kamal.

        I agree with you, it doesn’t.


    This was how it all started.from UN few died to suleja Church few dead and some cadualties it ended with mass killing of people in the Mosque, Market, Garage. No matter the height of their cospiracy and what ever decoy they apply, they can never stop GODS plans and strategy.
    Why the innocent ones, what is their sin.
    They are helpless and voiceless, nobody cared to ask who and who is involved because they are children of nobody.
    But thank God, the nobody of today and the somebody of today will face the same God.
    Many Ferrors, Hitlers have come to pass this will come to pass the generation to come will write and read stories of us all.


    Nigerians and indeed citizens living in core Boko Haram proned-attack-states should continually be vigilant. The war against Boko Haram is not just for Governments, it involves everyone. Information gathering is key as a way to aid security intelligence.

    Everyone should be involved in security matters. Sooner than we think, Boko Haram will be history. May God help GEJ, our Military Authority and all Nigerians!

  • Moore-Coker

    Sorry people of Gombe, build up security for yourself because this government can and will not do it for you. Those killing your kindreds are Nigerian politicians – all of them.

  • obinnna77

    Don’t play fast and loose with historical facts. Ironsi had his lamentable failings, but bigotry wasn’t one of them. The bulk of the officer corps was Igbo then. 75% to be precise. Now, if they weren’t to be promoted, who would have been? The chairs in the officer’s mess?

    • Dele Awogbeoba

      For the record, neither OBJ nor Adekunle nor any of the officers that distinguished themselves during the war a year later were promoted during the promotion exercise commenced by Ironsi. Ironsi promoted mainly incompetent people mostly from his tribe but also promoted the incompetent Murtala Mohammed who was also a disaster as a commander of the 2nd Division. We know how the heads of the division fared when faced with mutiny just 6 months later. All ran post haste to the East in the boot of a car, roof of a train or disguised as a maigard.

      • obinnna77

        You obviously know nothing of promotions in the NA below the rank of Brig Gen. Promotions are done according to precedence on the roll. Now if 75% of the roll were from the East it stands to reason that they would comprise the bulk of the promotions. You have a healthy interest in the topic, though your analyses are somewhat laughable. I refer you to Omogui’s online archives. Happy reading. with an objective mind, mind you.

        • Dele Awogbeoba

          Quantity and quality are not the same. Name one person from the people promoted by Ironsi that distinguished themselves either in combating the July 1966 coup or in the actual theater of war between Nigeria and Biafra a year later? Promotions based on merit will shine through and promotions based on bigotry weakens the institution.

          • obinnna77

            I would say Mohammed Shuwa distinguished himself in handling the 1st Division, while Hilary Njoku made the best of a terrible situation as head of the Army, but I fear bias would not let you admit to this. Also try Max Siollun’s book.

          • Dele Awogbeoba

            Lets see, 22 people were promoted. Of the 22, you can only mention 2. Of the two you mentioned, one can be disputed out right and the other’s impact on the war was not as decisive as it should have been. We all know the actions of Hilary Njoku on 29 July 1966. Hardly inspiring. I believe Njoku was relieved of his command as head of Biafran forces very early on during the war and placed in detention. Not sure I would agree on that. I believe Shuwa’s division which was North of igbo land was closer to Uli and the place of Biafra’s eventual collapse than the 3rd Marine corp who had to fight from the sea in the South right into the heart of Igbo land. Shuwa’s division was a hesitant and slow division. It was slow and deliberate. It made baby steps throughout the war but won almost all battles it fought.

          • obinnna77

            Slow and steady does work. Compared to Murtala’s blustering squandering of his men’s lives. I’d say Njoku did a good job of reorganising the Biafra Army, pre Madiebo. Why do you hold July 66 against Njoku? Was he to have allowed himself to be killed by the Northern troops that came for Ironsi?

          • Dele Awogbeoba

            I was not comparing Shuwa with the incompetent and hot headed Murtala (another indictment of Ironsi’s promotion exercise). I was comparing Shuwa with Adekunle’s division in the South. Njoku’s posting was a military posting. Fajuyi’s posting was a political assignment. Njoku was sent by Ironsi to see and report on troop movements outside Govt house Ibadan on July 29 1966. He was shot at but still escaped. His job as an officer and a man supposedly loyal to his supreme commander was to organize Ironsi’s rescue once he had escaped. No actions in that regard were even attempted. His first actions was to disguise himself and get to the East in a boot of a car. Njoku was a coward and a disgrace to the uniform. He was also a let down to Ironsi in his time of need.

          • Remi

            Dear Mr Awogbeoba

            I do not think that your comments are fair to Col Njoku because:

            In the circumstance, the nearest
            place where he could have rallied troops to Maj. Gen. Ironsi’s defence was
            from the Fourth Battalion in Ibadan. A proposition that was virtually infeasible,
            at that time, given the unreliability and questionable loyalty, to Ironsi,
            of the largely northern troops of that battalion.

            The dark and ominous
            clouds that had hung over the barracks since the advent of the coup of
            January 15 1966, coupled with the long expectations of a northern revenge,
            made it difficult for Col Njoku to fall back to Lagos for support, as it
            was impossible to know who was on whose side in the confused atmosphere of
            a coup day. In any case, Lagos was at least two hours away, by which time
            valuable time would have been lost and the coupist would have accomplished
            their objective and dug in.

            Therefore, out-gunned, out-manned and surrounded in “enemy territory”,
            survivalist instincts left Col. Njoku with no option than to cut and run when he
            was attacked in Ibadan by the July 29 couppist. It would have been foolhardy for him to act

            Regarding Col. Njoku’s Biafran travails, it was because he
            strongly advised Ojukwu against the suicidal mission of fighting against a
            Nigerian Army, which was manifestly superior to the Biafran Army, in arms and
            manpower. You will recall that at secession, the Nigerian Army was about
            8000man -strong, against the 3000man -strong, Biafran Army; while the bulk of
            Nigeria’s military assets, before the secession, fell on the Nigerian side. As
            a professional, Brigadier Njoku gave his advice, and history has proved him

          • Dele Awogbeoba

            I am sure not even you will appreciate that excuse. Ibadan was out of the question because he was not the commanding officer there. Lagos was different. He was the commanding officer heading up Lagos brigade. Njoku is a soldier and his job is to act professionally and bravely in pursuit of his duties as commander of the Lagos Brigade. The key here is he did not even try to assume control of his own brigade. That is cowardice pure and simply. Soldiers get court marshaled for such conduct.

          • Remi

            Dear Mr Awogbeoba

            Thank you for your response to my comment. May I observe as

            Notwithstanding the conduct of our military to the contrary,
            coup making is not a military function. Whereas, in all military operations, an
            army acts as one body- there is espirit de corps, cohesion, loyalty, discipline and a clear line of
            command. However, none of these ingredients for the success
            of a military operation is guaranteed where an army is in rebellion (coup
            making). This is especially more so, when the rebellion is targeted against the
            leadership of the army. When, during a military operation, an officer leads his
            men in a frontal assault on an enemy position, one thing that he is 99 per cent
            sure of is that the bullet that will kill or incapacitate him will not come
            from behind him. But, in a coup situation, you cannot be sure of that. Discretion, they say, is the better part of
            valour. So, what you do in such confused situation is to lie low until you can
            ascertain who is on what side. For example, had Brigadier Maimalari been that
            discretionary, he would have probably been alive today, or would have at least
            lived to ripe old age and would not have been felled by the bullets of his
            brigade Major – Ifeajuna.

            While Col. Njoku’s posting may have been military, remember that
            he was part of a factionalised army that had technically been in rebellion, all
            along. Therefore, the proposition that Col. Njoku could have easily walked into
            his Brigade headquarters in Lagos, issue commands and get everyone marching to
            Ibadan, or wherever, is a farfetched one.

            Also, do not forget that for a Col. Njoku who had just
            barely escaped with his life in Ibadan of those days, Lagos, at that time was
            at least two hours away, assuming that he could immediately get transport to
            get him there. Assuming all was Okay at his brigade headquarters in Lagos when
            he got there, it would probably have taken him another four hours to mobilise
            his men and get back to Ibadan, by which time Ironsi would have been dead
            anyway. So, all of that effort to what avail? Gallantry and bravery, yes;
            however, foolhardiness is neither gallantry nor bravery.

            Had Ironsi been more discretionary himself, he would have
            avoided his fate. We now know that he was warned by his spooks against
            undertaking that national tour, but he overruled them. Exercising indiscretion first and then trying
            to valorise your way out of your indiscretion, is not a particularly wise idea.
            Col Njoku was just called in to solve what had already become an irretrievably bad
            situation. Hence, faced with a devil’s
            alternative, Col. Njoku simply chose the most pragmatic option.

  • Kickboxer

    aaahaaa….. another semi-literate YARIBA SLAVE using LIES & HALF-TRUTHS, like in the Western crisis of 1964-1966, to start crises while hoping that another tribe would INHERIT the crises once they get started.

    BACK TO SENDER…….KARMA is fast approaching YARIBA land like a roaring hurricane wind while they are busy pursuing rats…