DRCongo: Understanding the M23 insurgency and how to solve it

On 27 January, Rwanda-backed Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) forces took control of Goma, capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu province. The city’s capture and M23’s advances towards Bukavu in South Kivu mark a drastic escalation of the rebellion since peace talks collapsed under the Luanda and Nairobi processes – with devastating humanitarian and civilian consequences.

The East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) are prioritising the conflict. Leaders from the two regions will meet on 8 February in Dar es Salaam to discuss options for stabilising the region. Given the two blocs’ different approaches to eastern DRC, lessons from both processes must inform discussions.

Goma and Bukavu, eastern DRC

Under the African Union (AU)-backed Luanda Process, started in 2022, Rwandan President Paul Kagame was scheduled to meet DRC President Felix Tshisekedi in mid-December 2024 to sign a provisional peace agreement. But Mr Kagame cancelled because the DRC refused to include a commitment to dialogue with M23, since it (the DRC) sees the Luanda Process as strictly between states.

This development blocked earlier progress, when participants agreed that the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (FDLR) – a Hutu armed group operating in eastern DRC – would be neutralised in exchange for Rwanda lifting its ‘defensive measures’ (a mutually understood reference to Rwanda withdrawing from the area).

Led by the EAC, the Nairobi Process focuses on inter-Congolese hostilities. Its work has also been difficult, partly because the DRC considers several EAC countries, particularly Kenya, biased towards Rwanda.

These regional tensions, along with pressure on Mr Tshisekedi from the DRC electorate to show military results, led the Congolese government to push for the EAC regional force’s early withdrawal from eastern DRC. The force was deployed in November 2022 to help restore stability. It was replaced with the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC).

Despite their failures, all international and regional emergency summits on the crisis have called for renewed support for both processes. The EAC, SADC and AU also sought to harmonise regional approaches through a second AU Quadripartite Summit and a joint EAC-SADC summit.

Although there is broad support for regional efforts, significant differences in approach cannot be ignored. Several EAC countries consider a dialogue between Kinshasa and M23 as the only viable path forward, and they refrain from publicly referring to Rwanda’s involvement.

In contrast, SADC condemned M23’s recent attacks on SAMIDRC, called for Rwandan withdrawal, and reaffirmed support for the DRC. (It’s worth noting that the DRC is a member of both the EAC and SADC, while Rwanda is a member of the EAC.)

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SAMIDRC’s future is however now uncertain, with Malawi planning to withdraw its troops. Rwanda has criticised the mission for being an offensive force and for bringing ‘war to Rwanda.’ Tellingly, Mr Tshisekedi skipped the EAC extraordinary summit on 29 January, going instead to Angola (a SADC country) to deliberate with President João Lourenço.

Both regional efforts must adapt to the new realities of the M23 rebellion on the ground. These include its territorial expansion and connections to other armed groups, facilitated by the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). The alliance is led by former DRC electoral commission head Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo, whose national political agenda has incentivised other regional actors to engage with the AFC.

M23 is up against not only the Congolese army and foreign troops, but also a coalition of armed groups under the banner of ‘Wazalendo’ (patriots). Congolese government’s promises that they will be integrated into an army reserve force undermine the Nairobi Process’ demobilisation efforts and may fuel further armed mobilisation.

Peace talks must consider not only the FDLR, but also the broader military escalation in the east. This includes addressing the presence of thousands of Burundian soldiers deployed to fight M23 alongside the Congolese army and allied militias since 2023. Their deployment fuelled regional tensions with Rwanda, and several Burundian soldiers are believed to remain captured by M23.

Rwandan support to M23 has been decisive for the armed group’s expansion; it’s doubtful M23 could have conquered Goma without it. Regional actors – including in the EAC – should openly acknowledge this.

They should clearly signal to Rwanda that no humanitarian justifications or security concerns warrant this violence on the Congolese population or the blatant disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state. These are after all the foundational principles for regional and international frameworks.

Rwanda’s open reference to the arbitrariness of colonial borders as root causes for the conflict should be a matter of international concern. While it is important to address Rwanda’s humanitarian and security concerns, it must be recognised that the vulnerability of Congolese Tutsis, anti-Rwandan extremism and links between the DRC army and FDLR have been aggravated by both the M23 rebellion and nationalist Congolese demagoguery.

Kinshasa describes M23 as a ‘Rwandan puppet’, and Kigali calls the armed group a ‘domestic Congolese problem’ – but neither is completely true. M23 is both a Congolese movement and aligned with Rwandan interests. The group also faces internal differences and previously split into regional factions with competing loyalties.

M23’s original agenda is strongly connected to demands for the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees from mainly Rwanda to eastern DRC, and the integration of the movement’s members into the DRC state and army. But its agenda has evolved throughout its resurgence since the end of 2021, with M23 signalling its intent to provide an alternative to the Congolese state in the areas it controls.

Despite AFC leaders’ stated intentions to march to Kinshasa, most M23 commanders likely prioritise local agendas in North Kivu over national regime change.

Regional diplomacy must take into account these dynamics. Equally relevant is eastern DRC’s complex geopolitics between neighbouring countries, based on cross-border ethnic ties, economic and security motivations, and domestic political issues.

While regional diplomacy should support dialogue, it must also be pragmatic. Simply calling for the DRC to negotiate with M23 will likely fall on deaf ears and further frustrate Kinshasa. Discrete diplomacy with M23 via back-channel talks is the most realistic path, along with efforts to bring Rwanda and the DRC back to the table.

There are positive signs that diplomatic engagement can be renewed. First, on 3 February, M23 unilaterally announced a humanitarian ceasefire, possibly in anticipation of the EAC-SADC summit that Rwanda and DRC will attend. However, the group has since continued to move through South Kivu.

Second, National Assembly Speaker Vital Kamerhe has called for diplomatic restraint and asked to explore diplomatic resolutions to the crisis. And third, the EAC-SADC summit opens avenues for dialogue and revitalising the Nairobi Process to complement the Luanda Process.

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However, with M23 progressing towards Bukavu and Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye openly warning of a full-scale regional war, the two regional blocs should be realistic about expected outcomes of the joint summit.

Given the heightened tensions, immediate priorities are a ceasefire and opening supply routes to facilitate humanitarian access which could be monitored through the joint EAC-SADC initiative. Such decisions should be endorsed by the AU’s 15-16 February Peace and Security Council Heads of State meeting.

A single unified peace initiative could prevent Rwanda and the DRC from engaging in forum shopping as they have done with the Nairobi and Luanda processes – favouring mediators perceived to support their side.

Bram Verelst, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region and Nicodemus Minde, Researcher, East Africa Peace and Security Governance, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Nairobi

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).